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The goal of this thesis is to shed new light on tax compliance and tax administration in a
developing region of the world, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Domestic revenue mobilisation,
enshrined as one of the Sustainable Development Goals, has not reached its full potential in
the African Continent. The urgent need to collect more taxes, and, more importantly, in a
better way, in order to sustain development calls for evidence-based policy recommendations
on what works and what does not in the way revenue authorities in SSA enforce and
encourage tax compliance.
The central question motivating this thesis refers to how to foster tax compliance in a
context where, on one side of the equation, tax administrations are constrained, both in
terms of budget and of technical and staff capacity, and, on the other side, society’s will-
ingness to voluntary contribute is low. A sequence of relevant research questions naturally
arises: (i) How do taxpayers differ in terms of their filing behaviour and how relevant are
these compliance patterns in SSA? (ii) Which mix of economic and behavioural factors
more reasonably predicts the way in which SSA taxpayers declare their taxes? (iii) After
learning more about these factors, what can resource-strapped SSA tax administrations do
to leverage them in order to improve both tax attitudes and behaviour?
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1.1 Background
Why do taxation and tax administration matter for development? In the last
70 years, taxation has gradually become a fundamental pillar of how scholars model the
economic development process. Back in the early ’60s, this was probably very clear to
the economist Nicolas Kaldor who, exposed to the tax system of a developing country
(India), raised the question on why developing countries tax so little and whether they
will eventually “learn to tax” (Kaldor, 1963) – a question that still retain its relevance
today (Genschel and Seelkopf, 2016). He eventually argued that for a country to become
“developed” it needed to collect in taxes 25-30 percent of its GDP, a target of which, as
explained below, most SSA countries still remain short.
Since Kaldor, the international community reached unanimous agreement and full com-
mitment in supporting taxation in developing countries, while setting more achievable rev-
enue targets.1 Specific Sustainable Development Goals were set in development areas for
which public financing is critical, including ending poverty (SDG1) and hunger (SDG2),
improving health (SDG3) and education (SDG4), achieving gender equality (SDG5), re-
ducing inequality (SDG10), and enhancing infrastructure (SDGs 6, 7, 9, 11). Domestic
revenue mobilisation has therefore been championed as the main solution to fill the gaps
in available development finance.
Apart from the immediate link between increased tax revenues and more funds to devote
to structural development, there are other important reasons for which taxation matters
for development in SSA, which will be only sketched out in this section, but will emerge
as recurring themes throughout the thesis.
First of all, taxation is mostly about State-building, which in turn is crucial for devel-
opment. This governance argument is clearly outlined in Bird (2015), according to which
“the tax system constitutes one of the major interfaces between citizens and state in any
country so how taxes are administered may affect [...] public trust in government. Tax
administration may thus play a critical role not only in shaping economic development
1With the UN Millennium Project (2005), a less ambitious target was set according to which developing
countries needed to mobilise only an additional 4 percent of GDP in tax revenue beyond their current
average level of about 18 percent. However, very few countries (such as India) actually met that target.
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but in developing an effective state”. The tax system can play a key role in building and
strengthening the relationship between citizens and State, in a context, like SSA, for too
long associated with violence, crime, despotism and bad governance (Chabal and Daloz,
1999). By means of effective taxation, the State necessarily has to create robust public
organisations, supported by a clear legal framework and adequate bureaucratic capability
– accompanied by meritocratic hiring, higher professionalism, a less capricious enforcement
and judicial system. In so doing, the State becomes accountable for its actions to the eyes
of taxpayers, which in turn can raise their voice for better policy and take part in public
debates. This tax bargaining process eventually paves the way for the construction of a
fiscal social contract (Moore et al., 2018), in which taxpayers abide to the law and the
State is considered as legitimate, accountable, responsive (Prichard, 2015). Cross-country
descriptive evidence confirms this argument (Long and Miller, 2017).
As a second related point, taxation fundamentally relies on the coercive power of the
State and its ability to establish law and order. As shown in Besley and Persson (2013),
States with poor tax performance commonly fail to protect property rights effectively and
are characterised by higher informality. Properly implemented taxation could, on one side,
improve the functioning of financial markets and encourage formality and, on the other
side, change the way coercive power is imposed – no more enforced capriciously, but based
on the rule of law.
Third, better taxation has an intrinsic economic value in the way it reduces distortions
in the economy between different categories of firms, which in turn reverberates on overall
economic efficiency, societal fairness and structural growth. In this sense, reliance on
income taxes is encouraged, since they are perceived to be fairer and more effective in
achieving redistributive goals. Income taxes are also instrumental in improving a State
overall fiscal apparatus, as they require an efficient tax administration, a smart enforcement
strategy, a clever use of data. The reliance of a tax system on a progressive income tax is
directly correlated with State tax capacity (Keen, 2012).
Lastly, developing countries seeking to collect their own revenue would ultimately de-
pend less on international aid and donors – with the caveat that the effect of aid on tax
effort is complex and not always obviously negative (Prichard et al., 2012). A decrease
in aid-dependence translates into more control of a State’s political agenda and increased
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accountability towards the citizens. The overall aid-related debate and donors’ agenda
would inevitably shift on different, probably more constructive, priorities.
Given the importance of taxation in a developing context, it is no surprise that increas-
ing investment has been directed to reforming tax administrations. As a matter of fact, the
ideal tax policy or reform is inevitably bounded by what can be implemented in practice.2
This is truer in developing countries: as Casanegra de Jantscher (1990) famously put it,
“in developing countries, tax administration is tax policy”, meaning that what actually
happens in terms of revenue collected depends as much on how the tax code is admin-
istered as on the provisions in the code itself (Keen, 2012). In light of the benefits that
effective taxation can bring to developing countries outlined above, the very same benefits
are likely to vanish if the way in which a tax system is administered is not fair, professional,
transparent and predictable.
While fiscal capacity in developed countries enabled a series of tax improvements and
instruments that facilitated raising revenue – such as withholding, third-party reporting or
a complex-to-administer tax as the VAT (Pirttilä, 2017) –, SSA is still undergoing a period
of transition (Moore et al., 2018). While there is no one-size fits all solution to the funda-
mental question on how to best reform tax administrations in such a diverse and complex
environment as the African continent, some key ingredients are quite unanimously thought
to be needed to modernise tax authorities in SSA. Apart from the political will and clear
reform strategy which are at the linchpins of any structural transformation (Bird, 2015),
more practical points, which will also be discussed throughout the thesis, are the follow-
ing: (i) the simplification of procedures, regulations and practices (ii) a service-oriented
approach in which the taxpayer is seen as client and not as a potential criminal (iii) the
institutional reorganisation in order to work more independently and cost-effectively (iv)
digitalisation, conceived as an opportunity to fundamentally rethink systems and proce-
dures. This thesis attempts to provide scientific evidence on how effectively tax authorities
could pursue these solutions.
Tax collection in Africa When starting to consider taxation and development in Africa,
a first practical question one has to answer is: how is SSA performing in terms of revenue
2As Bird et al. (2008) observe, “the best tax policy in the world is worth little if it cannot be implemented
effectively”.
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collection? The immediate reaction to this question is one of dismay. If one considers the
tax raised over a country’s GDP – usually called the tax take – as an indicator for fiscal
performance, SSA raises about 15% of its GDP in tax revenues (ICTD/UNU-WIDER,
2020). This ratio is remarkably low when compared to the OECD economies and still
short of the revenue target imposed by the SDG agenda. According to IMF (2019), SSA
will need additional resources amounting to 19% of GDP to finance the SDGs by 2030. On
top of that, the trend over time has been stable, with the SSA tax-to-GDP ratio rising by
only 2 to 3 percentage points of GDP in the past two decades (Akitoby et al., 2019). Figure
1.1 displays the trend over time of the tax rate in SSA as compared to the OECD. It also
displays the tax performance of the two countries under study (Rwanda and Eswatini), as
well as of South Africa, which is clearly an outlier in the continent.
Figure 1.1: Tax revenue as a share of GDP, 1995 to 2017
Source: Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2018) from Our World in Data
In reality, the situation is not as bleak as one may tend to think. First of all, while
SSA scores poorly when compared to the OECD group, SSA tax agencies perform almost
as well as their counterparts in the much wealthier environment of Latin America, and
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quite better than in South Asia (Moore et al., 2018). Second, contrary to general wisdom,
SSA would perform relatively well when taking into account a different, less popular and
documented, indicator of fiscal performance, the “tax effort” – the ratio between the actual
revenues that a government collects and the potential one given the structure and features
of the economy.3 Thirdly and more importantly for this thesis, reliance on income taxes
in SSA – a measure of tax performance, also indicating, as stated above, the equity and
sophistication of a tax system – is reasonably high: in SSA, 31% of tax revenues are from
direct taxes, compared to 35% in East Asia and Pacific region; 30% in Latin America;
25% in South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. In SSA, income tax usually
represents the second largest contributor – after VAT – to tax revenue (ATAF, 2017).
In sum, the overall picture of tax collection in SSA is much more nuanced than one
would generally expect, especially in light of the abundant scholarship studying how poor
State capacity and governance (of whom taxation is a core function) are in the continent
(Bayart, 1993; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The reality is different: since the 1990s, SSA
countries are entering a tax transition process or a new tax era (Moore et al., 2018), in
which modernisation of tax administration is key, and reached a point in which tax (or a
mix of taxes) is the dominant source of public revenue, as it happens in the rest of the
world. As stated in Moore et al. (2018), the core policy issue, for both donors and SSA
policymakers, is not only about raising more taxes, but also about addressing the “current
challenges around who pays taxes, how they are collected, and how governments use the
revenue.” If the SGDs cannot be financed adequately is still because SSA has not yet
untapped the full potential of its tax system (Long and Miller, 2017). There exist several
margins of improvements that would, at least partially, solve the factors which are still
hampering tax performance. These factors can be summarised as:
1. Informality, which is not captured by taxpayer records and totally out of the legal
tax system, is still rampant in the continent. According to Schneider and Medina
(2018), the shadow economy amounted to about 40% of SSA’s GDP in 1991-2015,
compared to just 17% of OECD countries’ GDP.4 The existence of a ghost, informal
3According to the IMF (2011), the average tax effort for the 14 SSA (mostly anglophone) countries in the
sample, excluding South Africa, was 75%. By contrast, the average for 6 Latin American countries was
59%, and for 4 South Asian countries it was 51%.
4Only Latin America has similar extent of informality over the period, 39%, while other regions in the
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economy generates a number of horizontal inequalities and economic distortions that
eventually undermine tax perceptions and the moral fibre of a society as whole.5 In
tax terms, income taxes are the most likely tax types to be underperforming due
to informality. This aspect makes informality an ever bigger challenge to domestic
revenue mobilisation, since income tax represents a large share of the revenue pot
in SSA. Relatedly, most harm to revenue is produced not by micro-enterprises, such
as street vendors, who operate out of government regulations, but rather from tax-
minimising schemes of professionals and high-net worth individuals (doctors, lawyers,
architects, etc.) which are equally hard-to-tax but determine much larger revenue
losses and damage to the fairness of the tax system (Keen, 2012; Kangave et al., 2016).
From a redistributive point of view, informality also severely undermines the validity
of the optimal income tax approach for redistributive policies (Mirrlees, 1971) – so
far widely adopted in developed countries –, as illustrated in Kanbur et al. (2018).
2. Despite the continued efforts of SSA tax authorities in registering income-generating
activities, compliance of formal taxpayers is far from being optimal, as the following
can be observed: (i) non-filers, i.e. taxpayers who are liable to file a return but
systematically fail to do so, are widespread both in SSA6 and in the countries under
study – in Rwanda, over three-fourths of individuals supposed to file for the fiscal year
2018 failed to do so, with about half of companies doing the same, while the last 6
years average non-filing rate in Eswatini is 57% for individuals and 43% for companies
(Chapter 2 and 3); (ii) nil-filers, i.e. taxpayers filing nil tax returns (zero turnover,
taxable income and tax liability) are common as well7 – in Rwanda (2013-2018), 53%
world fare better (South Asia 34%, East Asia and MENA 25%, Europe 22%).
5For a review on this topic, see Joshi et al. (2012)
6In Uganda, the average rate of Personal Income Tax (PIT) non-filing is 86% over the pe-
riod 2014-2018. In Malawi, almost 50% of income taxpayers have filed no tax return and/or
made no tax payment over the period 2014-2016 (Ligomeka, 2019a). Additional descriptive
evidence from Kenya shows that out of the over nine million registered taxpayers, only 3.5
million filed their 2018 returns (see https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/lifestyle/profiles/
what-to-expect-file-nil-return/4258438-5232858-oiqmom/index.html, accessed on June 10, 2020.)
Lastly, Moore (2020) notes, non-filing rates in Nigeria are exceptionally high: 98% for PIT; 94% for
Corporate Income Tax (CIT); and 95% for Value-Added Tax (VAT).
7In Ethiopia, about 23% of CIT returns filed in 2006/2013 are from nil-filers (Mascagni and Mengistu, 2016).
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and 19% of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) and Personal Income Tax (PIT) returns
are nil, while in Eswatini the corresponding figures are 29.5% and 26% (Chapter 2
and 4); (iii) imperfect compliance takes place also within active taxpayers, i.e. those
reporting positive tax liabilities, but who are able to minimise their tax due either
through avoidance or blatant evasion (Chapter 3 and 4).
3. Although SSA revenue authorities experienced important structural reorganisations
and modernisation in their processes, mostly spurred by tax reforms initially mo-
tivated by external actors, the average enforcement capacity is still low (Chapter
2, 3 and 4) due to insufficient investment in specialised skills, qualified personnel,
customer relations, ICT, research and data matching – such as use of third-party
reporting to detect evasion (Pirttilä, 2017).8
4. Taxpayers’ morale and willingness to pay is remarkably low (Chapter 3), especially
when compared to outliers such as Nordic countries (Pirttilä, 2017). Afrobarometer
surveys provide insightful evidence on how African taxpayers see the tax system they
live in. Factors such as distrust towards a corrupt, rent-taking State (Bratton and
Gyimah-Boadi, 2016; Isbell, 2017), dissatisfaction with how tax revenues are spent,
so that citizens cannot realise the benefits derived from tax payments (Blimpo et al.,
2018), perceived unfairness of the tax system (D’Arcy, 2011) and the complexity
in navigating often obscure tax regulations (Aiko and Logan, 2014) all concur in
affecting tax morale, which in turn is likely to deter compliance.
5. More macroeconomic factors are at play as well (Besley and Persson, 2014), which are
however beyond the scope of this thesis: (i) the particular structure of the economy
– less urbanised, marketised and wealthy, more reliant on hard-to-track agricultural
activities and with a lower international trade to GDP ratio; (ii) reliance on easy-
to-tax natural resources, especially oil and minerals, where taxation can use royalty
Likewise, in Uganda 27% of PIT returns are nil over the period 2013-2018 and, according to Almunia et al.
(2017), 15% of VAT returns in 2012-2015 are nil.
8Related to the last point, revenue authorities are undergoing a process of digitalisation for which coherent
evidence is still missing. This thesis attempts to contribute to this point by providing convincing evidence
on the benefits of systematic data analysis on the massive amounts of administrative data produced daily
within revenue auhorities.
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payments which act as a substitute for direct taxation; (iii) reliance on external
aid, which also substitutes for internally generated tax revenue; (iv) the political
economy of most SSA countries, in which vested interested of wealthy individuals
and companies are lobbied by politically influential groups and more equitable tax
reforms are harder to implement. On top of that, Governments use their ability
to grant tax exemptions as a direct instrument of rule and political support, while
democratic negotiation and collective action are undermined (Moore et al., 2018).
For the sake of this thesis, point 5 above is out of the scope of my work, while point
1 is touched only tangentially. Points 2, 3 and 4 are directly addressed. More specifically,
the next subsection will deal with the behavioural drivers of compliance (point 4) more in
depth. While this paragraph focused on tax administrations, the next one will provide a
more thorough discussion on the other side of the compliance equation – the taxpayers.
Why do African taxpayers comply? A behavioural solution Against the back-
ground delineated above, it is crucial to understand why African taxpayers choose to comply
with or escape from tax obligations. It is also worth stressing that tax compliance deci-
sions of income taxpayers are particularly interesting from both a theoretical and practical
point of view, since tax evasion from these agents is particularly difficult to uncover given
that this group has a higher economic incentive to underreport income to reduce their tax
liabilities (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Sandmo, 2005). The
challenge of taxing income is even more exacerbated in a context of low tax capacity as in
SSA.
The theoretical formulations produced in the literature provide a robust framework in
which to conceive the taxpayer’s decision. Two broad branches are usually referred to. On
the one hand, the neoclassical theory of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) formulates that
taxpayers are self-controlled, fully rational, utility-maximising agents and, therefore, all
potential evaders. As in a gamble, taxpayers compare the benefits from evading (lower
tax paid) with the potential costs (the probability of getting caught and punished). Only
pecuniary motives are at play: tax rates, audit probabilities and fines.
On the other hand, the neoclassical model soon appeared insufficient to explain the
complexity of the taxpayer decision-making process. The model could not justify the
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observed rates of compliance, except by using unacceptably high measures of risk aversion
(Clotfelter, 1983; Andreoni et al., 1998). Given that more taxpayers comply than what
predicted by the theory, scholars incorporated in the model a range of new, non-pecuniary
factors in order to explain the observed behaviour. At least two sets of non-pecuniary
factors are explored in this thesis and described in detail in Chapter 2 and 3:9 (i) the
complexity of navigating the tax system, a broad concept that encompasses compliance
costs and tax knowledge, (ii) behavioural motives that usually go under the umbrella term
of tax morale (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014) and include perceptions on the fairness of the tax
system, a reciprocity mechanism through which taxpayers pay taxes if they get something
in return, intrinsic attitudes to comply, the effect of peers’ behaviour and descriptive norms
around compliance, perceptions on State legitimacy and trust towards the authority, etc.
Only recently the main behavioural formulations have been embedded in a conceptual
framework to understand tax compliance (Prichard et al., 2019), which however needs to be
tested more coherently in the field, as this thesis attempts to do. The framework encourages
revenue authorities in low-income countries to pursue a multi-pronged approach to foster
compliance, consisting of three main paradigms: (i) the enforcement paradigm, which
directly links to the neoclassical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), (ii) a facilitation
paradigm – as in Alm (2012) – in which communication, simplification, assistance, tax
education and facilitation are offered to the taxpayer-client, (iii) a trust paradigm, in
which non-pecuniary, soft, factors such as professionalism, trustworthiness, transparency,
wise use of revenue, rewards for honesty and social norms are all leveraged by tax agencies
in order to encourage voluntary compliance.
This thesis contributes to the main gap in knowledge according to which very little is
known about why African taxpayers remit their taxes. The majority of existing studies are
descriptive in nature, focus on survey data only and are not backed by administrative data.
Therefore, the correlational and causal evidence produced in this thesis is relevant to both
scholars and SSA tax administrators. For what concerns the latter, this thesis confirms
the adoption of a multi-faceted strategy, as suggested in Prichard et al. (2019), in which
the behavioural solution plays a greater role. In addition to the traditional enforcement
9Additional, more theoretical, factors pertain to deviations from utility maximisation and non-standard
preferences, thus affecting how the modelling problem is set up. These factors are only briefly mentioned
in Chapter 2 and are out of the scope of this study.
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paradigm, this thesis makes the argument in favor of the role of both facilitation and trust
in understanding compliance.
1.2 Approach
Working with local tax authorities This thesis would not have been conceivable
without the support of the revenue authorities in Rwanda and Eswatini, as the only way
this research could be carried out has been through the joint work with tax administrators.
The three chapters presented in this dissertation take part to the recently inaugurated
wave of the public finance literature which builds on close research collaborations between
economists and tax administrators from the South. This new wave of tax research pro-
duced a remarkably insightful evidence based on a wealth of new, previously inaccessible,
administrative data. It also carried innovative and more ambitious research questions who
advanced the current debate on tax and development.
Throughout my work in Rwanda and Eswatini, the collaboration followed a similar
path in both countries, which largely resembles the process described in Pomeranz and
Vila-Belda (2019). After getting institutional buy-in and establishing a formal relation-
ship,10 I devoted much effort in running exploratory, qualitative analysis and piloting the
intervention. This preliminary work greatly improved my understanding of the context
and generated mutual trust with my partners.11
A following important phase consisted in accessing a large number of administrative
10High-level commitment is officially reached through the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween the partnering revenue authorities and the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD),
for which I work. The MoU signing undoubtedly helps in formalising the research collaboration and align-
ing the (apparently divergent) partners’ interests over a long-term period. In most cases, the primary
goal of revenue authorities is revenue maximisation. This goes often in conflict with the broader research
perspective. As shown in Chapter 2 and 4, both the tax trainings in Rwanda and tax nudges to non-filers
in Eswatini significantly improved the likelihood to file a return, a meaningful result per se in a context
where non-filing is the norm, while had no direct impact on revenue generation.
11This also helped sensitising my partners on the value of research and pave the way for the introduction
of more sophisticated design aspects, such as the implementation of an RCT, which can be seen with
suspicion and resistance by tax administrators.
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data, signing a legal agreement with the authority and understanding the content of many
different datasets. In this phase, multiple iterations with local officials are needed, usually
travelling to the partner country, since tax officials have deep knowledge of the meaning
of each tax return item. Extracting clear knowledge and insights for interpretation from
often obscure raw administrative data is a key component of the plumber approach for
development economists, as outlined by Duflo (2017).
Subsequently, the most delicate phase probably consists in designing an effective exper-
iment by trading-off a high level of flexibility – in order to meet the partners’ expectations
– with the need of implementing a robust and clean project, in which causal effects can
be measured. Repeated inputs and feedback from both senior and junior staff are incorpo-
rated in the final design. If the project has been designed carefully, the implementation of
it is likely to proceed as planned, even if inconveniences are likely to raise anytime. After
the project has been implemented, it is the role of the researcher to produce results using
the most advanced econometric tools.
As a last step, which is still ongoing in this case, it is crucial to communicate the
research findings to the main stakeholders, with the ultimate goal of leading government
partners to policy changes.
This thesis makes an argument in favor of setting up research relationships with lo-
cal partners in Africa. As a key outcome of this approach, this type of collaboration often
translates into fruitful, mutual learning. On one side, international researchers build capac-
ity of local tax officials, who have often little time to devote to research, with the hope that
they will eventually end up owning the research output.12 On the other side, economists
are introduced by tax officials to the peculiarities of the local reality they intend to study.
Administrative and survey data As repeatedly emphasised throughout the disserta-
tion, measuring tax compliance is not an easy task. In the innovative attempt to accurately
capturing tax evasion, the approach adopted in this thesis consists in combining quanti-
tative and qualitative methods, with the overarching idea of reaping the benefits of both
administrative and survey data, while controlling for the potential pitfalls in each of them.
On the one side, all three chapters of this thesis rely heavily on a wealth of de-identified
12A key challenge is represented by teaching often sophisticated data analysis and econometrics to staff
from tax authorities, since it would then be hardly applied in their everyday job.
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tax records shared by the partnering agency. Administrative data is produced on a daily
basis and in massive amounts, often difficult to manage even by the collectors (the revenue
authorities) themselves. At this level, the collaboration with data experts and economists
offers remarkable synergies and opportunities for mutual learning. This data comes from
all different types of sources, from companies filing their income tax return to VAT pay-
ers, from border trade posts to employers remitting PAYE on behalf of their employees.
Even if this data is gathered for administrative and enforcement purposes, it provides ex-
ceptional opportunities for research and has gained momentum in the last decade. Most
importantly, revenue authorities from the South, and SSA in particular, began to share
their tax records with international researchers, spurring a new wave of tax studies in the
Continent (Mascagni et al., 2016), to which this thesis aims to contribute.
On the other side, survey data produces extremely valuable information on certain
features, such as tax attitudes and perceptions, which cannot be captured otherwise. The
contribution of this thesis stands in the attempt to merge survey data with tax records
by the use of unique identifiers. In so doing, I am able to observe both a taxpayer’s filing
history from tax records and a range of background information that are likely to explain
that particular filing decision. This synergistic combination of different data sources takes
place in Chapter 2 studying the tax trainings in Rwanda (see section 1.4), where survey data
provides insights on the mechanisms likely to explain the observed compliance outcomes
after the training, as well as in Chapter 3, where non-filers and active taxpayers in Eswatini,
as extracted from official tax records, are explored through the analysis of detailed survey
data. Lastly, in Chapter 4, the same survey data collected in Chapter 3 serves the purpose
to shed more light on the impacts of a nudge experiment.
Both sources of data presents important drawbacks which are discussed at length in
Chapter 3.13 It is notoriously difficult to capture tax evasion from surveys (Pirttilä and
Tarp, 2019) and scholars, as well as international organisations, have used more or less
justifiable proxies for identifying compliant taxpayers. However, as elaborated more in
detail in Chapter 3, these measures are rarely satisfactory. On the other hand, it is also
true that administrative data do not capture the informal, not registered, economy and
13Relatedly, in that Chapter, I am able to show how divergent self-reported measure of compliance can be
when compared with actual filing status from official records.
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report only the taxable income that registered taxpayers decide to disclose. Despite these
limitations, this thesis points towards a strengthened reliance on this type of data. As
a supporting example, the following chapters show that registered, formal taxpayers who
systematically fail to file (non-filers) show a profile – in terms of business practices, record-
keeping, IT sophistication, tax awareness, etc. – which is more similar to small, subsistence-
level informal entities than to active taxpayers, suggesting that researchers can learn about
this type of informality indirectly through the study of chronic non-filers.14 At the same
time, another supporting argument is given by the fact that taxable income itself – as
derived from administrative data –, even though self-declared, is a key outcome per se
that can be shaped through different strategies and respond to a full-house of motivations
whose understanding is at the core of most tax evasion research.
In conclusion, there is much to learn from this mix of quantitative and qualitative
methods. The approach I follow in this study is ultimately motivated by the desire to
produce evidence-based policy recommendations to enhance domestic revenue mobilisation
from revenue authorities in SSA. To this aim, the evidence here produced necessarily had
to be extracted from and shed light on the local realities of taxation in the countries under
study, which are outlined next.
1.3 Rwanda and Eswatini
The choice of Rwanda (a low income country, ranking 167th in the world for GDP per
capita in 201915) and Eswatini (a lower-middle income country, 118th) as case studies has
been motivated by a number of reasons.
First, strategically, the two countries became partner of the International Centre for
Tax and Development (ICTD) in 2015 (Rwanda) and 2018 (Eswatini) after repeated infor-
mal consultations and meetings with the revenue authorities’ senior management. Second
14In this particular case, by informals I refer to small, often subsistence-level, income-generating activities
while I exclude professionals and other high-net worth individuals, who are equally likely to trade outside
of the legal tax system.
15See World Bank webpage https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?most_recent_
value_desc=true - accessed on August 14, 2020.
28
and relatedly, the two countries enjoy the service of two professional, service-oriented and
modern revenue authorities, with whom the process of doing research has evolved smoothly
and stimulatingly. Third, the two countries are similar in size and geography – they are
both landlocked – even if Rwanda has a ten times larger population. The fact that the
countries are small in size significantly facilitated doing research in the field.
Apart from these broad similarities, the two countries also share some common features
of the tax system, which relies mostly on non-oil tax revenues. Above all, the trend of the
tax revenues over GDP is similar, with the tax/GDP ratio hovering around 15 per cent
in both countries (Table 1.1 below). While Rwanda’s ratio is line with the East Africa
average, Eswatini’s is quite lower than the Southern Africa average, indicating more severe
challenges with revenue mobilisation.16
As a second point in common, income taxes, the focus of this thesis, represent about 40
per cent and 35 per cent of Rwanda and Eswatini total tax revenue (ICTD/UNU-WIDER,
2020), hence their policy relevance in both countries. Despite being important in relation
to total revenue, the share of income taxes over GDP is still low in both countries – and in
Africa as a whole. Rwanda and Eswatini collect about 7-8 per cent of GDP in income tax,
which is much lower than how the Continent outlier South Africa and OECD countries
perform, as shown in Figure 1.2.
Thirdly and relatedly, similar alarming patterns of compliance with income taxes can be
found in both countries. The extent of non-filers is widespread, often being the majority
in Rwanda and Eswatini (and other SSA countries as well) and also nil-filers are quite
common, as highlighted in section 1.1 and explained in detail throughout the thesis. Lastly
and explaining the low take of income taxes, the informal sector is widespread in both
economies and stands at about 36-40 per cent of national income (Schneider and Medina,
2018).17
Apart from these broad similarities, the institutional context of the two countries is
quite different. Country indicators are reported in Table 1.1 below, which is also discussed
16While Rwanda is booming in terms of economic growth (10 per cent in 2019), Eswatini projected growth
stands well below, at 1.3 per cent for 2019. About 40 per cent of the population in both countries live
under the international $1.90 poverty line.
17As with the tax/GDP ratio, while Rwanda is in line with the regional average, informality in Eswatini is
much higher than in the corresponding region.
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Figure 1.2: Tax on incomes of individuals and corporations as a share of GDP, 1995 to 2016
Source: Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2018) from Our World in Data
at length in Chapter 3. In a nutshell, Table 1.1 indicates that Eswatini scores worse
in terms of most governance indicators. The Corruption Perception Index, which ranks
countries based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be by experts
and business executives, is lower in Eswatini than in Rwanda, meaning a higher perceived
corruption in the former than the latter. In contrast, Rwanda’s public sector is perceived to
be much more transparent than the East African average. Consistently, Eswatini performs
worse than Rwanda in terms of the World Bank Governance indicators and the Index of
Economic Freedom. This reflects a situation in which institutions in Eswatini are perceived
to be less effective, reliable and accountable. This divergence will resonate in the survey
findings extracted from both countries in Chapter 2 and 3 – while perceptions of government
authority, fairness of the tax system and satisfaction with public services are extremely high
in Rwanda, there is much more discontent and mistrust in Eswatini. Lastly, Rwanda ranks
higher in terms of the WB Doing Business indicators, which also includes proxies for the
compliance costs of firms, a concept that will be explored at length in Chapter 2 and
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3. Relevantly for this study, while Rwanda ranks 38th in the world for the ease of doing
business, Eswatini is 122nd; when considering the ease of paying taxes, however, Eswatini
fares slightly better (77th) but still below Rwanda (38th), which is also the second best
rating in SSA, following Mauritius.
In sum, the two countries represent a unique scenario – both in terms of successful
collaboration with the tax agency as well as for the institutional background and compliance
patterns they feature – to gain a deeper knowledge of the role of taxation in a developing
context. More detailed information on the two contexts will be provided in the main
Chapters.
1.4 A bird’s eye view of the thesis
This thesis is composed of three Chapters, from 2 to 4, while Chapter 5 highlights some
conclusive arguments and directions for future research. The dissertation begins in Chap-
ter 2 with the impact evaluation of a tax training program implemented by the Rwanda
Revenue Authority, which aims at improving the knowledge of the tax system of newly
registered income taxpayers. This chapter represents a longer, more elaborated version of
the working paper published with the ICTD (Mascagni et al., 2019) and is a joint work with
Giulia Mascagni (ICTD) and the RRA research team. The main research question I aim to
address is whether and how the provision of tax education shapes tax compliance, as well
as tax knowledge and perceptions. This work contributes to the literature in different ways.
First, to the best of my knowledge, it represents the first study of its type exploring the
link between tax education and tax compliance in a low-income country (Rwanda). The
evidence on this link is limited and exclusively deriving from high-income countries (Chetty
and Saez, 2013). Second, this study combines pre- and post-training survey data of 1,000
taxpayers with tax returns records. As discussed in section 1.2, this approach enables tax
researchers to overcome most of the shortcomings of both survey and admin data. Third,
this study contributes to the current understanding of tax compliance by considering its
multi-dimensionality and, in the same vein, it implements a quite detailed survey module
on tax knowledge. The results show that taxpayer education significantly increases the
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Table 1.1: Governance and country indicators - Eswatini vs Rwanda
Eswatini Southern Africa Rwanda East Africa Year
Tax to GDP ratioa 14.7% 22.3% 15.3% 13.8% 2018
Tax revenue per capita (USD)a 444 949 106 112 2018
Informality (% national income)b 40.1 32.3 36.3 40.3 2005-2015
CPIc 39 47 55 33 2017
Governance indicatorsd
Control of corruption -0.44 0.18 0.69 -0.59 2016
Rule of law -0.32 0.10 0.07 -0.50 2016
Regulatory quality -0.58 -0.07 0.11 -0.33 2016
Government effectiveness -0.56 -0.08 0.11 -0.54 2016
Political stability -0.49 0.19 -0.05 -0.592 2016
Voice and accountability -1.42 0.06 -1.21 -0.75 2016
Index of economic freedome 55.9 60.2 69.1 59.3 2018
Tax burden 74.8 64.9 75.8 75.6 2018
Government integrity 27 41.4 61.2 35 2018
Judicial effectiveness 35.3 52.6 79.6 44.1 2018
Business freedom 61.1 63.2 81.2 51.8 2018
Doing business indicatorf 59.5 62.3 76.5 59.3 2018
Starting a business 77.2 79 93.2 81.6 2018
Registering property 60.8 57 93.7 63.1 2018
Paying taxes 77.1 76.2 84.6 69 2018
Bank account ownershiph 29% 42% 38% 39.5% 2017
Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Eswatini.
East Africa: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.
a Annual Reports of the SRA/RRA
b Schneider and Medina (2018)
c Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Range: 0-100.
d World Bank (2017). Range: -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).
e The Heritage Foundation. Range: 0-100.
f World Bank (2018). Range: 0-100.
h Global Findex (2017). Adults (+15 yo) in labor force. Burundi excluded.
filing probability of attendees, in a context where non-filers with income tax are the norm,
as outlined in section 1.1. The most plausible mechanism consists in the improvement of
tax knowledge and perceptions of complexity, while other perceptions and attitudes are
not affected. In sum, this study makes the argument for a more pronounced focus on
taxpayer education as a key driver of compliance, especially so in a continent where most
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tax authorities are increasingly implementing a variety of taxpayer educational initiatives
(Mascagni and Santoro, 2018).
Chapter 3 focusses on Eswatini and attempts to shed light on the often neglected be-
haviour of tax non-filing. By surveying a representative sample of one thousand sole traders
registered for personal income tax, evenly split in non-filers and active filers, this study tries
to understand which are the behavioural drivers of tax filing. The modus operandi mirrors
the one adopted in Rwanda. First, this paper stems from a close research collaboration
with the Eswatini Revenue Authority (SRA). Second, it merges survey data with the filing
history (2013-2018) of the sample, as derived from income tax records, and gives particular
attention to a mistakenly under-researched aspect, i.e. a taxpayer’s past filing behaviour –
by creating the category of perpetual non-filers. Third and relatedly, it contributes to the
current knowledge on how to measure tax compliance by comparing self-reported measure
of compliance with actual filing behaviour. Lastly, it tests a range of theoretically driven
explanation for compliance, ranging from neoclassical to more behavioural formulations.
Results show that economic deterrence, compliance costs and moral factors are strongly
correlated with actual filing, supporting the framework of Prichard et al. (2019). At the
same time, drivers of actual compliance are quite divergent from those correlated with
self-reported willingness to pay. Consistently with what found in chapter 2, this study as
well argues that tax knowledge plays a major role in explaining the decision to file.
Lastly, the thesis ends with Chapter 4, always set in Eswatini. In collaboration with
the SRA and the national post office, this study implements a nation-wide randomised
controlled trial nudging more than 20,000 income taxpayers with behaviourally-informed
mailings. Following the same broad rationale as Chapter 3, this study attempts to answer
the relevant questions on which are the drivers of African taxpayers’ compliance and how
can these be leveraged by resource-constrained tax authorities. While the tax nudges
literature has boomed in HICs and Latin America, only a handful of studies can be found in
SSA (Shimeles et al., 2017; Mascagni et al., 2017, 2020). At least three main contributions
can be identified. First, following the economists as plumbers approach of Duflo (2017),
this study builds on the research partnership with local policymakers to evaluate actual
policies and highlights margins for policy improvement that diverge from textbook models
of tax compliance. Second, thanks to the wealth of administrative data provided by the
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SRA, this study is the first of its kind in targeting three different categories of taxpayers
at the same time – non-filers, nil-filers and active (section 1.1) – while most of the existing
literature focusses on positive filers. Relevantly, I tailor the content of letters to be specific
to each taxpayer category. Third, I am able to target both companies and individuals
and explore heterogeneity of results along a number of dimensions, including past filing
behaviour. I find that non-filers significantly respond to the nudges, while nil and active
filers do not. The best performing nudges build on the deterrence and taxpayer-assistance
paradigms (Prichard et al., 2019). Also, perverse responses from large companies are found.
With the causal evidence produced, I am able to produce policy recommendations on how
to best target the multidimensional ecosystem of income taxpayers.
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Chapter 2
Teach to Comply? An
Experimental Evaluation of a
Taxpayer Education Program in
Rwanda
Abstract
The role of taxpayer education in improving tax compliance has been largely unexplored
in the literature. This paper starts filling this gap by providing the first ever rigorous
evaluation of the effectiveness of taxpayer education on knowledge, perceptions, and com-
pliance. The study is an impact evaluation of the Taxpayer Training Programme run by
the Rwanda Revenue Authority and targeting newly registered taxpayers. The analysis
is based on a unique dataset that combines administrative and survey data. I show that
taxpayer education results in significant and large increases in knowledge, which starts
from a very low level at baseline. I also show that the program contributes to improving
compliance behaviour. The results show that training new taxpayers helps bringing them
into the habit of filing tax declarations, in a context where non-filing is widespread. In
terms of policy, results show that the benefits of taxpayer education go beyond increased
revenue in the short term, and include building a habit of tax compliance.
2.1 Introduction1
As discussed at length in Chapter 1, tax collection in low-income countries is severely
underperforming (Akitoby et al., 2019). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is not an exception,
with direct negative consequences on the resources available to finance development (IMF,
2019). The tax revenue to GDP ratio, usually seen as an indicator for the tax effort
in a country, in SSA is 20 to 30 percentage points less than that of Europe and North
America.2 On top of that, the trend across country income categories has been stable for
decades (Cottarelli, 2011). This gap in tax capacity translates in fewer resources available
to provide basic public goods and services, incentivise investments or fund anti-poverty
programs. Consequently, without a reliable and sustained stream of tax revenues, SSA
countries are still depending on external aid, which most often acts as a substitute for
properly raised domestic revenues. In the country under study, Rwanda, in the last two
years foreign aid has been almost equal to total revenues collected.3
In this context of weak fiscal capacity, it is crucial to understand which strategies SSA
tax authorities could pursue to raise domestic tax revenues. While deterrence has histori-
cally been the main tool for inducing compliance, alternative service-oriented solutions are
gaining momentum among SSA tax agencies (OECD, 2015; Mascagni and Santoro, 2018).
Among them, initiatives providing tax education are becoming more and more popular.
Tax knowledge and, more in general, compliance costs recently received attention as key
explanatory factors of poor compliance (Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Alm et al., 2010). In the
context of taxpayer confusion, compliance costs refer to the cognitive effort that taxpayers
make in understanding complex tax systems, and to the administrative costs they incur in
fulfilling their tax obligations. Taxpayers often have a very limited understanding of the
tax system. As a result, they behave in ways that are inconsistent with economic theory,
and with the incentives set out by policymakers (Feldman et al., 2016). However, as elab-
orated more in section 2.2, the role of tax knowledge in explaining actual tax compliance
has not yet been rigorously tested so far.
1This chapter is an extended version of a paper written with Giulia Mascagni and published as an ICTD
working paper (Mascagni et al., 2019).
2For a visualisation of tax/GDP ratios worldwide, see Figure A1 in the Appendix.
3Appendix Figure A2 shows the trend of aid and revenue collected over time.
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This paper aims to address this gap by answering the following question: can taxpayer
education affect compliance? To address this question I attempt to measure the effective-
ness of a taxpayer education program, run every year by the Rwanda Revenue Authority
(RRA), on tax compliance, as well as on tax knowledge and perceptions. The program is
targeted at newly registered income taxpayers and is specifically aimed at helping them to
comply as they enter the tax system, with a focus on learning and setting good compliance
habits right from the start. In addition to the training program, a novel educational strat-
egy in the form of a personalised tax coaching provided by RRA officials is piloted and
evaluated (section 2.3.3). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to explore
the link between knowledge of the tax system and tax compliance in a developing country.
The context, Rwanda, is typical of a low-income SSA country, both in terms of poor
tax compliance (section 2.3.2) and low literacy rates (73%) when compared with high
income countries (almost 100%),4 despite being considered a success story in terms of
economic and social development. African countries, Rwanda included, also face very low
tax knowledge, to the extent that the majority of Africans do not know what taxes they
owe to the government or what tax payments are for (Aiko and Logan, 2014; Isbell, 2017).
These facts make the analysis both urgent and relevant on top of being novel, given the
near absence of other studies in this area (section 2.2).
In addition, income taxes are economically significant in the Rwandan context (and
SSA as a whole) – the country collects a third of the total tax revenue from this type
of tax (ATAF, 2017). However, filing of income taxes is far from being optimal. Apart
from informal entities, who are totally out of the tax system,5 filing behaviour of regis-
tered taxpayers is inadequate. It is important to consider filing behaviour in its inherent
multi-dimensionality (Slemrod, 2019). In order to do that, I consider three important filing
choices: the probability to declare, the probability to nil-file, and the tax amount remit-
4The corresponding average figure for low-income countries is 63%. The figures for Rwanda and LICs
are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SE.ADT.LITR.ZS accessed on 21 January 2020), while the figure for high income countries is from Our
World in Data (https://ourworldindata.org/global-education accessed on 21 January 2020).
5In Rwanda, informality is rampant, representing 36% of national GDP in 1991-2015 (Schneider and Medina,
2018), indicating, on the one hand, a situation of lack of information on the tax base and weak monitoring
power of the tax agency (Porta and Shleifer, 2016) and, on the other hand, a common norm of tax evasion
among the population.
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ted. All these choices may imply tax avoidance or evasion: while non- and nil-filing have
immediate negative repercussions in terms of impaired domestic revenue generation, tax
avoidance usually takes place also among positive filers. The presence of non- and nil-filers
is sizeable in Rwanda, where only a portion of newly registered taxpayers remit positive
taxes every year (section 2.3.2). Non- and nil-filing is the norm also outside Rwanda. Ev-
idence on this filing patterns come from the United States6 and Latin America.7 Also the
SSA region experiences both failure to file8 and nil returns.9
The research design builds on the collection of survey data from a randomly selected
group of one thousand taxpayers before and after the training. Survey data provides a
rich source of information on the level of tax knowledge – thanks to a detailed quiz-like
section on tax – and perceptions towards the tax system, which are investigated as the key
mechanisms of impact at play. In terms of the main outcomes, I observe taxpayers’ filing
behaviour thanks to administrative data from tax returns provided by the RRA (section
2.4.1). Using different methods to address self-selection into the training, which I discuss
in detail in section 2.4.3, I measure the causal impact of the training program on tax
knowledge and perceptions as well as tax compliance.
Results in section 2.5 show that trainees perform significantly better in terms of fil-
ing behaviour. The training is explaining a 15 percentage points (or 43% of the control
group mean) increase in the probability to file a tax return (extensive margin), despite not
inducing taxpayers to remit more taxes (intensive margin). The impact at the extensive
6Erard et al. (2018) estimate the share of ghosts for the US federal individual income tax for the tax years
2000-2012 to be 7.1% of the total number of returns expected to be filed. In the same fashion, looking at
the city of Detroit’s individual income tax for the tax year 2014, Meiselman (2018) estimates that 48% of
returns were still missing as of April 2016, two years later.
7In Guatemala, the share of non-filers of income tax in 2013 is of 39%. In Costa Rica, Brockmeyer et al.
(2019) estimate that 25% of tax-registered firms and 19% of self-employed did not file an income tax
declaration in 2014 as of February 15, 2015, two months after the filing deadline. The incidence is lower
but still substantial for sales tax: 14% of firms and 19% of the self-employed. In a companion paper,
Brockmeyer and Hernandez (2016) find that about 50% of tax-liable firms fail to file their income tax
declaration for the period 2006-2014. Moreover, 20% of the businesses registered for the municipal income
tax in a municipality of Venezuela’s capital did not have any fiscal activity for at least 3 years (Ortega
and Scartascini, 2016b).
8See footnote 6 of Chapter 1.
9See footnotes 7 of Chapter 1.
38
margin of compliance is consistent across three different econometric methods. This result
is economically significant given a context where every year about half of registered tax-
payers fail to file. Bringing taxpayers into the tax system, who in turn share information
and remain visible to the authority, is a main goal of any tax agency. Moreover, filing tax
returns could become a virtuous habit and a learned responsibility (Dunning et al., 2017),
most importantly for small taxpayers who usually are less likely to file a return. There is
no significant impact in terms of the amount of tax declared, largely due to lack of power
and self-selection. Always due to low sample size and relevant implementation issues, the
coaching intervention does not prove to be effective (section 2.5.3).
In terms of mechanisms (section 2.6.1), the most plausible one is an increase in taxpayer
knowledge and a decrease in the perceived complexity of the tax system – both of which are
directly related to the central themes of taxpayer confusion and compliance costs. Given
the very little evidence on the role of tax knowledge and compliance costs in motivating
compliance, this result is a key contribution of the paper to the existing literature, as
explained more in depth in section 2.2.4. I trust that future exciting work will be carried
out in this direction.
2.2 Literature Review
This study aims at producing new evidence on the determinants of tax compliance by
considering a largely neglected factor, tax knowledge. The literature on the drivers of
compliance is abundant and composed by different branches, which are summarised below.
2.2.1 Neoclassical standard theory on utility maximization
The workhorse model of tax compliance is the one by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) – AS
from now on – who builds on the economic theory of crime (Becker, 1968) and uncertainty
(Mossin, 1968).10 In the AS setting, taxpayers are modelled as self-controlled, fully rational
utility maximizing agents and all potential evaders. They face the decision to comply under
10See also Srinivasan (1973) for an early model of compliance.
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risk, as in a gamble: the agent compares the benefits from evading (lower tax paid) with
the potential costs (the probability of getting caught and punished). The main finding
from this utility maximisation calculus is that the level of evasion is negatively affected by
deterrence factors, such as audits and fines.
In a following contribution, Yitzhaki (1974) shows that, when the fine is assessed on
the evaded tax rather than on the undeclared income as in AS, higher tax rates will lead
to lower level of evasion, at odds with most empirical evidence (Clotfelter, 1983; Andreoni
et al., 1998). For this and other reasons discussed below, the AS model is unanimously
considered as incomplete and unsatisfactory.
2.2.2 Deviations from the standard approach
The neoclassical model has been often criticised for relying on assumptions that are gener-
ally unrealistic for explaining a compliant behavior (Andreoni et al., 1998). First, taxpayers
are assumed to have full knowledge of all the key policy parameters, such as the audit risk
and the size of penalties.11 Second, taxpayers’ response is predicted to be the same across
all of them. Third, risk preferences are assumed to be identical across taxpayers. It results
that, according to the assumption of risk aversion in the AS model, evasion should be
much more than what is actually observed in the real word. In reality, the probability
of getting caught is often very low and varying by type of income, while expected fines
are rather small, both for political motivations and because quite infrequently imposed.
Audits are even more unfrequent in administrations with inadequate staff and budget as
in low-income countries.12 For these reasons, the AS model requires coefficients of risk
aversion to be much higher than normal to justify the higher rate of compliance observed
(Alm et al., 1992).13
Alternative theoretical formulations enriched the standard model with new parameters
that attempt to explain the high observed levels of compliance. The term “tax morale”
has been used as an umbrella term capturing the non-pecuniary drivers of tax compliance
11This paper mainly aims at questioning this assumption.
12In Rwanda, the revenue authority audited less than 300 taxpayers in 2015-16 (Mascagni et al., 2016).
13For example, the estimated Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion in the United States is between 1 and
2, when it should be around 30 to reach the observed tax compliance level.
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who are not accounted for in the AS framework (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).14 The
theoretical contributions of this alternative approach are reported in Appendix section
A1.1. Throughout the paper, these aspects will be touched only tangentially, while the
main focus is directed on an unduly neglected factor driving compliance, i.e. tax knowledge.
2.2.3 The role of tax knowledge and compliance costs
This paper contributes to the scant literature on the role of tax knowledge in shaping
compliance. The only study on this topic evaluates the effect of a 2-minute explanation
provided by tax preparers to taxpayers who are eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) in the United States (Chetty and Saez, 2013). The authors find no effect on
the amount of income reported, which is the only outcome evaluated. While this paper
represents a key reference point for this study, it focuses on a relatively quick (2 minutes)
and focussed (specifically on the EITC) intervention.15 Also, Chetty and Saez (2013)
consider a high-income country, which is very different – for example, in terms of literacy
rates in the population – from the context of this study.
A number of studies have included general education as a background variable, assuming
that tax knowledge is increasing with literacy (Vogel, 1974; Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976;
Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Kinsey and Gramsick, 1993). More recently, knowledge about
tax has been shown to promote positive tax ethics. Roberts et al. (1994) study how
the general lack of understanding of the concept of progressive taxation is related to tax
attitudes. When asked a general question on tax preferences, the majority of students are
in favour of a progressive structure. However, when asked in concrete terms how much
they should contribute in comparison to other taxpayers, the majority consider a system
of flat tax to be fairer. Likewise, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) provide evidence of the impact
14Interestingly enough, Allingham and Sadmo themselves recognised that their model was not capturing all
the factors motivating tax compliance: “This is a very simple theory, and it may perhaps be criticised for
giving too little attention to non-pecuniary factors in the taxpayer’s decision on whether or not to evade
taxes.”
15In the words of the authors: “While our results suggest that knowledge about the tax code cannot be
easily manipulated with simple information treatments, the spread of knowledge through peer networks
or other sources that affect knowledge in more persistent ways could have larger impacts on behaviour”
(Chetty and Saez, 2013).
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of tax information on the perceptions of the tax system. In a quasi-experimental work,
students who are taught about the tax law tend to change their attitudes at the end of the
year: the tax system is perceived to be fairer, while own and other’s tax evasion is more
likely to be considered wrong.
Despite the paucity of rigorous evidence, the lack of tax knowledge is assumed to
explain a substantial part of total tax non-compliance (Richardson, 2006; Palil, 2010).
Significantly, as much as 30% of all misreporting in income taxes may be due to honest
mistakes (Christian et al., 1993; Erard, 1997). In practical terms, ignorance can affect
tax compliance in two opposite ways. On the one hand, it can be associated with lower
compliance, including both underreporting and failure to file (Palil, 2010; Lubua, 2014;
Kira, 2017). On the other hand, a limited understanding of the tax system could result in
higher compliance costs or even overpayment. A recent study shows that taxpayers in the
US often pay more than they should due to high compliance costs and relatively complex
reporting requirements (Benzarti, 2015).16 Compliance costs due to regulatory burdens
on firms are relevant in SSA too, as some growing literature shows (Bird, 2015; Dabla-
Norris et al., 2017).17 Moreover, this type of costs seem to have a regressive nature. Small
taxpayers are more affected as they have less resources to dedicate to tax matters (e.g.
through tax advisors), as suggested in Coolidge (2012); Yesegat et al. (2015); Mascagni
and Mengistu (2016). Consistently, a recent study focussing on small firms in Finland
shows that compliance costs produce larger behavioural responses than changes in the tax
rate (Harju et al., 2019).
2.2.4 Contributions
The main contribution of this study is to produce causal evidence on the linkages between
tax knowledge and compliance in the specific context of a low-income country in SSA, for
16This is in line with related findings showing how poor people often fail to benefit from public programs
due to their lack of knowledge about them (Duflo et al., 2006; Feldman et al., 2016).
17Using data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys on 17 SSA countries for the period 2014-2016, Ali
(2018) shows that managers in a typical firm in the formal sector spend about 1.3 months dealing with
government regulations every year. A strong negative correlation exists between compliance costs and
and index of a government regulatory quality.
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which knowledge on the topic is almost non-existent.18 As a matter of fact, very little
is known about why people in Africa pay taxes (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2001; D’Arcy,
2011). Only descriptive, albeit suggestive, evidence on African taxpayers’ attitudes exists.
Using Afrobarometer data on 36 African countries, Isbell (2017) reports that the majority
of respondents have difficulty figuring out what taxes they owe to the government. While
small taxpayers are likely to suffer more from lack of tax knowledge, large taxpayers and
business associations are also not immune to this issue (Nalishebo and Halwampa, 2014).
In a previous study on Afrobarometer data, the same confusion is observed (Aiko and
Logan, 2014).
At the same time, there is an increasing awareness, especially amongst African tax
specialists, that lack of tax education and knowledge is one of the key obstacles to voluntary
tax compliance (OECD, 2015; Mascagni and Santoro, 2018).19 In SSA alone, Mascagni
and Santoro (2018) document the existence of radio programs on tax topics; tax-themed
soap operas to sensitise the public about taxpaying; tax clubs in schools where pupils learn
about tax and then compete across schools; informative videos on social media, where
celebrities explain to young people why is it important to get their tax affaires in order
right from the start; and mobile tax units, which are essentially vans traveling to rural
areas to support taxpayers.
In this setting, the goal of this study is to inform revenue authorities on how effec-
tive alternative, service-oriented, strategies could be in improving tax compliance. While
much evidence has been created on the effectiveness of enforcement strategies based on
deterrence,20 much more empirical evidence is needed to support the relevance of “soft”
18Few exceptions are qualitative studies (Tanui, 2016; Kira, 2017). Likewise, Ali et al. (2015) find indications
that tax knowledge and awareness have a significant impact on tax compliance attitude in South Africa
and Tanzania, using, as a proxy for tax knowledge, perceptions on the difficulty to find out what taxes
the respondents are required to pay.
19This evidence has been collected with in-depth interviews with officials from the taxpayer services de-
partments of revenue authorities in Rwanda, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania. I have been able to
contact them thanks to the network of the ICTD.
20Increasing the probability of audit reduces evasion as shown in a variety of contexts: personal income tax
in US (Blumenthal et al., 2001) and Norway (Bott et al., 2014), VAT payments in Chile (Pomeranz, 2015),
individual municipal taxes in Argentina (Castro and Scartascini, 2013), firm taxes in Ecuador (Carrillo
et al., 2017), individual public-TV fees in Austria (Kleven et al., 2011; Fellner et al., 2013), individual
church tax in Germany (Dwenger et al., 2015), corporate income tax in Uruguay (Bergolo et al., 2019).
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alternatives.
As a second main contribution, this research is related to the growing strand of experi-
mental literature on informational nudges used by tax administrations to increase compli-
ance (more on this in Chapter 4).21 These field experiments evaluate the effectiveness of
messages sent by the local tax administration to taxpayers around the time of declaration.
Such messages provide information about specific aspects of the tax system, typically re-
lated to either deterrence (e.g. sanctions for non-compliance) or tax morale (e.g. public
services funded by tax). While these nudges are generally effective in increasing compliance
in the tax declaration that immediately follows receipt of the message, most studies do not
look at longer term effects. The limited existing evidence is that they do not seem to gen-
erate any longer-term effect (Manoli and Turner, 2014). The literature is a lot more scarce
for low-income countries, although two studies from Ethiopia and Rwanda largely confirm
the results of the broader literature – including the lack of any effect beyond the first year
(Shimeles et al., 2017; Mascagni et al., 2017). The (very) short-lived effectiveness of be-
havioural nudges begs the question on which other interventions can be implemented to
affect compliance in the longer term, through learning. This study attempts to address this
question by showing that taxpayer education can be an effective alternative that, contrary
to simple messages, could affect compliance more persistently.
Lastly, these results also speak to the literature linking taxation to state-building and
accountability (Brautigam et al., 2008; Prichard, 2015; Moore et al., 2018). While weak
tax knowledge can directly translate into poor compliance, it also has a number of other
detrimental implications. Confused taxpayers would not know with confidence how much
they should pay, thus potentially being more vulnerable to corrupt officials or to be coerced
into making unofficial payments. They may also be more prone to seeing the tax system
as unjust and extortionary, either because of corruption or because they might misperceive
the benefits of paying taxes (Ali et al., 2015).22 Ultimately, uninformed taxpayers are less
likely to engage in a meaningful debate with the government about tax issues, thus limiting
the potential of taxation to act as a catalyst for improved governance and accountability.
21Recent reviews of this literature are, for example, Mascagni (2018) and Hallsworth (2014).
22A recent study has shown that providing beneficiaries with information about the eligibility and amount
of a subsidy, increases the amount of subsidy they receive by about 26%, thanks to lower leakage (Banerjee
et al., 2018).
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2.3 The Rwandan context
Rwanda is a small landlocked country in Eastern Africa, with a densely packed population
of about 12.5 million people (2017). After going through a civil war and genocide in the
1990s, the country experienced a period of development that ensured a sustained economic
growth, progress on human and social development, and a large expansion of public services.
However, Rwanda remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita GDP
of $702 in 2016, rising from just $342 ten years before. Between 2001 and 2016, real GDP
growth averaged at about 8% per annum, while in 2017 it amounted to 6.1%.23
As shown in Table 2.1 (extracted from Table 1.1), tax revenues represent about 15.3 per
cent of GDP in 2018, higher than the average of the East African Community (EAC)24.
In a constant positive trend, Rwanda’s total domestic revenue as a percentage of GDP
rose from 8.4 per cent in 1993 to 15.3 per cent in 2015.25 This figure is in line with other
African and low-income countries, despite the absence of significant natural resources, but
considerably lower than OECD’s 25 per cent . More importantly for the sake of this study,
as compared to other African countries, Rwanda collects proportionally more income taxes,
about a third of total revenues (ATAF, 2017).26 In a context of rising inequality such as the
African continent, the higher reliance on progressive income taxes is usually seen as a way
to reduce such inequalities. From the researcher’s perspective, it is also more interesting
to look at income tax compliance as evasion’s opportunities are much higher with income
taxes than other types of taxes (such as PAYE), given that the income taxpayer has to
self-assess her own tax liability (Slemrod et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011).
Table 2.1 also provides a quick picture of the quality of governance in the country. The
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2017 indicates considerable
differences between Rwanda and EAC: Rwanda’s score is 66% higher (better) than EAC’s.
This is reflected in the World Bank Governance indicators for 2016. Specifically, Rwanda
23World Bank website: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview#3
24Other economies in East African Community: Kenya 17.7%, Uganda 12.3%, Burundi 12% and Tanzania
11.6%. Tax revenues per capita amount to $106, lower than the EAC average, $112 (ATAF, 2017)
25In the year in which the genocide took place (1994), however, total domestic resources as a percentage of
GDP fell to 3.6% (ATAF, 2017).
26This is more in line with what happened in high-income countries (33%), than low-income ones (27%).
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Table 2.1: Governance and country indicators
Rwanda East Africa Year
Tax to GDP ratio a 15.3% 13.8% 2018
Tax revenue per capita (USD)a 106 112 2015
Informality (% national income)b 36.3 40.3 2004-2015
CPIc 55 33 2017
Governance indicatorsd
Control of corruption 0.69 -0.59 2016
Rule of law 0.07 -0.50 2016
Regulatory quality 0.11 -0.33 2016
Government effectiveness 0.11 -0.54 2016
Political stability -0.05 -0.592 2016
Voice and accountability -1.21 -0.75 2016
Fragile States indexe 89.3 91.7 2018
Index of economic freedomf 69.1 59.3 2018
Tax burden 75.8 75.6 2018
Government integrity 61.2 35 2018
Judicial effectiveness 79.6 44.1 2018
Business freedom 81.2 51.8 2018
Doing business indicatorg 73.4 59.3 2018
Starting a business 87.66 81.6 2018
Registering property 93.26 63.1 2018
Paying taxes 84.6 69 2018
Bank account ownershiph 38% 39.5% 2017
East Africa: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.
a African Tax Administration Forum (2017)
b Schneider and Medina (2018)
c Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Range: 0-100.
d World Bank (2017). Range: -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).
e Fragile States Index. Min 17.9 - Max 113.
f The Heritage Foundation. Range: 0-100.
g World Bank (2018). Range: 0-100.
h Global Findex (2017). Adults (+15 yo) in labor force. Burundi excluded.
has much higher control of corruption than the rest of the region. Similarly, the rule of
law index, which measures the degree of confidence in and compliance with the rules of
society, is much larger in Rwanda. It results that the perceived legitimacy and authority
of the State is better judged. Likewise, the capacity of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies effectively (represented as the government effectiveness and reg-
ulatory quality) is perceived to be higher. Moreover, political stability is higher than in the
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EAC – even though with a negative value. Only the index on voice and accountability is
worse than the regional average, signalling that political freedom is constrained. Overall,
the values of these six governance dimensions clearly indicate a higher level of institutional
quality in Rwanda compared to the rest of the region.
Additionally, Table 2.1 also shows that Rwanda scores better in terms of economic
freedom and ease of doing business. According to the index of economic freedom from the
Heritage Foundation, while the tax burden is somehow in line with EAC, perceptions of
the government integrity and judicial effectiveness almost double the ones in EAC. Overall,
the index of economic freedom in Rwanda stands at 69.1, well above the EAC average of
59.3. The World Bank Doing Business indicators reflect the same story: Rwanda has the
best rating among the EAC countries, 73.4 versus 59.3. Starting a business is much easier
in Rwanda – it has the second best score over the whole sample of 190 economies for
what concerns registering property, taking just 7 days against an average of 59 for SSA.
More significantly, the best result concerns the ease of paying taxes, for which Rwanda
ranks 31st out of 190 countries worldwide in 2017, and the second best rating in the Sub-
Saharan Region, following Mauritius.27 The WB Doing Business indicators suggest that
the Rwanda Revenue Authority already put in place measures to reduce compliance costs
and simplify the tax system.28 For example, Rwandan taxpayers can file online through
the e-tax system or, for micro taxpayers, through a mobile phone platform (m-tax). To
simplify things further for small taxpayers, Rwanda also enjoys two simplified regimes with
minimal bookkeeping and reporting requirements (i.e. only turnover), as explained in the
next section.
27According to the World Bank 2018 Paying Taxes report, a Rwandan company is required to make just 8
payments a year which are below the SSA average of 37.2 p.a., and even fewer than the OCED average
of 10.9 p.a.
28This is relevant to this study, as the intervention I set to evaluate does not vary any administrative
parameter on compliance costs (i.e. simpler procedures, less strict requirements), but rather affects
access to information about the tax system and the cognitive costs related to understanding the taxpaying
process.
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2.3.1 Statutory income taxes
Rwanda’s tax system includes many of the features that one would expect to find in a
modern tax system. In terms of direct taxation, Rwanda adopts three types of income tax:
Personal Income Tax (PIT), Corporate Income Tax (CIT), and Pay As You Earn (PAYE).
Firms above a specific threshold are also required to pay value added tax (VAT), while
below the threshold they are liable for turnover tax (TOT).29 In this study, I focus on PIT
and CIT, since PAYE differs in terms of how it is collected.30 According to ICTD/UNU-
WIDER (2020), income taxes represent 40% of total tax revenues in 2018. The two types
of income taxes – regulated by RRA (2017) – can be described as follows:
• PIT taxes individual businesses. Three regimes exist, depending on the business’
turnover: 1) real regime, 2) lump-sum regime, and 3) flat-amount regime. While large
businesses in the real regime have to submit full books of accounts to RRA, smaller
businesses are subject to less strict bookkeeping rules. The declaration deadline
is March 31st of the following tax period. The tax rate in the PIT real regime is
progressive, depending on income: turnover below RWF 360,000 is exempted from
taxation; between RWF 360,001 and RWF 1,200,000 is taxed at 20%; higher incomes
are taxed at 30%. Small enterprises (turnover between RWF 12 million and RWF
50 million per tax period) are subject to a lump-sum tax of 3% of turnover. Micro-
enterprises generating a turnover of more than RWF 2 million and less than RWF 12
million are required to pay a flat amount between RWF 60,000 and RWF 300,000,
depending on income (RRA 2017: Articles 11 and 12).
• CIT taxes the income generated from corporate business activities, which has to be
declared annually by March 31st, as for PIT. Corporate income is levied at a flat rate
of 30%. Some reductions exist for businesses less than 5 years old, depending on how
many shares the public possesses (RRA 2017: Articles 41 to 43). Moreover, small
and micro companies follow the same tax structure as in the PIT scheme.
29The threshold is 20 million RWF, or about 21,400 USD. Firms can voluntarily opt in the VAT system
even if they are below the threshold.
30PAYE tax of employees is usually withdrawn from the employer at the time of paying salaries. Rwanda,
like many other countries, also applies a number of other taxes that I will not mention here because they
are not relevant to this study, such as property taxes, taxes on capital gains, etc.
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A descriptive analysis of RRA tax returns data provides some stylised facts on the
relative importance of the two income taxes. More details are reported in Appendix Table
A1. In 2017, over a total of 50,346 declarations, PIT represents the 44% while CIT the
56%. However, CIT accounts for the 94.5% of the total tax take. Indeed, PIT businesses
are much smaller: they report an annual average of RWF 1.7 million ($1,921), versus RWF
144 million ($161,645) declared by CIT taxpayers. The amount of tax declared is also
different in magnitude, with PIT averaging RWF 345,000 ($388) while CIT more than
RWF 2.3 million ($2,600). The location of businesses is relevant too: while 54% of all
declaring businesses are registered in the capital Kigali, they account for 94% of the tax
take, while taxpayers outside the province of Kigali contribute for 6% only, as shown in
Appendix Figure A3. This is consistent with the fact that most CIT firms are registered in
Kigali. At the same time, Appendix Figures A4 displays the share of income tax revenue
contributed by small and large firms, where large firms have business income greater than
the 90th percentile. As often happens in less developed economies, most of the revenues
are raised from the top-decile of firms who account for 94% and 82% of CIT and PIT take,
respectively, in the Rwandan economy.
2.3.2 Non- and nil-filers
Despite the ease in paying taxes discussed above, failure to file and zero filing of income
taxes remain sizeable issues in Rwanda, especially for new registered taxpayers. Failure to
file happens when a registered taxpayer misses his declaration by March 31st of the next
year, so becoming a “ghost” to the eyes of the authority (Erard and Ho, 2001). Instead,
nil-filing implies filing a declaration, but declaring zero turnover and zero income tax.
While failure to file unequivocally represents a wrongdoing and a severe cause of in-
equality (competitiveness’ gaps, economic distortions and lower tax morale among similar,
filing, taxpayers), nil-filing is harder to explain. At the moment, three alternative hy-
potheses for nil-filing can be considered: i) tax evasion from a business hiding its income
ii) legitimate declaration from a business who registered but is not operating yet, thus
having zero income to declare, and iii) businesses who ceased operations but are still reg-
istered due to the bureaucratic complexity of deregistering from the authority records. A
parallel work in Rwanda (Mascagni et al., 2020), attempts to shed light on nil-filing, com-
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bining a descriptive analysis of tax returns data, a randomised controlled trial (RCT), and
qualitative interviews with taxpayers and tax officials. Mascagni et al. (2020) argue that
evasion seems to play only a relatively small role in explaining nil-filing. Instead, a major
reason for nil-filing seems to refer to aggressive recruitment campaigns by the RRA and
taxpayers’ response to a complex and often confusing tax system.
Administrative data help quantifying these two phenomena. If I consider new registra-
tions for the period 2015-2017, it results that 48% of income taxpayers failed to file in their
first year and, among those that filed, 54% nil-filed in their first year. It is also noticed
that failure to file is a bigger problem for smaller, individual businesses registered for PIT,
which probably do not have proper accounting skills, while nilfiling is more prominent in
CIT businesses, who may manage to declare but nevertheless report nil as a tax avoiding
strategy (Table A1).31
2.3.3 RRA tax education strategy and registration campaigns
In the context delineated above, the RRA operates since its establishment as a semi-
autonomous agency in 1997.32 In recent years, RRA successfully embraced the key princi-
ples of a modern tax administration and adopted a strategic orientation towards providing
tax education and assistance. Many different civic education initiatives are held each year,
ranging from the National Taxpayer’s Day to tax taught in schools, seminars and work-
shops. Among these initiatives, the service-oriented approach is well represented by the
Tax Education Program, the focus of this study, funded and implemented by the Taxpayer
Service Department (TPS) within RRA.
The program has a national coverage and consists of about 30 trainings events in every
district per year. In the year under study, trainings started in August 2017 and ended in
March 2018 (see Table A2). Trainings in big urban districts are held twice a year given the
large number of attendees. The program targets specifically new registered taxpayers, as
they are believed to need more information to navigate through the system and abide to
the law. They have typically registered for income taxes (PIT or CIT) and obtained their
31The larger extent of nil returns among companies is also documented in Eswatini (see Chapter 3 and 4).
32After a wave of structural reforms in the 2000s, today the RRA has offices in all the provincial headquar-
ters, and in 11 out of the 30 districts, employing about 1300 staffs
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TIN for the first time.33 These are all new businesses, either individual non-incorporated
ones (PIT) or corporations (CIT), and not taxpayers who only have employment incomes.
The program is delivered by TPS tax officials. The content covers the basics of taxpay-
ing, including for example explanations of the various taxes and duties, such as deadlines,
what is a TIN and why it is needed, procedures for tax declaration and payment, services
available for simplifying declarations and payments, such as online services, amongst oth-
ers. As such, the content is more focussed on providing practical information on taxpaying,
rather than taking a broader approach based on accountability and citizen engagement. I
would therefore expect it to have some impact on compliance behaviour, not least because
it is specifically targeted at increasing taxpayer knowledge to this respect. Trainings are
mainly conducted in hotels, last for a half a day and lunch is provided. Invitations normally
happen through SMS, official letters posted at the office of the relevant tax centre and the
local branch of the Private Sector Federation, and some phone calls from RRA officials to
taxpayers to remind them of the session.
Although the invitation process is comprehensive in principle, practical difficulties and
administrative constraints mean that in reality it does not reach all intended beneficiaries.
Nonetheless, the explicit intention of the RRA is to invite all new taxpayers and, potentially,
keep the training accessible to any other taxpayer even if they were not specifically invited.
In practice, the vast majority of attendees are new taxpayers from the relevant district.
However, this policy intention means that I could not randomise the attendance to the
trainings.
On top of this initiative, a new alternative program is evaluated in this study. A
personalised, coaching program is designed where TPS staff provide assistance to sensitise
and educate taxpayers on timely and accurate filing. The content was open in the sense that
tax officials would just answer to any query the taxpayer might have, with a maximum of 3
questions or about 15 minutes of duration. Initially thought as a pilot, this 1-1 assistance
service may be extended in coming years if proved to be effective. More details are provided
in section 2.4.2.
As a last consideration, it is worth stressing that the RRA has been devoting increas-
33A taxpayer may subsequently register also for VAT, with the same TIN number for the same business,
and thus would not be included in the definition of new taxpayer used here.
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ing energies to expanding the tax base and registering new taxpayers. In a State-led
push towards facilitating entrepreneurship, mass registrations and door-to-door recruit-
ment campaigns happen frequently and are often implemented aggressively. In 2008, the
Rwanda Development Board (RDB) introduced simplified procedures for business regis-
tration which reduced the time for registering a business from 16 days to 6 hours.34 In
a context in which tax officials aim at increasing the size of the taxpayer registry, many
of the new taxpayers are often recruited without having actually started a business and
therefore are unlikely to generate any income. The trend in registration is depicted in Ap-
pendix Figure A5. Registrations peak in 2014 with more than 23,000 taxpayers entering
the system, representing an increase of 66% with respect to 2013. After 2014 the number
of registrations rapidly decreases and stabilises around an average of 18,000 in 2015-2017.
Importantly for this study, Mascagni et al. (2020) highlight that very little guidance and
information are provided to new entrants at the time of registration. New taxpayers are
not given any written confirmation, such as a certificate or proof of registration. This is
likely to generate confusion. Unsurprisingly, as shown in section 2.5.1, many new taxpayers
do not even know what tax type they are registered for.
2.4 Evaluation Design
2.4.1 Data
Data includes information from three main sources: (i) phone-based baseline and endline
surveys, (ii) attendance recording of all trainings in the country, and (iii) RRA admin-
istrative data on income tax returns. Importantly, I can connect these three sources of
information thanks to unique identifiers (TIN).
34According to the World Bank Doing Business report, Rwanda ranks fifty-first worldwide and third in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) for the ease of starting a business. Simplification in registration, with a score of
91.4, is much higher than the average for SSA, 78.5. Online company registration has become mandatory
as of 17 February 2014 and is free of charge.
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Survey data
Survey data is collected by an independent team of enumerators from a research company
based in Rwanda. The first wave of survey was conducted in August 2017, one week
before the trainings. The endline survey was implemented one week after the trainings, in
September 2017. In this fashion, information before and after the intervention is gathered
from the same respondents.
Surveys have been administered by phone, with enumerators contacting taxpayers on
the phone numbers extracted from RRA administrative records.35 Respondents are re-
placed in case they are not reached on their phone (see section 2.4.2). Survey coding and
data inputting took place through SurveyCTO software. Survey protocol also includes oral
consent to take part in the survey and information about confidentiality, delivered at the
beginning of the interview.36
For what concerns the questionnaire content, the final version went through repeated
testing and a meticulous translation in Kinyarwanda. The survey was designed with inputs
from RRA researchers and TPS team. The baseline surveys took 42 minutes to complete
on average, and consisted of six modules: (i) respondent’s demographics (5 questions),
(ii) business characteristics (14 questions), (iii) reasons to register or remain informal (2
questions), (iv) tax attitudes and perceptions (14 questions),37 (v) a quiz on tax knowledge
(19 questions),38 and (vi) intent to attend and other tax training experiences (5 questions).
The endline survey was shorter in length, with an average duration of 23 minutes, con-
sisting of the same questions of modules 4 and 5, plus ten new questions for attendees only,
where the enumerators asked the attendees for feedback on the training. For what relates
35The choice to use cell phones for data collection has been mainly motivated by budget reasons, with
in-person surveys being more expensive. Moreover, it can be assumed that the distance created using
cell phones also put the respondents in a more comfortable position to answer some sensitive questions
related to attitudes towards compliance and perceptions about the tax system.
36Permission to conduct the survey has been obtained by the National Institute of Statistics in Kigali,
which also granted the Ethics Approval in July 2017.
37Most of the questions on attitudes and perceptions are derived from the most recent wave of Afrobarom-
eter survey (2017). However, Rwanda is not covered by it. Unfortunately, Rwanda lacks nation-wide
perception surveys, which would have offered the possibility to compare and validate the data collected
in this study.
38Knowledge questions have been formulated so to reflect the topics taught in the training.
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to non-attendees, an additional module enquired about the reason of non-attendance.39
With the available survey data, I create a set of variables, which will provide valuable
information on the underlying mechanisms of impact. These can be considered as inter-
mediate outcomes in the theory of change that attempts to shape filing decision through
changes in tax knowledge and perceptions. In order to efficiently summarise different vari-
ables and reduce concerns on multiple hypotheses testing, the solution is to form aggregate
index measures. More specifically:
• Knowledge: out of 19 questions, a first index is built as the average of 19 dummy
variables, each taking value 1 if the answer is correct. Appendix Table A4 describes
the 19 questions. Using this index, three key measures are created: (i) a dummy for
the ex-post increase in the knowledge, (ii) a continuous knowledge gain variable as
the fraction of the post-pre difference over the baseline knowledge score, and (iii) a re-
scaled index from 0 to 10, thus representing the percentage fraction of questions that
the respondent answered correctly. Additional knowledge indicators are used as well:
(i) a knowledge difference index was built as the difference of the post-training minus
the pre-training scores (the numerator of measure (ii) above), and (ii) a standardised
Kling index (Kling et al., 2007).40
• Perceptions: 13 statements on attitudes and perceptions are proposed to the respon-
dents, with answers ranging from 1 totally disagree to 5 totally agree, as summarised
in Appendix Table A5. An additional question on satisfaction with a range of public
services allowed answers going from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5.41 Binary
perceptions variables are created with value of 1 if respondents agreed with the state-
ment and 0 otherwise. In the same fashion, a binary satisfaction variable is derived
39Questionnaire forms are available upon demand.
40The Kling normalisation helps translate the magnitudes of different measures into standardised units.
The index is defined to be the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components (the 19 knowledge
variables), with the sign of each measure oriented so that more positive outcomes have higher scores. The
z-scores are the normalised transformations of each variable and are calculated by subtracting the control
group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation. Thus, each component of the index
has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group.
41Six public services are included: health, education, water and sanitation, electricity, security/police and
infrastructures.
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that takes value 1 if the respondent is somehow and very satisfied with a public ser-
vice (score of 3-4-5) and 0 otherwise. Seven indexes of perceptions are created as
group averages of binary variables (see Table A6): complexity costs, enforcement,
attitude to evade, fairness of the tax system, government authority, social duty. Fi-
nally, an index from principal component analysis summarises the satisfaction with
public services.
Attendance data
A dedicated team of enumerators, with the support of RRA staff, registered attendance
at the training venue.42 A pre-populated Excel list of all new registered taxpayers invited
to the trainings was provided. Enumerators registering attendance were equipped with
laptops to speed up the procedure. Pieces of information such as TINs, business name, tax
centre, name of the legal representative, phone numbers, were already in the list. Therefore,
attending taxpayers simply had to identify themselves and tick for attendance.43
The new registration activity produced more reliable attendance lists.44 Overall, at-
tendance data from all trainings (see Table A2) held in the country is available:
i 3 trainings in the survey sample, Kicukiro, Musanze and Rubavu
ii 4 trainings in the rural areas, implemented in November–December 2017, in Huye,
Muhanga, Nyagatare and Rusizi
42Previously, attendance was tracked with a paper form passed in the room where attendees were supposed
to write by hand few personal details, such as the attendee and business’ name, but not the Tax Identi-
fication Number (TIN). A first inspection of the previous hard-copy attendance forms revealed that this
registration procedure was likely to be flawed and produced unclear data on attendance. More impor-
tantly, the absence of TIN information meant that RRA could not easily identify the business and the
taxpayers as registered in its records, with no possibility to link attendance to tax returns data.
43Separate variables were indicating whether the taxpayer himself was the one surveyed at the baseline or
a delegate for him. Given that access to the trainings is open to anyone interested, a separate Excel sheet
was used to collect information on all those attendees who had been not surveyed, for example taxpayers
from other tax centres, or those registered after July 31 or in previous years.
44As a result, the measurement of attendance in each district has become much more precise and the new
procedure has been extended to all the RRA trainings for the rest of year.
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iii 3 trainings in 3 tax centres in Kigali (Kicukiro, Gasabo and Nyarugenge), held (twice)
in January–February 2018.45
Data from ii) and iii) refer to the population of new taxpayers invited to the trainings (see
Table 2.2 below) and are used to question the external validity of the impacts measured in
the survey sample (see section 2.7.1).
Administrative data
Access to administrative data has been officially granted by RRA. It consists of different
types of anonymised tax data.46 First, the CIT and PIT taxpayer registry, accessed at
the beginning of August 2017, contains the information needed to select the study sample,
such as registration date, tax centre and type of business. Each taxpayer is assigned a TIN
thanks to which I am able to observe his filing behavior and link survey data both with
attendance data and declaration data. Second, data from CIT and PIT declarations for
2017 fiscal year constitute the key source to analyse the impact on filing behaviour, namely
the amount of tax declared, if any.47 However, this also implies that I have no baseline
administrative data for these new taxpayers, as they never filed a declaration before.48
Declaration data has been available only after the end of the fiscal period. With the filing
deadline being March 31, I received the data by mid-April 2018. Additional sets of data
have been used to clean the main registry and run side checks: moto-taxi, VAT registered
taxpayers, prepayments datasets (see section 2.4.2).
A key feature of this study is the ability to merge survey data with administrative data.
Any impact found in the administrative data can be corroborated by the analysis of survey
responses. In fact, tax returns capture filing behavior in a more accurate way than what
can be measured through questionnaires. Survey respondents often do not provide honest
45In Kicukiro, taxpayers registered from August 2017 are invited, so to exclude those already invited to the
training in August 21, included in the survey sample. All taxpayers registered in Gasabo and Nyarugenge
from January 2017 are invited in those tax centers.
46While taxpayer’s name and contact details are removed, I can access all information included in the
registration/declaration forms.
47Full information on turnover, costs of goods and services sold, gross profits, deductions, allowances and
expenses is available too.
48At least, they have not with the TIN number they recently obtained. I cannot observe whether they
previously had another TIN number, which however could refer to a completely separate business.
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answers about income.49 Administrative data can solve these problems because it include
information on declared income and actual tax payments. At the same time, one of the
drawbacks of administrative data is the limited range of variables available in tax returns,
typically only sector and location (or a few others) in addition to financial variables related
to income, expenses and the tax base. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that the the
amount of tax declared only captures the information that taxpayers decided to disclose
to the authority, while income from the informal economy or just misreported (blatant
evasion, legal but informal activities, etc.) is unobserved.50
With these data sources available, three specific sub-samples are created. For surveyed
taxpayers, I have all information from all three data sources described above (administra-
tive, attendance, and survey data). Beyond the survey sample, I can still rely on attendance
information and administrative data for the whole population of new taxpayers who reg-
istered in 2017. Table 2.2 summarises the key data sources by groups of taxpayers that I
will use in the analysis.
Table 2.2: Available data by evaluation groups
Group Attendance Admin data Survey
Population of new TPs: all TPs registered
in any district anytime in 2017
X X ×
Survey reference population: all new TPs
registered in Kicukiro, Musanze and Rubavu
in Jan-July 2017 (encouragement design)
X X ×
Survey sample: random selection from sur-
vey reference population (naive estimation and
PSM)
X X X
49Obtaining honest answers about taxpayers’ compliance is typically one of the major challenges in tax
compliance research, especially in studies based on survey data.
50It still possible to infer compliance, in terms of income under-reporting, by comparing taxpayers who
received a certain intervention to those who did not, for example a letter in the typical nudging RCT




The trainings under study are the first three trainings from the 2017/2018 RRA plan.
They include one district from Kigali (Kicukiro) and two from the Northern Province
(Musanze and Rubavu districts).51 The training in Kigali was held on August 21 2017,
while trainings in Musanze and Rubavu took place at the end of the month, August 29
and 30 2017, respectively.
The target population is derived from the list of taxpayers who registered for income
tax, both personal and corporate, in 2017, as provided by RRA (section 2.4.1). Adminis-
trative data contain details of a total of 16,260 new taxpayers, registered across the country
from January 1 2017 to June 31 2017. After restricting eligibility to the three districts of
interest, respondents without phone number, the 4% of the population, are dropped. Like-
wise, a small number (2%) of moto-taxi taxpayers, who follow a different tax regime, are
removed. The final target population for the three districts under study amounts to 2,551
taxpayers. Of these, the target sample size was set at one thousand, the maximum number
of individuals that it was possible to survey with the available budget.52 The population
is thus composed: 64% taxpayers are from Kicukiro, 20.4% from Rubavu and 15.6% from
Musanze.
Enumerators surveying taxpayers also invited them to the training. As already ex-
plained in section 2.3.3, RRA usually invites the whole pool of new registrations with a
SMS, while taxpayers in this sample received an additional, more formal, invitation by the
enumerators.
Crucial to the identification strategy of this study, it is worth stressing that the ran-
domisation happens at the invitation-to-the-training level. Indeed, the survey company
51The first location, Kicukiro, is a busy urban district in Kigali with a population of 320,000 people (2012),
where a big number of taxpayers register every year: in the first six months of 2017, 13% of all new
registered taxpayers in Rwanda are from Kicukiro, making it the third largest tax center in the country.
Musanze and Rubavu are much smaller centres outside of Kigali (3% of the total pool of new registrations
each), with both urban and rural population totalling about 86,000 people in each city (2015).
52The survey company was provided with the full list of 2,551 taxpayers with the instruction to stop
surveying when reaching a sample size of 1,000.
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randomised the call order. I use this random allocation to the survey sample as the basis
of the encouragement design, which is discussed in more detail in section 2.4.3. This type
of randomisation represents the best feasible option in a setting where attendance to the
training cannot be denied.
A total of 1,007 respondents are interviewed at the baseline, while all the remaining
contacts in the list are left out. Enumerators had to attempt to call 1,621 taxpayers to
achieve the target, randomly replacing unreachable taxpayers. The main reasons individu-
als are not interviewed are that phone numbers were not valid or not available at the time
of the call, while refusals to join the survey are pretty low.53 In other words, the success
rate of the baseline survey is 62% (1,007/1,621) with a failure rate of 38%.
Appendix Table A7 provides t-test statistics on the differences between business in the
sample and those left out.54 An additional column reports the ∆, the so-called normalised
difference from Imbens and Rubin (2015). ∆ is a scale-free measure of the difference in
locations, equal to the difference in means, scaled by the square root of the average of the
two within-group variances (Imbens and Rubin, 2015).55 While businesses’ life in month
is well balanced across surveyed and non-surveyed unit, it was more difficult to contact
respondents from Kigali and who remit CIT. ∆ statistics for location dummies is beyond
the 0.25 threshold of significance. For this reason, over-representation of rural areas is
addressed using sample weights throughout the analysis, which restore the balance at the
location level and the representativeness of the sample.
One week after the training, enumerators attempted to reach the same respondents for
a follow-up. A subset of 186 taxpayers is not found at the endline, implying an attrition
rate of 18% (186/1,007).56 Overall, attrition can be considered relatively low and implies
a final sample of 821 taxpayers for which data is available both pre- and post-intervention.
53Two percent only.
54Unfortunately, very little information is available from the taxpayer registry (only 3 covariates).
55As Imbens and Rubin (2015) report, the t-statistic may be large in absolute value simply because the
sample is large and, as a result, small differences between the two sample means are statistically significant
even if they are substantively small. Large values for the normalised differences, in contrast, indicate that
the average covariate values in the two groups are substantially different.
56Common types of attritors include (i) 143 respondents who cannot be reached on the phone, (ii) 33
respondents who do not have time for the survey, postpone it and do not pick up when called back, and
(iii) 10 respondents who say they do not wish to participate without giving a reason.
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Appendix Tables A8 and A9 report balance tests comparing non-attrited and attrited
taxpayers. Women and less educated respondents are slightly less likely to be found,
together with people who are not owning the business. Likewise, when considering outcome
variables, attrition is more likely to happen for people with a lower complexity score and
less satisfaction with health and security. From a statistical perspective, attrition does not
pose an insurmountable problem: only one variable (owner) among the many tested is
above the 0.25 threshold of the normalised difference.
Coaching sample
As mentioned in section 2.3.3, this study compares the main RRA education program
with an alternative input: the one-to-one coaching program. The motivation for piloting
this activity is twofold. First, when collecting feedback on the program at endline, many
taxpayers signalled that they would benefit from some form of complement to the training
program. About 40% of attendees mentioned that the session was too short, and that there
was not sufficient time for questions. Second, a growing number of studies have shown that
a more intensive and personalised approach might be beneficial. In the financial education
literature, personalised counselling is shown to be a useful alternative to more standard
financial education, to increase real financial outcomes (Carpena et al., 2015). The very
scarce literature on tax coaching does not seem to be fully conclusive on this respect, and
it only concerns high-income countries (Chetty and Saez, 2013; Gangl et al., 2014).
The sample for the 1-1 coaching treatment is derived from the subset of respondents
who did not attend the training – in order to compare them with the trainees. As will
be described in section 2.5.2, 572 taxpayers did not attend. Half of them (293) are ran-
domly selected to be in the coaching group. The strata used are four: gender, location
(in/out Kigali), business’ size and baseline tax knowledge. Appendix Table A10 shows
that the coaching sample and the control group (Training group excluded) share the same
characteristics across most covariates as well as knowledge and perceptions outcomes.57
Two rounds of coaching calls are made, one in mid-February and the other in mid-
57In the balance tables, the non-coaching sample consists of non-attendees not selected for the coaching.
Strata are included too (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009). Just 2 out of 23 covariates are unbalanced (no
school or primary and perception of taxation as social duty) and I assume it is just a random result.
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March. The first wave reached 216 taxpayers (out of 293 assigned to this treatment), 57%
of whom had at least one tax-related question. Similarly, the second wave contacted 182
taxpayers, with a third having a question. In order to be conservative, I consider as treated
those taxpayers receiving at least one call in any of the two rounds, even if they do not
have a tax-related question.58 In conclusion, the coaching treated sample consists of 160
taxpayers.59 Those taxpayers who were not reached at all are included again in the control
group of respondents who did not receive any of the two alternative education treatments.
2.4.3 Identification strategy
Näıve estimation
The first estimation strategy can be labelled näıve. It regresses outcomes on treatment indi-
cator variables using an OLS estimation so to get the difference in outcomes between atten-
dees and non-attendees. The näıve estimates represent the benchmark to which to compare
more robust models. When looking at tax compliance outcomes, I estimate pseudo-ATEs
with the following specifications:
Yi = αi + β11{Training}i +XiΓi + ZiΦi + εi (2.1)
Yi = αi + β11{Coaching}i +XiΓi + ZiΦi + εi (2.2)
It is worth stressing that the näıve estimation of the training impact will be improved
with more robust methods, since attendance to the training is not random. On the other
hand, the estimation of coaching effects is more straightforward since it builds on the
stratified random assignment to the treatment. Hence, coefficients from equation 3 can be
considered as causal estimates, with no further improvement required.
58I assume that the coaching treatment could be effective even just signalling that the authority is client-
oriented enough to offer a free service to taxpayers. Plus, the perceived audit risk may be affected even
just by the fact that RRA is calling and knows that the taxpayer exists.
59The low compliance with the treatment and lacking records are mostly due to capacity constraints on
RRA’s side, as the staff allocated to this task were few and spread thin across a number of other duties.
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In the specifications above, I add both the vector of individual-level covariates Xi (more
on this below) and the vector Zi of tax knowledge and attitudes at the baseline, which are
likely to be key determinants of subsequent filing behavior. Covariates used as strata in
randomising the assignment to coaching are included in the Xi vector in equation 3 as well.
The error terms are robust and clusterised at the individual level.
In terms of reporting outcomes, tax compliance is a multi-faceted concept that encom-
passes various different aspects, including registration, filing a declaration, doing so in time,
reporting the correct amount of tax base, and paying in full and on time (Slemrod, 2019).
It is therefore important to consider multiple outcomes in the analysis. Here I focus on
three aspects that are particularly relevant to new taxpayers: the probability to declare,
the probability to nil-file, and the amount of tax declared.
When it comes to investigating possible mechanisms, two sets of outcomes from the
survey sample are considered: i) tax knowledge and ii) tax perceptions. The estimating
equation reads:
Yi = αi + βi1{Training}i + γiY0i +XiΓ + εi (2.3)
Where 1{Training}i is an indicator variable that equals 1 if individual i attended
the training and βi is the coefficient of interest. In order to improve statistical precision, I
include the baseline value Y0i of the outcome (McKenzie, 2012). In equations (1) to (3), the
vector of individual-level covariates, Xi, includes age (in years), a female gender indicator
variable, a dummy for businesses of large size (more than 20 employees), time in months
since registration and a number of dummies for primary education only, university degree,
being CIT registered, business location in Kigali, use of email, bank account, books of
accounts, whether the taxpayer manages taxes by himself (and the number of days spent
in tax matters in a year), as well as whether he had a previous business or a previous
training.60 As above, the error term εi are robust to heteroskedasticity and clusterised at
the individual level.
Different tax knowledge outcomes are considered: i) a dummy for knowledge increase
after the training, ii) a continuous variable for knowledge gain in percentage points and iii)
the 0-10 index. For attitudes and perceptions, I will provide results on: i) seven indexes,
60Appendix Table A3 lists the covariates used.
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and ii) 13 separate attitudes variables. The creation of such outcomes has been described
in detail in section 2.4.1.
Dealing with self-selection Estimating the equations above poses a number of techni-
cal challenges. First, training attendance is not randomised, due to RRA’s explicit policy
intention to keep it open to all new taxpayers who might find it useful. Therefore, I cannot
assume the two groups I compare to be randomly equal. Second, always due to the lack of
randomisation, taxpayers may self-select into the training. This implies that there could be
unobservables in the error term explaining the decision to attend and also influencing the
outcomes, thus biasing the results. My approach to tackle these issues is to adopt different
econometric methods that, at least in part, take care of self-selection.
Propensity score matching
Propensity score matching (PSM) estimators (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) have become
increasingly popular in medical trials and in the evaluation of economic policy interventions
mostly because matching on the propensity scores helps approximate randomised trial.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define the propensity score as the conditional probability
of assignment to a treatment given a vector of covariates. In this setting, the probability pi
of attending the training is allowed to depend on covariates Xi and the vector of baseline
outcomes Y0i (see section 2.4.3).
61 These individual-level assignment probabilities pi are
called propensity scores and derived with a Logit function.
A first identifying assumption is unconfoundedness or strong ignorability (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983) and requires that treatment exposure is independent of potential out-
comes. Ideally, if all confounders are included in Xi, the independence holds after control-
ling for Xi. Under this assumption, adjusting for the propensity score only is enough to
remove all confounding. Unconfoundedness is untestable. However, as I show below, atten-
dees and non-attendees are similar based on Xi (and baseline outcomes), thus supporting
the adoption of PSM.
A second relevant assumption is the overlap or common support condition. It states
that the probability of assignment is bounded away from zero and one, meaning that
61Therefore, I suppose that adjusting for a set of covariates is sufficient to eliminate selection bias.
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individuals with the same score can be either attendees or non-attendees, as if a completely
randomised experiment were carried out. In this case, the overlap assumption nicely holds:
Figure A6 shows how the probability distributions of attendees and non-attendees are
mostly overlapping.62
Next, I estimate average treatment effects using different matching algorithms. These
are: i) nearest-neighbor matching with replacement,63 ii) radius-caliper matching with a
radius of 0.5,64 and iii) Epanechnikov kernel matching with bandwidth 0.06.65 As usually
done in the literature, standard errors are estimated with the bootstrapping technique.66
Moreover, the quality of the matching is evaluated. Ideally, the matching procedure
should be able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the control
and treatment group. Many different techniques to test the matching quality exist. The
basic idea of all approaches is to compare the covariates’ distributions before and after
matching and check if any differences remain after conditioning on the propensity score.
In the results tables, I report two estimates of balance: (i) the pseudo-R2s before and after
matching from Sianesi (2004),67 and (ii) a likelihood ratio test on the joint significance of
62Only two taxpayers are out of the common support and are removed from the analysis
63The taxpayer from the non-attendees group is chosen as a matching partner for a trained taxpayer that
is closest in terms of the propensity score. With replacement, an untrained taxpayer is used more than
once as a match.
64Applying caliper matching means that a taxpayer from the untrained group is chosen as a matching
partner for a treated taxpayer that lies within a given distance of pi (caliper) and thus is closest in terms
of propensity score.
65Kernel matching (and local linear matching) are nonparametric matching estimators that use weighted
averages of (nearly) all individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. How
many individuals are chosen from the control group depends on the kernel function. Weights depend on
the distance between each individual from the control group and the participant observation for which
the counterfactual is estimated.
66An early example of bootstrapping with PSM is found in Heckman et al. (1997) who report bootstrap
standard errors for LLM estimators. Other application examples are Black and Smith (2004) for nearest-
neighbour and kernel matching estimators or Sianesi (2004) in the context of caliper matching. Each
bootstrap draw implies the re-estimation of the results, including the first steps of the estimation (propen-
sity score, common support, etc.). Repeating the bootstrapping N times leads to N bootstrap samples
and N estimated average treatment effects. The distribution of these means approximates the sampling
distribution (and thus the standard error) of the population mean.
67Sianesi (2004) recommends to reestimate the score on the matched sample, i.e. only on attendees and
matched non-attendees, and compare the pseudo-R2s before and after matching. In this case, the pseudo-
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all regressors in the Logit model. According to (i), the pseudo-R2s after matching should
be close to zero,68 while, in terms of (ii), the test should not be rejected before (since
balance is not achieved), and should be rejected after (when the score balances the two
groups), matching. It can be seen that it is the case in all PSM results below.
Finally, PSM can be implemented on the survey sample alone (see Table 2.2) for which
the features to build the score are available.
IV strategy
The intuition behind the adoption of the IV strategy is that, while I cannot randomise
training attendance, I can at least randomise the invitation to the training and then use
the random invitation as an instrument for the training attendance.69 The encouragement
consists of the random survey itself, at the beginning of which enumerators made sure that
respondents knew about the date and location of the training.
The encouragement can be considered as unintended because this information would
have been redundant in presence of a comprehensive invitation process by RRA, which
should have in principle reached all newly registered taxpayers. However, administrative
constraints in the RRA department in charge of invitations meant that, in practice, many
taxpayers did not receive the invitation and, thus, did not know about the program. As a
result, exposure to the program was much higher for the surveyed taxpayers (49% attended)
than for the remaining ones (15%). It can be argued that the main, or perhaps even the
only, reason for this difference is that the first survey round happened a week before the
training, and therefore served as a reminder to attend. The questionnaire did not include
any incentive for attendance, and respondents were informed that data was being collected
by an independent company and used in anonymised format only for research purposes.
In this setting, two groups are created at random: 827 taxpayers who are called and
R2 indicates the explanatory power of the covariates Xi and Y0i on the probability to attend the training.
After matching there should be no additional systematic differences in the distribution of covariates
between the two groups and therefore the pseudo-R2 should be fairly low.
68Or, at least, smaller than the pseudo-R2s on the unmatched sample.
69This is in line with the frequent setting of encouragement design where it is impossible to force people
to take up at treatment but the encouragement is randomly assigned. For a theoretical discussion see
Angrist and Pischke (2009).
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surveyed and 1551 who are left out.70 Using the random invite as an instrument, I can purge
the training treatment T of its correlation with the error term ε in the main specification
(section 2.4.3) and produce less biased estimates.71
In order to be valid, the instrument must be: (i) correlated with the endogenous ex-
planatory variable (relevance condition); (ii) but uncorrelated with the error term (exclu-
sion restriction). While it is possible to test (i), it is not possible to verify directly (ii), since
the error term is unobservable. In terms of testing (i), the first-stage result confirms that
the instrument is relevant and significantly affecting training attendance (more in section
2.7.5) . Relatedly, while actual attendance is 49% for the survey sample, it falls to 15% for
the out-of-the-survey sample. For what concerns (ii), section 2.7.5 shows different tests on
the plausibility of the exclusion restriction.
Although the encouragement design allows to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of the
program, the fact that it relies on both surveyed and non-surveyed taxpayers means that I
cannot use the full dataset. More precisely, I can only use administrative and attendance
data, since the survey is only available for part of the survey reference population that I
use for the encouragement design (see Table 2.2). At the same time, PSM is limited by
data availability and it cannot control for unobservables which, in turn, are addressed by
the random invitation used in the IV strategy. For this reason, I consider the IV as the
most robust and conservative strategy to measure impacts in this study.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Anatomy of invitees at baseline
Since I have no baseline administrative data, in this section I rely mostly on the survey
to provide an anatomy of new taxpayers before the program. In the first three columns
70The group of surveyed taxpayers exclude those assigned to the coaching treatment, which is not covered
in this section. I will focus on instrumenting attendance to the training only.
71More specifically, instrumenting gets rid of the bad variation in T, which compromises identification
because it entails that Cov(T, ε) 6= 0 - while keeping only the good variation in T - that part of the
variation in T that is uncorrelated with ε.
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of Table 2.3, summary statistics of the sample are displayed.72 First, as expected, new
taxpayers are a relatively homogeneous group of small businesses: over 90% have less than
5 employees and many have no employee (besides the owner).73 In almost 80% of the cases,
the invitee is the owner of the firm. Average business practices are poor: only 25% use
emails for business-related communications, 44% have a bank account,74 while 47% make
use of books of account. Second, for what concerns invitees’ demographic background, the
average respondent is 33 years old and a woman in a third of the cases. About 20% have
primary education at most, while a sizeable 44% report to have university education.75
Third, when looking at tax-related characteristics, it results that only 6% of the sample
had a previous tax training. When asked about the main reason they had to formalise,
obeying the law is mentioned by almost 70% of the sample while only rarely the fear of
sanctions from being illegal is the key reason to register.76 Strikingly enough, 94% of the
sample acknowledges that the main reason to attend the RRA training is that they “need
to know more about taxes”.
In the same fashion, Table 2.4 provides baseline values of the variables of interest,
knowledge and perceptions. On the one hand, knowledge at baseline is very low. Out of
19 questions in our knowledge module, respondents in the sample answer correctly to only
6 of them, or 3.4 correct answers once I re-scale the knowledge index to take values from
72Note that the sample here is defined as the 971 taxpayers for which survey data could be matched with
TINs in the attendance sheets. Due to some issues in the logistics of attendance registration, the survey
company was unable to track all the 1007 taxpayers invited at the baseline in the data collection process.
For 36 taxpayers TIN could not be found.
73More specifically, about 48% of the sample have no other employee, while another 39% have less than 5
employees.
74According to the 2017 Global Findex, 38% of Rwandan adults (aged 15+) in labor force have an account
with a regulated financial service provider, declining from 42% in 2011 and 45% in 2014. In comparison,
the average rate of account ownership in the East Africa Community (Burundi excluded) is 39% as of
2017.
75This result is not surprising. Anecdotal evidence from RRA tells a story of a high number of young
business enthusiasts responding to Government calls for them to start their own business after completing
university. The Government encourages business creation for the overall goal of sustaining the economic
growth of the country.
76At the same time, taxpayers are aware that many constraints prevent business to be legal: too small size
(27%), too high taxes (25%) and lack of knowledge about the benefits of regulating their position with
the State.
67
Table 2.3: Baseline Characteristics and Mean Differences by Attendance
Baseline results Non-attendees Attendees
Mean St.dev Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Diff. ∆
Covariates
Age 33.08 9.37 971 32.48 604 34.08 367 -1.61∗∗∗ 0.17
Female 0.32 0.47 971 0.31 604 0.34 367 -0.02 0.05
No school or primary 0.19 0.40 971 0.21 604 0.17 367 0.03 -0.08
University degree 0.45 0.50 971 0.46 604 0.44 367 0.02 -0.04
Owner 0.78 0.42 971 0.76 604 0.80 367 -0.03 0.08
CIT 0.47 0.50 971 0.44 604 0.51 367 -0.07 0.13
>5 employees 0.09 0.29 971 0.08 604 0.11 367 -0.04∗∗ 0.13
Life in months 4.62 2.01 952 4.56 598 4.64 382 -0.08 0.04
Kigali 0.49 0.50 951 0.52 569 0.43 382 0.09∗∗∗ -0.17
Email use 0.25 0.44 971 0.25 604 0.26 367 -0.01 0.02
Bank Account 0.44 0.50 971 0.42 604 0.48 367 -0.05 0.11
Books 0.47 0.50 971 0.46 604 0.50 367 -0.04 0.08
Had previous business 0.21 0.41 971 0.20 604 0.22 367 -0.02 0.04
Had previous training 0.07 0.25 971 0.07 604 0.06 367 0.01 -0.06
Tax time use days 1.86 4.99 710 1.90 432 1.78 278 0.12 -0.03
# RRA visits 1.36 2.31 845 1.44 521 1.23 324 0.21 -0.09
Reasons to formalize
Obeying the Law 0.70 0.46 971 0.70 604 0.70 367 -0.00 0.00
Better reputation 0.26 0.44 971 0.24 604 0.28 367 -0.03 0.08
Constraints to formalize
Business too small 0.27 0.44 971 0.25 604 0.31 367 -0.07∗∗ 0.15
High tax rate 0.25 0.43 971 0.26 604 0.24 367 0.02 -0.04
No knowledge abt process 0.13 0.33 971 0.12 604 0.14 367 -0.02 0.05
No knowledge abt benefits 0.15 0.35 971 0.15 604 0.14 367 0.01 -0.02
Reasons to attend the training
I need to know more 0.94 0.24 929 0.93 565 0.95 364 -0.02 0.08
Compulsory to attend 0.26 0.44 929 0.21 565 0.32 364 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.24
I’m curious about training 0.16 0.37 929 0.17 565 0.15 364 0.01 -0.03
Observations weighted by sampling weights. T-test are computed on the Difference across the two groups. ∗ p <
0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. ∆ is the normalized difference from Imbens and Rubin (2015), equal to the difference
in means, scaled by the square root of the average of the two within-group variances.
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0 to 10.77 No respondent gave the right answer to all questions. Interestingly, 37% of
the respondents do not know what tax type they registered for. This clearly confirms the
importance of organising taxpayer education trainings in Rwanda, as well as the presence of
large margins for improvement. Low knowledge of the basic parameters of the tax system is
also consistent with the fact that most new taxpayers in Rwanda fail to make a declaration
in the first year since registration, as explained in section 2.3.2.
On the other hand, perceptions are generally good at baseline. Virtually all taxpayers
agreed with the tax attitude statements I provided, for example on the government’s au-
thority to make people pay tax (95%), fairness of the tax system (98%), and tax as a social
duty (98%). These figures are fully in line with the Rwandan context and the government
rhetoric of self-reliance but also more objectively corroborate by international assessment
(Table 2.1). The perceived enforcement likelihood is also very high (98%). At the same
time, complexity of the tax system matters: 70% of the sample agree that filing tax is
complex. Taxpayers with lower tax knowledge find tax filing more difficult.78 Satisfaction
with public goods is also very high, with security ranking first. Appendix table A5 reports
the distribution of answers for the 13 questions in the perceptions module. Having very
high percentages of agreement with many of the statements included means that I should
not expect the training to have much effect in increasing them further.79
2.5.2 Attendance and self-selection
When surveyed, as many as 97% of the taxpayers say that they will attend the training,
as shown in Table 2.3. However, actual attendance rates were not as high. A total of
367 taxpayers out of 971 surveyed actually attended, or 37.8%.80 To be conservative, I
77Lower education, location outside of the capital, being female, and smaller business size are all associated
with lower tax knowledge - although not all of these differences are statistically significant.
78Taxpayers who agree with the “difficult to file statement” have an average knowledge score of 3.2, while
taxpayers disagreeing have a score of 3.6, with a p-value of the t-test of the difference in averages of 0%.
79Relatedly, it must be emphasised that all types of survey data may be subject to social desirability bias
and other forms of measurement error, in particular when asking about sensitive topics, such as politics
and tax evasion (Mullainathan and Bertrand, 2001; Krosnick, 1999).
80As already stated in section 2.5.1, note that 971 are those taxpayers the survey company was able to
track in the data collection process. See footnote 72. Also, note that the attendance rate is lower than
the what mentioned in section 2.4.3 in the context of the IV strategy, since, in that case, the coaching
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Table 2.4: Baseline Outcomes and Mean Differences by Attendance
Baseline results Non-attendees Attendees
Mean St.dev Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Diff. ∆
Baseline Knowledge Index 6.35 2.92 971 6.29 604 6.46 367 -0.17 0.06
Complexity 0.70 0.46 939 0.69 579 0.72 360 -0.03 0.06
Evasion attitude 0.33 0.47 924 0.33 572 0.34 352 -0.01 0.02
Fairness 0.98 0.14 932 0.98 578 0.98 354 0.00 -0.00
Govt Authority 0.95 0.21 950 0.95 591 0.96 359 -0.01 0.04
Social duty 0.98 0.14 969 0.98 602 0.99 367 -0.01 0.06
Enforcement 0.98 0.15 969 0.98 604 0.98 365 0.00 -0.03
Public Service Satisfaction
Health 3.39 1.17 961 3.38 597 3.42 364 -0.04 0.04
Education 3.50 1.16 957 3.47 595 3.54 362 -0.08 0.02
WASH 3.35 1.23 965 3.35 599 3.34 366 0.00 0.08
Electricity 3.81 1.03 967 3.83 600 3.78 367 0.06 0.10
Security 4.69 0.60 968 4.68 601 4.70 367 -0.03 0.10
Infrastructure 4.16 0.82 965 4.17 600 4.16 365 0.01 0.01
Observations weighted by sampling weights. T-tests are computed on the Difference across the two groups. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. ∆ is the normalized difference from Imbens and Rubin (2015), equal to the
difference in means, scaled by the square root of the average of the two within-group variances.
assign the attendance status to a given taxpayer if both her reported attendance in the
endline survey and the actual attendance as collected during the training are the same.
Among the reasons for not attending, the most common are Busy at work - No time
(32%) and Sickness (his or his parents’) (30%), followed by Lack of information/reminder
- Forgetfulness(13%). While I do not argue that attendance is random, the fact that these
reasons are rather ad-hoc may suggest that there is some element of randomness in the
decision to attend. As a matter of fact, very few non-attendees gave answers that would
make me think attendance is related to unobserved factors (e.g. didn’t think it would be
useful, or prefer to learn from other sources).
Next, the remaining columns of Table 2.3 display the differences between attendees and
non-attendees. From the observable characteristics on hand, it seems that self-selection into
the training does not represent an issue. The table shows that most variables are balanced.
sample (formed by non-attendees) was removed from the calculations, hence the higher rate.
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Only three background covariates appear to have a statistically significant difference be-
tween the two groups: age, large, and Kigali. While the latter reflects higher attendance
rates outside of the capital, differences in the former two variables are quite small in mag-
nitude. Attendees are on average 1.6 years older and 4% more likely to be large. The
difference in the compulsory reason for attending is also predictable: non-attendees are
much less likely to be required to attend the training due to their role in the business.
Likewise, I do not believe that a difference of 7% in one of the reasons to formalise is rel-
evant to create imbalance, given that respondents are already registered and all visible to
the authority. Additionally, following Imbens and Rubin (2015), if I examine not just the
statistical significance of balance tests but the normalised difference ∆ across treatment
and control, there are no normalised differences greater than 0.25, the benchmark they
suggest in testing for balance. This confirms that the two groups are balanced and the dif-
ferences of unbalanced covariates are not significant once I make them scale independent.
Nonetheless, to be conservative, all covariates, including the three imbalanced ones, are
included in the Xi vector in the main specification (see section 2.4.3).
More importantly, there is no difference in baseline knowledge and perceptions between
attendees and non-attendees. In principle, it was correct to expect that taxpayers with
lower knowledge were more likely to attend a training. As shown in Table 2.4, key per-
ceptions that are expected to be correlated with the decision to attend, such as the fear
of audits or State legitimacy, are similar across groups. These attitudes are also likely to
be correlated with other unobservables, such as intrinsic motivation to learn about taxes.
The as if random balance between attendees and non-attendees gives some relevance to
the näıve and PSM estimation, as well.
2.5.3 Did the training and coaching increase tax filing?
A unique feature of this study is that it combines survey data with administrative data
(section 2.4.1). The analysis of tax returns for the fiscal year 2017 provides direct evidence
on the capacity of education strategies to enhance revenue collection. In this section, I
start the analysis by addressing my main research question: does taxpayer education affect
compliance?
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Training Table 2.5 Panel A reports näıve impact estimates on the probability to declare
(column 1) and positive filing (the opposite of nil-filing, column 2) as well as on the amount
of tax declared (column 3). Outcomes for declaring and positive filing are dummy variables,
while tax declared is operationalised by log(tax+1).81 By construction, non-filers and
nil-filers are assigned a tax amount of zero. All treatment effects in the table are to
be interpreted relative to the control group who did not receive any educational inputs.
Coefficients in columns 1-2 are marginal effects from probit regressions evaluated at the
mean of other covariates, while columns 3 reports marginal effects from tobit regression.
Given the large share of nil-filers reporting zero income, the tobit model is well suited to
censored data since it allows to include nil-filers in the sample.82 Specifications include
two sets of control: taxpayer’s covariates (section 2.4.3) and a set of tax knowledge and
attitudes variables from at baseline.
According to the näıve estimates, the training is highly effective across all three tax
compliance outcomes: it increases declaration rates by over 9 percentage points (column 1),
decreases nil-filing by 7.5 percentage points (column 2), and increases log remitted tax by
0.372 (column 3). All these effects are statistically significant and economically large. When
estimates from PSM are considered in Panel B, it can be noticed that, while impacts are
consistent and significant for filing and positive filing probability, the significance vanishes
for the amount of tax declared. This finding is suggestive of some potential self-selection
bias distorting the näıve estimates: OLS specification could be overestimating impacts on
tax declared probably because those taxpayers who are more likely to remit more taxes are
more likely to self-select into the training.
The more robust estimates from the IV strategy in Panel C further address a possible
selection bias. Once instrumenting training attendance with the random invite, only the
impact on the probability to file remains significant, with an increase of 15 percentage
points, while I lose evidence on the other two outcomes. This may be due to the larger
81I do not consider log(tax), as log(0) is undefined. This involves throwing away information, and ignoring
a significant segment of the sample who is nilfiling (62%). Logs are also the best option to control for
highly skewed distribution, such as the one of tax declared.
82For the same reason that motivates me to adopt it here, the tobit model has been used in other studies
in the tax experiments literature, (Slemrod and Weber, 2012; Alm and McClellan, 2012; Alm et al., 2010;
Coricelli et al., 2010).
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standard errors that are inherent to the two-stage IV estimation – or it could be a genuine
reflection of ineffectiveness of the program on these outcomes, once a more rigorous esti-
mation method is used. Importantly, the lack of a detectable effect on the tax amount is
in line with the results of the only other study on a similar topic, Chetty and Saez (2013).
In sum, the training seems to be highly effective in increasing the probability to file
when considering the most conservative method. For the comparison group, non atten-
dees, the declaration rate is 35%. Compared to this level, an increase of 15 percentage
points corresponds to a 43% increase in the probability to declare, which I attribute to the
program.
Coaching Once gauged the impact of the training, I now turn to the coaching interven-
tion. Capacity constraints affected the implementation of the service, as this pilot program
resulted to be relatively burdensome for the tax administration, even if it only involved a
relatively small number of taxpayers. About half of the taxpayers assigned to the coaching
actually received it. To take this partial take-up into account, Table 2.6 reports results
using both ITT (intention-to-treat) and TOT (treatment-on-treated) specifications. While
the former considers all taxpayers randomly assigned to coaching as intentionally treated,
the latter uses the random allocation as an instrument for treatment status (i.e. the 160
that were effectively called in both rounds).
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that taxpayers appreciated the coaching call,
results do not seem to show that this pilot was successful, especially when compared to the
main program’s effects (see Table 2.5).83 This is potentially due to low compliance with
the treatment, both because of the limited number of taxpayers who were actually reached
(even if this is taken into account with TOT) and the fact that some of those reached did
not have any question or only spent a very short time on the call, as explained in section
2.4.2.
83Note that in Table 2.6 I have dropped the group of attendees, which is why the the number of observations
is smaller than in Table 2.5. However, results are still not statistically significant if I include them and
control for their attendance status.
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Table 2.5: Program impact on tax outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Declare Positive Log Tax
Panel A: Näıve estimation
Training 0.094∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.024) (0.084)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Control group Y 0.35 0.11 0.860
Observations 969 969 969
Panel B: Kernel Matching
Training 0.08∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.34
(0.031) (0.030) (0.712)
Common Support 807 807 807
Ps-R2 matched 0.002 0.046 0.056
LR chi2 matched 2.14 25.78 29.18
Panel C: IV Strategy
Training 0.15∗∗ -0.01 0.45
(0.05) (0.07) (0.68)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.03 0.01
Observations 2378 2378 2378
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. Declare and Positive are dummy vari-
ables with value 1 if the taxpayers declared and positively
filed, respectively. Log Tax is the log(tax+1) transforma-
tion of the raw tax amount variable. In Panel A, coeffi-
cients are marginal effects from probit (1-2) and tobit (3)
regressions evaluated at mean. The control group are tax-
payers who did not receive any educational input. Covari-
ates and Knowledge and Perceptions used are those indi-
cated in section 2.4.3. All regressions weighted by sampling
weights. In Panel B, standard errors are bootstrapped from
999 repetitions. In Panel C, Training is instrumented by
the invite call. Coaching group has been dropped. Refer
to Table A26 for first-stage results.
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Table 2.6: Impacts of Coaching on Tax Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ITT Declare TOT Declare ITT Positive TOT Positive ITT Tax TOT Tax
Coaching 0.02 0.03 -0.13∗ -0.06 0.04 0.23
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.93)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Y 0.38 0.38 0.68 0.68 2.53 2.53
R2 0.312 0.352 0.283
Observations 618 618 618 618 618 618
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Coaching group is compared to control
group, i.e. taxpayers not attending. Training group is dropped. Covariates used are those indicated in section
2.4.3.
2.5.4 Longer-term effects: the role of habit
As discussed in section 2.2.4, taxpayer education provides information in a more in depth
and comprehensive way than other interventions, such as informational messages that
have been used in the literature on behavioural nudges. As such, I would expect it to
generate learning effects that extend beyond the first year post-intervention. To test this
expectation, this section investigates whether the effects on compliance last over time.
In addition to the data relative to fiscal year 2017, which I used for my main results, I
also obtained data for declarations relative to fiscal year 2018, filed between January and
March 2019. I use these data to track taxpayers in the survey and encouragement design
groups, and check whether the program effects last in the second year after registration.
The estimation methods are the same as those used in section 2.5, but the outcome is now
measured in year two, that is fiscal year 2018.
Appendix Table A14 reports results only on declaration rates, since it is the most robust
result from the main analysis. Table A14 provides some initial evidence that the program
continues to have a significant impact on the probability to declare in the second year
after registration.84 In Panel A, the coefficient of interest remains statistically significant,
84In the same fashion, Appendix Table A15 shows the results on outcomes measured in year 2 for the whole
population of new taxpayers.
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whether I control or not for filing status in year 1. The effect size of 10 percentage points
is comparable with the one from year 1 (see Table 2.5). The IV strategy produces a similar
impact estimate in column 1, which however turns insignificant when I control for filing
status in year 1.
I reinforce these results in two ways. First, I provide some descriptive evidence on the
persistence in declaration behaviour. I look at administrative data for taxpayers registered
before the study, for which I have a longer time series. A taxpayer who registered in 2015
and made a declaration in the first year (year 1) has a 55% probability of filing again the
following year (year 2) and a 86% probability for the year after that (year 3) – conditional
on having declared in year 2. On the contrary, a taxpayer who failed to file in the first
year has a negligible probability of ever making a declaration: 1% in year 2 and 0.2% in
year 3. The same pattern can be shown for the cohort of new taxpayers who registered
in 2017: those who declare in the first year are much more likely to keep declaring (77%),
while others are very unlikely to ever submit a declaration (6%).
Second, I recur to mediation analysis to quantify the contribution of filing behaviour
in year 1 caused by the intervention to its overall impact on filing behaviour in year 2. I
estimate the average controlled direct effect (ACDE) of the training (Vansteelandt, 2009;
Acharya et al., 2016). The mediation analysis framework implies that the training can
have both a direct impact on fling behaviours and an indirect impact which is channeled
through a mediator – in this case, filing behaviour in year 1. In this framework, the ACDE
is defined as the direct effect of the training, that is, the effect that the training would have
if the mediator (filing behaviour in year 1) was not allowed to respond to the intervention
and hence the indirect effect was removed.
The main assumption in order to identify the ACDE is the sequential unconfounded-
ness. According to Acharya et al. (2016), this amounts to assuming that there are no
omitted variables which confound the effect of the mediator on the outcome, conditional
on treatment and a set of pre-treatment controls (Acharya et al., 2016). The identification
of the ACDE proceeds in two steps. First, I regress the outcome (the filing probability
in year 2) on the mediator (the filing probability in year 1), the training dummy, a set of
controls, and the interaction between the mediator and all other variables. I then derive
the predicted value of the outcome fixing all mediators to zero. This is the demediated
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outcome, in the words of Acharya et al. (2016). In the second step, I regress the demedi-
ated outcome on the training dummy. The coefficients from this regression represent the
ACDE estimate. I obtain that the proportion of the total effect of the trainings on filing
behaviour in year 2 that is mediated by filing behaviour in year 1 is quite high – 59%.
These figures are highly suggestive that getting taxpayers into the habit of declaring is
crucial to their future compliance behaviour. A recent paper has shown that habit can be
a powerful driver of compliance – a finding that is consistent to the separate, but related,
literature on get-out-the-vote (Dunning et al., 2017). Further research is needed on the
medium and long-term effects of similar interventions.
2.6 Unpacking the training impacts
2.6.1 Evaluating alternative mechanisms
The previous section established the effectiveness of the training program on tax compli-
ance, particularly on the extensive margin (i.e. declaration rates). I now investigate what
is the channel through which this effect comes about. If compliance costs and taxpayer
confusion are the main mechanisms (as discussed in section 2.2.3), I would expect to see
program impacts particularly on knowledge and taxpayers’ perceptions about the complex-
ity of the tax system. Thanks to the survey, I can measure both variables, as well as others
capturing potential alternative mechanisms. Arguably, there are at least two other plau-
sible ones that might determine the final effect on compliance. The first one is deterrence
and enforcement. It is perfectly plausible to think that just the fact of being in touch with
RRA officials, who delivered the program as trainers, acted as a deterrent to non-compliant
behaviour. The second one is the set of factors captured by tax morale. The hypothesis
here is that the program might have improved taxpayers’ perceptions on trust and social
duty, amongst others, as they met friendly and helpful RRA officials whose main objective
was to provide useful information, rather than aggressively enforce tax laws. Peer effects
might have also been at play, as attendees found themselves in the same room as other
similar businesspeople who were also trying to navigate the tax system.
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Knowledge Comparing the knowledge index before and after the training intuitively
suggests that the training has been effective. On average, the knowledge index increases
from 3.4 to 4.5. This change is largely driven by attendees, 86% of whom see an increase
in their knowledge index.85 On average, attendees’ gain is 91% of their initial knowledge
level, while it is only 30% for non-attendees.86
Table 2.7 Panel A, in columns 1-3, reports results from a simple OLS regression explain-
ing taxpayer knowledge with attendance. The first row shows that the Training variable
always displays a 1% level of significance and large coefficient, while coefficients for controls
are omitted for brevity. Magnitudes suggest that trainees are 27% more likely to have an
ex-post increase in knowledge (column 1), have a 57% higher knowledge gain over the base-
line (column 2) and about 1.3 knowledge points (out of 10) than non-attendees (column
3). Considering the baseline value of 3.3, this coefficient suggests a 40% improvement in
knowledge as a result of the training. When estimates from propensity scores matching
are added in Panel B, results remain the same.
Perceptions As far as perceptions are concerned, the training does not appear to have
the same positive impact it has on knowledge. For the sake of brevity, Table 2.7 column 4
reports impacts on the only perception that considerably changes after the training. Using
a probit regression in Panel A, it results that the training reduces the perceived complexity
by over 9 percentage points, significant at the 5% level, suggesting that attendees are 14%
less likely than non-attendees to consider the tax system difficult to deal with. The same
result is confirmed by the PSM strategy in Panel B, becoming more statistically significant.
The positive result suggests that the training is successful in correcting perceptions
about the complexity of the tax system (“it is difficult to file an income tax declaration”)
and in bringing the tax administration closer to taxpayers (“it is difficult to to get in touch
with RRA”). More specifically, Appendix Table A11 splits the complexity index in the
85Reasonably enough, those attendees who do not see an improvement after the training are already scoring
the best at the baseline, with an average of 4.9 points out of 10. Instead, those who experience an increase
are starting from a lower level of knowledge, 3.2 points on average.
86Although I do not expect any direct impact of the training on non-attendees, there are two possible ex-
planations for this increase. First, they may have received some information about the training indirectly
(i.e. spillovers). Second, they might have informed themselves about the knowledge questions asked at
the baseline, so that they were better prepared at the endline.
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two components, showing that most of the reduction is driven by the strong impacts on
the perception on how difficult is to file a return.
Table 2.7: Program impact on tax knowledge and complexity perceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Increase Gain Index Complexity
Panel A: Näıve estimation
Training 0.27∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group Y 0.59 0.30 3.86 0.57
R-sq. 0.211 0.360 0.507 0.098
Observations 820 815 820 815
Panel B: Kernel Matching
Training 0.25∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.10) (0.03)
Common Support 818 813 818 813
Ps-R2 matched 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
LR chi2 matched 1.74 1.87 1.74 1.87
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Increase is a dummy variable for a ex-post increase in knowledge. Gain is
the ratio of difference in scorer over the 0-10 pre-training score. Index is
the 0-10 rescaled knowledge index. Controls used are: age, female, large,
business life in months, primary education, university education, Kigali,
email use, books of accounts, previous business, previous training, tax
time in days, respondent manager of taxes. Complexity is a 0-1 index
from two indicators of perceptions of complexity. In Panel B, standard
errors are bootstrapped from 999 repetitions.
Contrarily, there are no significant impacts on any other perception (Table A12). There
is some weak evidence on the enforcement mechanism, but the increase is very small in
magnitude (0.006), compared to a very high baseline average of 95%. The PSM impact on
social duty (and on trust) is negative but still negligible if compared to the 98% average at
the baseline. Overall satisfaction with public goods is not affected by the training either,
with the only exception of satisfaction with water and sanitation (Table A13). While I
cannot fully rule out changes of tax morale due to the training, the data available does not
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support it as a significant mechanism in this case.
These results, taken together, are highly suggestive that the program’s effects on com-
pliance largely occur through improvements in taxpayers’ knowledge and perceptions about
complexity. Figure 2.1 visually displays the marginal effects on each perception index and a
dummy for knowledge increase.87 By far, the most sizeable effect is found with tax knowl-
edge and perceived complexity. These variables capture taxpayer confusion and compliance
costs, intended as the cognitive costs to access information and understand how the tax
system works. This mechanism is consistent both with the recent literature highlighting
the importance of these aspects of compliance (see section 2.2.3), and with the nature of
the program that aims to educate taxpayers about basic elements of the tax system in a
context of very low taxpayer knowledge.
2.6.2 Heterogeneity
After having shown the main results in sections 2.5, I study here the heterogeneity of
treatment effects along several taxpayer features. As a note of caution, these effects can
only be measured for the survey sample and therefore the most robust IV strategy cannot
be used. The following results are produced from the näıve specification in section 2.4.3.
In order to be conservative, I show heterogeneous results for filing probability only, since
the IV strategy showed no significant effects for positive filing and tax remitted.
In order to detect any difference in how the training affects the participants, I include
an interaction term of Training with key background variables, i.e. dummy variables for
being a female, being located in Kigali, having completed primary education and running a
large company (> 5 employees). For each variable, I partition the sample into two groups:
individual belonging to group G and the others, according to the indicator variable gi.
Following the same notation as in section 2.4.3, the new specification is:
Yi = α+ β1{Training}i + θgi1{Training}i + λgi + γY0i +XiΓ + εi (2.4)
With this estimation, the estimated treatment effect of being in Training for taxpayers
in the group G is β + θ , while it is β for taxpayers not in G. θ reflects the difference in
87This last outcome is chosen to ease comparability with the other 0/1 variables.
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Figure 2.1: Training impact on knowledge and perceptions
Coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions computed at the mean of the explana-
tory variables. Perceptions are indexes which range from 0 (disagree) to 1 (agree). All regres-
sions are weighted by sampling weights.
effects across the two groups. The significance of θ implies that there exists heterogeneity
across the two groups. The level effect on Yi of belonging to the group G is λ.
Appendix Table A16 reports the heterogeneity in impacts on the filing probability. An
additional indicator variable for the top two deciles of baseline tax knowledge is explored
as well. The coefficient of the interaction terms indicate the additional incremental effect
of being in group G, on top of the effect of Training. Some weak evidence (10% only) on
heterogeneous effects is found for female (col. 2) and taxpayers with lower education (col.
4). Interestingly, Training estimate is not significant for male only (row 1 column 2), thus
indicating that female are more affected from the training when choosing to declare.
In the same fashion, Appendix Table A17 displays the heterogeneity in impacts on tax
knowledge. Two outcome variables are used: a dummy for knowledge increase and the
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percentage gain over the baseline level. The most striking feature of this analysis is the
consistency in the estimated treatment effects of Training in row 1: for all subgroups,
the coefficients are positive and highly statistically significant. Only two interaction terms
are statistically significant (5% level): being in Kigali has an additional positive effect on
knowledge increase with respect to being in rural areas, while being large has a negative
effect on knowledge gain as compared to being small. This is consistent with the fact that
large firms have already more resources to navigate the tax system (e.g. dedicated accoun-
tants, consultants) as reported in Tanzi (2012). Smaller, unequipped and less educated
taxpayers are benefiting more from the training. No heterogeneity is found for gender and
education.
2.7 Robustness
2.7.1 Additional evidence from trainings across the country
In this section I address the issue of external validity. In other words, do results hold
when looking at the whole population of new taxpayers in Rwanda? For those registered
in 2017, both attendance and compliance from administrative data are available, as well
as the limited set of administrative covariates (described in section 2.4.1). I can therefore
estimate the relationship between program attendance and the three compliance outcomes,
for the universe of new taxpayers. However, in this case I am unable to adopt any of the
more rigorous estimation methods used elsewhere, such as IV, PSM, or even the inclusion
of a large set of controls from the survey (as in section 2.5) as it was not implemented in
these trainings.
Table A18 reports these results for the whole population of new taxpayers who reg-
istered in 2017. I start by re-estimating the coefficients of interest in the survey sample
(column 1) and in the encouragement design group (column 2), but this time using a sim-
ple OLS and including only the administrative covariates.88 The results on the probability
88A dummy for being incorporated (CIT), life in months, months since the training, being registered for
VAT.
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to declare, the strongest result so far, are very similar to the ones reported in Table 2.5,
which are estimated with more robust specifications. This gives me confidence on two
fronts. First, it confirms that choices over the control variables do not affect results in any
substantial way: the coefficients of Table A18 are well within the range of those in Table
2.5. Second, and relatedly, it suggests that the results on the population of new taxpayers
may not be overly biased, despite the more limited options I have in terms of methods and
data.
Column 3 reports results for the full population of new taxpayers. It shows a much
larger effect of almost 30 percentage points, compared to 12 and 14 p.p. in columns 1
and 2. Running separate regressions for rural (Table A19) and urban areas (Table A20)
does not help to explain this difference, as the relevant coefficients are always much larger
in the broader population than in the other groups. The most plausible explanation for
this difference lies in the timing of sessions, which is reported in Table A2. While the
three relevant sessions for both the survey sample and the encouragement design group
happened in August 2017, the other sessions were organised between late November 2017
and March 2018 – with an almost three months gap in between. The latter timing certainly
made the program a lot more salient for taxpayers, who were approaching the end of the
year (31 December) and the declaration period (January to March). On the contrary, the
August sessions were still quite far from the time when most taxpayers start wrapping up
their accounts for the year and think more concretely about their tax affairs. Despite their
limitations, these results suggest that, if anything, my main results are a lower bound for
potentially much larger effects of this type of intervention.
Panels B and C of Table A18 estimate the program’s effect on the other two compli-
ance outcomes, positive filing and the tax amount, for the whole population. As for the
declaration probability, the results on the other two compliance outcomes are very similar
to the main results reported in section 2.5. However, once I consider the whole population,
the coefficient on positive filing and on the tax amount are both highly significant and
of similar magnitude to those presented in Table 2.5. Perhaps the most interesting result
here is on the tax amount, which seems to sizeably increase for attendees in the broader
population. While this result is far from conclusive, it hints at the possibility that the
program has also some effect on the intensive margin too – especially when the program is
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attended closer to the declaration period.
2.7.2 Alternative knowledge outcomes
Table A21 reports estimates on tax knowledge using a couple of alternative outcome vari-
ables: i) difference of the post-training minus the pre-training scores, and ii) the Kling
index as explained in section 2.4.1. Estimates from column 1 shows that the training
causes a difference of 1.26 points, in line with the results from Table 2.7. For what con-
cerns the Kling index in column 2, an effect-size of 0.31 means that the average person
in the training group would score higher than 62% of a control group that was initially
equivalent.89 Näıve and PSM estimates are highly consistent.
In the same fashion, Appendix Figure A7 displays the OLS coefficients from regressing
training attendance on each of the 19 knowledge items. The items who see a larger impact
are those related to knowledge on VAT and PAYE, as well as knowing the deadline and e-
filing. Importantly, the latter are directly related to the basic concepts around correct filing,
and corroborate the strong impact on the filing probability in Table 2.5. At the same time,
somehow counterintuitively, attendees are not learning much about the penalties’ structure
and the tax rates – a pattern which is confirmed in the Eswatini taxpayer survey of Chapter
3. This might suggest that attendees are not complying out of fear of deterrence, but rather
because their compliance costs are decreasing.
2.7.3 Alternative tax outcomes
When considering a multidimensional concept such as tax compliance, other indicators of
it can be created, on top of the three main ones in section 2.5.3.
First, I check whether the program had any impact on the probability of making a pre-
payment following the declaration. Pre-payments are quarterly payments on account, based
on the previous declaration’s tax amount and divided in four payments of equal amount
(one for each quarter), that need to be performed throughout the year. Compliance with
pre-payments is far from being optimal in Rwanda (Mascagni et al., 2016). I find no
89If the group consisted of 100 people, this is the same as saying that the average person (i.e. ranked 50th
in the group) would now be on a par with the person ranked 38th in the control group.
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effect of the training on the probability of making a pre-payment, as shown in column 1 of
Appendix Table A23. This is probably due to the fact that data on pre-payments is only
available for those who made a positive tax declaration, which is a rather restricted sample
in my case, as taxpayers failing to declare or nil-filing would not be required to make a
pre-payment.
Second, I also consider the effective tax rate (ETR), usually identified in the literature
as a proxy for the tax burden. The ETR is defined as the ratio of tax declared over
business income and, in presence of mistakes due to poor tax knowledge, is likely to be
larger than the correct level.90 Focusing on the ETR allows to compare taxpayers from
different tax regimes and to understand whether taxpayers benefit in terms of reduced
mistakes and lower burden. Results from column 2 of Appendix Table A23 show that the
training reduces the ETR by a small fraction (about 1%) but results are not significant
at any statistical level. This may be mostly due to the small sample size, since ETRs are
calculated only for taxpayers with a positive amount of income declared.
Moreover, for what concerns the amount of tax declared, in addition to the log(tax+1)
used in the main specification, Appendix Table A22 reports coefficients for different trans-
formations of the tax amount variable: raw amount in Rwandan Francs, winsorised amount
at the 99th percentile and the inverted hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS).91 While es-
timates for both raw and winsorised amounts in RWF are not consistent across the three
panels, the more reliable variable IHS does not show any significant change, in line with
the findings on log(tax+1) in Table 2.5.
90It is important to note that the resulting ETRs are expected to be substantially lower than the statutory
tax rates, because the denominator here is overall income instead of taxable income.
91IHS is defined as log(tax + (tax2+1)1/2). Except for very small values of y, the inverse sine is approx-
imately equal to log(2y) or log(2)+log(y), and so it can be interpreted in exactly the same way as a
standard logarithmic dependent variable. It also accounts for negative values of tax. Relative to the most
commonly adopted log(x + 1) way of dealing with truncated data, the IHS transformation is an increas-
ingly more accepted solution, despite dating back to the late ’80s (Burbidge et al., 1988; MacKinnon and
Magee, 1990). A nice application is given in Pence (2006).
85
2.7.4 Alternative matching algorithms
When producing the PSM results in section 2.5, I adopted the Kernel matching as it
is usually seen as the most robust algorithms available. To check the robustness of the
PSM results, other algorithms have been used, whose description is given in section 2.4.3.
Appendix Tables A24 and A25 shows results from the N-N matching and radius caliper
techniques, for both knowledge/perceptions and tax outcomes, respectively. Impacts on
knowledge and perceptions stay consistently significant, except for the complexity costs
when using the N-N matching (Table A24). Likewise, in Table A25 the filing probability
is increasing with the training, consistently to what found in Table 2.5 Panel B.
2.7.5 More on the IV strategy
Appendix Table A26 provides some additional results from the IV strategy used in section
2.5. First, in Panel A column 1, the first-stage regression results are shown (as well as
the IV estimates from Table 2.5 Panel C). The instrument is highly relevant, i.e. the first
condition for a robust instrument is met. Second, Panel B shows estimates from the so-
called reduced-form regression of tax outcomes on the IV. It can be seen that the IV is
significantly correlated with Declare only. This confirms again the significant impact on
declaration rates derived in Panel A (or, similarily, in Table 2.5 Panel C).
Moreover, I also attempt to check whether the exclusion restriction is met (section
2.4.3). Appendix Table A27 reports estimates from a regression where both the instru-
ment (IV Surveyed) and the instrumented variable (Training) are included to explain tax
outcomes. Ideally, an instrument should not have any additional impact beyond the effect
it generates through the instrumented variable. Panel A estimates suggest that IV Sur-
veyed is never significantly explaining tax outcomes. This provides some evidence that the
exclusion restriction is not violated.
2.7.6 The effect of participating to the survey
As a final check, I address the concerns surrounding the possible side effects that par-
ticipation to the survey might produce on final tax outcomes – other than through the
86
mechanisms discussed in section 2.6.1. There is substantial evidence for this concern, no-
tably for developing countries. Zwane et al. (2011) show that completing household surveys
has consequences on later behaviour, such as water treatment product use and medical in-
surance take-up (though not on borrower behavior). If there is such an effect, then IV
results may either under- or over-state the consequences of the education program per se.
I test for the null (or negligible) effect of survey participation in two ways. First,
I compare tax outcomes of two groups, surveyed non-attendees and non-surveyed non-
attendees, which differ only in terms of receiving the survey, i.e. the instrument. This can
also be considered as a placebo test on the validity on the instrument (survey participation).
If completing the survey has an effect which is independent on attending the training, I
would expect to see surveyed non-attendees displaying statistically significantly different
tax outcomes than non-surveyed non-attendees. As shown by the t-tests in Appendix Table
A28, this is not the case and the two groups file following a similar pattern. This confirms
both the lack of any relevant effect from completing the survey and that the instrument
respects the condition of exclusion restriction.
Second, I compare the filing behaviour of taxpayers who completed both survey rounds
and those who completed only the baseline, i.e. those who attrited. As shown in Zwane
et al. (2011), subsequent follow-up surveys can alter later behaviour. Assuming that par-
ticipating to the followup induces the desired behaviour, if such an effect from the follow-up
survey actually exists, I would notice that non-attrited taxpayers are, for example, more
likely to be compliant. In Appendix Table A29, I test whether any significant differences
exist between the two groups. None of the key tax outcomes result to be different.
In conclusion, participating to the survey does not introduce any significant bias in
the estimates of impact. This is likely due to the fact that the surveys took place in
August 2017, about 7 months before the filing deadline, and to their shorter duration
when compared to the household surveys reviewed in Zwane et al. (2011).92
92In addition, the surveyors were not and did not present themselves as representatives of the tax authority
but independent contractors of a private survey firm.
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2.8 Conclusions
Several tax authorities in the African continent are devoting increasing resources to imple-
ment educational initiatives to improve taxpayers’ knowledge of the tax system (Mascagni
and Santoro, 2018). However, empirical evidence on whether tax knowledge can be im-
proved with these strategies and which are the effects in terms of compliance is absent
– despite the increasing evidence that taxpayer confusion and compliance costs are key
determinants of tax compliance. This paper argues that knowledge of the tax system is
crucial in explaining compliance and test the effectiveness of two tax educational inputs.
More specifically, I evaluate a taxpayer education program run by the Rwanda Revenue
Authority and offered to newly registered taxpayers. At the same time, I measure the
impacts of an alternative strategy, a personalised tax coaching. I am particularly inter-
ested in capturing the programs’ effects on behaviours (tax compliance), as well as on tax
knowledge and perceptions.
I investigate my research question by relying on a unique dataset that includes in-
formation from phone surveys and from tax records, combined using uniquely identified
taxpayer identification numbers. By doing this, I can address some of the common pitfalls
both of surveys (e.g. difficulty to measure evasion) and of administrative data (e.g. lack of
comprehensive information on taxpayers’ characteristics). Although I could not randomise
attendance to the program of interest, I am confident of the robustness of my results, based
on three methods: a näıve estimation based on two largely comparable groups (see section
2.5.2), propensity-score matching and an unintended encouragement design (section 2.5.3).
My key result is a large and statistically significant effect of the program on declaration
rates, which increase by 43% with respect to the control group. Additional compliance
outcomes such as positive filing probability and amount of tax declared do not signifi-
cantly change. The fact that the effect on tax declared is particularly weak is in line with
the only other article on this topic (Chetty and Saez, 2013), which shows no effect on
reported income for an education program in the United States. These results highlight
the importance to look at multiple aspects of compliance, especially in a context such as
Rwanda where failure to declare and nil-filing are highly prevalent phenomena (section
2.3.2). Moreover, and contrary to much of the literature on tax compliance, I present
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suggestive evidence that the program’s effect stretch beyond the first year (section 2.5.4).
Based on administrative data, I argue that habit plays an important role in tax compliance
(Dunning et al., 2017).
Furthermore, thanks to the rich set of survey variables, I test possible alternative mech-
anisms through which this effect may come about. I argue that the most plausible mech-
anism is increased knowledge and improved perceptions about the complexity of the tax
system (section 2.6.1). I show that training taxpayers about the tax system has a large,
40%, increase on knowledge and a 15% decrease in the probability of perceiving the tax
system as complex. This increase happens in a context where I see dramatically low levels
of tax knowledge at the baseline, as I show in section 2.5.1. While this is in line with
previous evidence on taxpayer knowledge (see section 2.2.3), I use a more accurate and
richer measure of knowledge, which is an original contribution to this literature.
Relatedly, the pilot of the RRA-led caching program (section 2.4.2) suggests that a
more personalised option is currently ineffective and hardly scalable. The failure to find any
significant impact is mostly due to poor implementation in the field. Taking into account
the resource constraints within tax authorities in SSA, programs of this type could only be
adopted for a limited, targeted group of taxpayers, or based on specific needs, rather than
be implemented at scale.
In terms of policy, my results provide a few important insights. One immediate rec-
ommendation for the revenue authority would be to provide some basic information to
taxpayers at the point of registration, for example stating clearly what taxes they regis-
tered for and what are the related obligations.93 This could be as simple as a brief script for
tax officials, and a document to leave with taxpayers containing their main duties, rights
and responsibilities. This would help tackle gaps in knowledge, along with other measures.
Secondly, my results also confirm that the existing program is effective to increase com-
pliance, at least on the extensive margin (i.e. declaration rates). From a policy perspective,
this means that policymakers may not see immediate revenue gains from such programs.
Nonetheless, I argue that bringing new taxpayers into the habit of submitting declarations
is crucial to ensure future compliance. As such, investing in taxpayer education seems to
93In a parallel study targeting nil-filers, Mascagni et al. (2020) show that registration procedures are often
confusing to new taxpayers.
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be a sensible strategy – as part of a broader range of measures to improve compliance.
For instance, more could be done to increase the program’s reach, which is currently quite
limited (section 2.5.1). This implies, for example, insuring that the department in charge
of taxpayer education initiatives (in RRA’s case, Taxpayer Services) has adequate capacity
to effectively manage such programs.
Last but not least, this study makes an argument in favor of collecting detailed data for
interventions carried by revenue authorities in the field. Data on project implementation is
crucial for evaluating the project impacts and using these results to inform evidence-based
policy. Carrying out the training evaluation with the data previously available would have
been impossible, as I did not know which taxpayers attended and which ones did not. This
practical example illustrates the broader issue that good data is an essential foundation to
evidence-based policymaking. I would therefore encourage to embed proper data collection






A1.1 Deviations from Neoclassical Model
The main theoretical formulations which attempted to improve the neoclassical model of tax
evasion can be grouped as follows:
• Intrinsic motivation and psychic costs: taxpayers experience feelings of pride, positive
self-image or warm glow from contributing (Andreoni et al., 1998), or guilt or shame for
failing to comply (Gordon, 1989; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Reckers et al., 1994; Traxler,
2010), according to the formulation of a remorse-based utility function (Eisenhauer,
2006).
• Reciprocity and fiscal exchange: taxes are part of social contract, where compliance
is affected by the perceived legitimacy of the State and the quantity/quality of public
services provided (Cowell and Gordon, 1988; Levi, 1989; Moore, 2013; Falkinger, 1988);
the consideration of the fair amount to pay, and whether it is justifiable to evade, takes
into account both the provision of public goods and the tax payments made by other
taxpayers, following the concept of Kantian morality (Bordignon, 1993).
• Peer effects and social influences: the cost from evading is an increasing function of the
proportion of taxpayers who comply (Myles and Naylor, 1996; Kim, 2003; Fortin et al.,
2007).94 Theoretical research on herd behavior (Banerjee, 1992) can be applied to tax
compliance as well.
• Cultural factors: religious beliefs (Torgler, 2003), ethnic-linguistic fractionalisation (Alesina
et al., 2003), country-level characteristics (Torgler, 2004a; Cummings et al., 2009) are
all taken into account in understanding tax compliance.
• Deviations from utility maximisation and non-standard preferences: new formulations
include bounded rationality with respect to time discounting, such as hyperbolic dis-
counting (Chorvat, 2007), behavior under uncertainty, in which gains and losses having
different utility weights and perceived probabilities, as in the prospect theory (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979; Yaniv, 1999; Dhami and al Nowaihi, 2007), limited information
and law complexity (Alm, 1988; Snow and Warrren, 2005) and the framing of the tax
(Copeland and Cuccia, 2002; Watrin and Ullmann, 2008).
94See Onu and Oats (2016) for a review.
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• Interactions between taxpayer-customers and the State provider of services: in the so-
called “slippery slope” framework, authority and trust dynamically interact and rein-
force/undermine each other (Kirchler et al., 2007, 2008). Relatedly, the responsive reg-
ulation paradigm with a service-oriented approach has been developed as a new modus
operandi of tax administrations (Braithwaite, 2009). Similarly, the crowding out theory
formulates that deterrence policy and other external factors (rewards, regulations) neg-
atively affect the intrinsic motivation to pay (Frey and Feld, 2002). In these theories, a
psychological contract between citizens and authority is considered (Alm and Torgler,
2011; Alm et al., 2010; Alm and McClellan, 2012).
Table A1: Corporate and Personal Income Tax
CIT PIT
Tax rates
Real regime 30% 0%-20%-30%
Lump-sum regime 3% turnover 3% turnover
Flat-amount regime pre-defined pre-defined
Fiscal Year January to December
Deadline March 31
% total # declarations (2017) 56% 44%
% total tax take (2017) 94.5% 5.5%
% in Kigali (2017) 69.6% 39.7%
Business income USD (2017) 161,645 1,921
Tax declared USD (2017) 2,600 388
Ghosts New (2015) 45% 52%
Nil-filers New (2015) 71% 28%
Ghosts New (2016) 45% 46%
Nil-filers New (2016) 77% 24%
Ghosts New (2017) 45% 58%
Nil-filers New (2017) 74% 30%
Own calculations using RRA administrative data.
Amounts in USD.
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Table A2: TPS training plan for 2017/18
District Date
1) Kicukiro 21 August 2017
2) Musanze 29 August 2017
3) Rubavu 30 August 2017
4) Muhanga 22 November 2017
5) Rusizi 29 November 2017
6) Huye 6 December 2017
7) Nyagatare 20 December 2017
8) Kicukiro 23 January 2018
9) Gasabo 6 February 2018
10) Nyarugenge 9 February 2018
11) Kicukiro 20 February 2018
12) Gasabo 22 February 2018
13) Nyarugenge 7 March 2018
Table A3: List of Covariates
Covariate Description Mean St. dev
Age age in years 33.08 9.37
Female dummy for female 0.32 0.47
No school or primary dummy for no school or primary 0.19 0.40
University degree dummy for university degree 0.45 0.50
Owner dummy for being the owner of the business 0.78 0.42
CIT registered for corporate income tax 0.47 0.50
>5 employees dummy for more than 5 employees 0.09 0.29
Life in months # months since registration with RRA 4.62 2.01
Kigali dummy for business based in Kigali 0.49 0.50
Email use dummy for use email for business communication 0.25 0.44
Bank account dummy for bank account ownership 0.44 0.50
Books of account dummy for use of books of accounts 0.47 0.50
Tax manager dummy for taxpayers managing taxes by himself 0.76 0.42
Had previous business dummy for having previous business 0.21 0.41
Had previous training dummy for having attended another training 0.07 0.25
Tax time use # of days spent in tax per year 1.86 4.99
# RRA visits # of visits from RRA staff since registration 1.36 2.31
Means and standard deviations measured at the baseline.
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Table A4: Tax Knowledge Module
Index Components Baseline
E-filing Do taxpayers always have to visit the local tax office in person
to file for income tax?
0.47
Tax center Do you know where the nearest tax center is? 0.90
Deadline When is the deadline for your income tax declaration? 0.05
Inactive Is the following statement true or false? If your business is
inactive, you don?t need to file a declaration.
0.70
IQP Is the following statement true or false? The quarterly prepay-
ments are calculated as a share of the previous tax declaration.
0.36
IQP share What share of the previous tax declaration is each quarterly
prepayment?
0.03
Diff. rate Do people pay income tax at different rate depending on their
income?
0.66
Max rate What is the maximum rate for CIT/PIT? 0.01
Tax base What is your tax base? Note: this is the base on which your
PIT/CIT tax is calculated.
0.17
PAYE Do employers generally have an obligation to pay taxes for
their employees?
0.69
PAYE exempt Is the following statement true or false? There is a threshold
for wage income under which the tax rate is 0%.
0.34
PAYE threshold What is that threshold? 0.22
VAT freq. Take the example of a business with a turnover of 100 mil-
lion RWF. How often does this business have to file a VAT
declaration in a year?
0.07
VAT rate What is the tax rate for VAT? 0.31
VAT refund Can all VAT-registered businesses claim VAT refunds for their
inputs?
0.28
VAT pay Are all business required to pay VAT, regardless of their in-
come?
0.43
EBM Is the following statement true or false? An EBM receipt
should not be issued for small sales, even if the business has
an EBM.
0.65
Fine failing How high is the maximum extra penalty for failing to declare
income, once you are caught with an audit?
0.01
Fine interest rate What?s the monthly interest rate for delaying to pay or failing
to declare?
0.00
Indexes are 1-0 dummies with the following meaning: 1 - agree or neutral; 0 - disagree.
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Table A5: Perceptions and Attitudes before Training
Statement Totally Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral Somewhat Agree Totally Agree
1. It is difficult to file an income tax
declaration
11% 28% 16% 23% 19%
2. It is difficult to get in touch with RRA
officials to get information
26% 41% 3% 14% 15%
3. It is right for some people not to pay
the taxes they owe on their income
25% 34% 8% 16% 15%
4. If my neighbors do not pay taxes, it
is fair for me not to pay them either
55% 40% 2% 1% 2%
5. Most businesses evade their taxes in
part or in full
7% 17% 27% 34% 11%
6. The tax system is fair, impartial and
uncorrupted
4% 9% 18% 22% 45%
7. Businessmen to make gifts or unoffi-
cial payments to get things done
22% 26% 31% 13% 5%
8. The government can make people pay
more taxes to increase spending on pub-
lic health care
5% 15% 15% 27% 36%
9. The tax authorities always have the
right to make people pay taxes
3% 11% 5% 25% 55%
10. Citizens must pay their taxes to the
government for our country to develop
0% 0% 1% 6% 93%
11. Taxation is a social duty of every
citizen
0% 1% 1% 10% 88%
12. RRA does its job professionally and
with integrity
1% 5% 11% 28% 54%
13. It is very likely that someone who
is evading tax will be caught and sanc-
tioned by the Government
0% 2% 4% 20% 73%
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Table A6: Perception Indexes Description
Index Components Baseline
Complexity It is difficult to file an income tax declaration - It is difficult
to get in touch with RRA officials to get information
0.704
Enforcement It is very likely that someone who is evading tax will be caught
and sanctioned by the Government
0.980
Evasion It is right for some people not to pay the taxes they owe on
their income - If my neighbors do not pay taxes, it is fair
for me not to pay them either - Most businesses evade their
taxes in part or in full. - Businessmen are sometimes required
to make gifts or unofficial payments to get things done with
regard to taxes.
0.582
Fairness The tax system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted. 0.867
Trust People in Rwanda generally trust the RRA to do their job
professionally and with integrity
0.939
Govt authority The government can decide to make people pay more taxes or
user fees in order to increase spending on public health care. -
The tax authorities always have the right to make people pay
taxes
0.933
Social duty Citizens must pay their taxes to the government in order for
our country to develop - Taxation is a social duty of every
citizen, to contribute to society’s welfare
0.981
Indexes are 1-0 dummies with the following meaning: 1 - agree or neutral; 0 - disagree.
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A2 Balance Tests
Table A7: Mean differences by reached status
Unreached Reached
Mean Obs Mean Obs Diff. ∆
Kicukiro 0.74 1551 0.48 980 0.27∗∗∗ -0.56
Musanze 0.10 1551 0.25 980 -0.15∗∗∗ 0.41
Rubavu 0.16 1551 0.28 980 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.27
PIT 0.45 1551 0.52 980 -0.07∗∗∗ 0.14
CIT 0.55 1551 0.48 980 0.07∗∗∗ -0.14
Jan17 0.25 1551 0.21 980 0.04∗∗ 0.09
Feb17 0.17 1551 0.18 980 -0.00 0.01
Mar17 0.20 1551 0.23 980 -0.03∗ 0.08
Apr17 0.07 1551 0.07 980 -0.00 0.00
May17 0.09 1551 0.09 980 -0.00 0.00
Jun17 0.09 1551 0.09 980 0.00 0.00
Jul17 0.12 1551 0.12 980 -0.00 0.00
Life in months 4.67 1551 4.59 980 0.08 -0.04
Observations 2531
Observations weighted by sampling weights.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A8: Covariates mean differences by attrition status
Non-attrited Attrited
Mean Obs Mean Obs Difference ∆
Covariates
Age 33.24 821 32.82 186 0.42 -0.04
Female 0.30 821 0.41 186 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.22
No school or primary 0.20 821 0.14 186 0.06∗ -0.16
University degree 0.43 821 0.54 186 -0.10∗∗ 0.20
Owner 0.79 821 0.62 186 0.17∗∗∗ -0.38∗
Individual business 0.52 821 0.45 186 0.07∗ -0.13
>5 employees 0.09 821 0.11 186 -0.02 0.07
Email use 0.26 821 0.27 186 -0.01 0.02
Bank account 0.45 821 0.44 186 0.01 -0.03
Books 0.48 821 0.51 186 -0.03 0.06
Tax time use days 2.00 605 1.32 134 0.68 -0.15
Had previous business 0.21 821 0.23 186 -0.03 0.06
Had previous training 0.06 821 0.10 186 -0.03 0.12
Willing to attend 0.99 793 0.98 176 0.01∗ -0.11
# RRA visits 1.39 716 1.32 158 0.07 -0.03
Reasons to formalize
Obeying the Law 0.70 821 0.66 186 0.04 -0.08
Better reputation 0.26 821 0.23 186 0.03 -0.07
Business too small 0.27 821 0.25 186 0.02 -0.05
Constraints to formalize
High tax rate 0.25 821 0.20 186 0.05 -0.12
No knowledge reg. process 0.13 821 0.12 186 0.01 -0.02
No knowledge reg. benefits 0.15 821 0.12 186 0.03 -0.10
Reasons to attend the training
I need to know more 0.94 789 0.94 173 0.01 -0.02
Compulsory to attend 0.25 789 0.29 173 -0.04 0.08
I’m curious about training 0.17 789 0.13 173 0.04 -0.12
Observations 1007
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. ∆ is the normalized difference from Imbens and
Rubin (2015), equal to the difference in means, scaled by the square root of the average of
the two within-group variances. Observations weighted by sampling weights.
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Table A9: Baseline outcomes mean differences by attrition status
Non-attrited Attrited
Mean Obs Mean Obs Difference ∆
Baseline Knowledge Index 6.37 821 6.42 186 -0.06 0.02
Complexity 0.71 796 0.62 177 0.10∗∗ -0.21
Evasion attitude 0.33 782 0.34 173 -0.01 0.02
Fairness 0.98 788 0.98 176 0.00 -0.02
Govt Authority 0.95 804 0.96 181 -0.00 0.01
Social duty 0.98 819 0.97 185 0.01 -0.06
Enforcement 4.39 821 3.54 186 0.85 -0.10
Health 2.68 821 1.06 186 1.61∗ -0.13
Education 2.03 821 2.22 186 -0.19 0.02
WASH 2.87 821 2.15 186 0.73 -0.08
Electricity 3.56 821 2.70 186 0.86 -0.10
Security 4.56 821 3.55 186 1.01∗∗ -0.13
Infrastructure 3.68 821 2.94 186 0.74 -0.08
Observations 1007
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Baseline Knowledge Index is the sum of correct
answers over 19 questions (range 0-19). Perceptions in row 2-5 are dummy variable indi-
cating whether the taxpayer agrees with a set of statement (section 2.4.1). Enforcement
is over a 1-5 scale where 5 is totally agree and 1 totally disagree. Last 6 rows show sat-
isfaction variables over a 1-5 scale where 5 is totally satisfied and 1 totally dissatisfied.
∆ is the normalized difference from Imbens and Rubin (2015), equal to the difference in
means, scaled by the square root of the average of the two within-group variances. Ob-
servations weighted by sampling weights.
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Table A10: Covariates mean differences by assignment to coaching
Control Coaching
Obs Mean Obs Mean Difference
Covariates
Age 279 32.40 293 32.56 -0.15
Female 279 0.30 293 0.31 -0.01
No school or primary 279 0.25 293 0.18 0.07∗∗
University degree 279 0.45 293 0.44 0.01
Owner 279 0.76 293 0.82 -0.06
CIT 270 0.46 283 0.43 0.03
>5 employees 279 0.06 293 0.08 -0.02
Life in months 270 4.44 283 4.63 -0.18
Kigali 272 0.51 281 0.52 -0.00
Email use 279 0.24 293 0.25 -0.01
Bank account 279 0.45 293 0.40 0.05
Books 279 0.46 293 0.44 0.03
Tax time use days 214 1.73 200 2.24 -0.52
Had previous business 279 0.18 293 0.22 -0.04
Had previous training 279 0.06 293 0.08 -0.02
Knowledge and Perceptions
Baseline Knowledge Index 279 6.19 293 6.25 -0.05
Complexity 267 0.71 281 0.70 0.01
Evasion attitude 264 0.32 278 0.32 0.00
Fairness 265 0.97 281 0.98 -0.01
Govt Authority 272 0.95 287 0.95 -0.00
Social duty 279 0.96 291 0.99 -0.03∗∗
Enforcement 279 4.67 293 4.63 0.04
Pub. Serv. Satisfaction 273 0.01 283 -0.01 0.02
Observations 572
Observations weighted by sampling weights. T-test are computed on the Dif-
ference across the two groups. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A3 Results
Table A11: Program impact on complexity perceptions - PSM
Difficult to File Get in Touch




Baseline Perception Yes Yes
Observations 816 818
Panel B: Kernel Matching
Training -0.10∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.04) (0.03)
Common Support 814 814
Ps-R2 matched 0.02 0.002
LR chi2 matched 1.79 1.90
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in paren-
theses are from 99 bootstrapped repetitions. Note that the Ps-
R2 unmatched is always 0.042 and the LR chi2 unmatched is
always 47.13∗∗∗. Perceptions outcomes are rescaled variables
which range from 0 (disagree) to 1 (agree). Difficult to File
= difficult to file an income tax return. Get in touch = diffi-
cult to get in touch with RRA. Controls used are: age, female,
large, business life in months, CIT, primary education, univer-
sity education, Kigali, email use, books of accounts, previous
business, previous training.
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Table A12: Program impact on attitudes and perceptions
Evasion Fairness Enforcement Trust Govt Power Social duty
Panel A: Näıve estimation
Training -0.003 0.003 0.006∗ -0.010∗ -0.005 -0.004
(0.034) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 811 810 820 817 817 820
Panel B: Kernel Matching
Training -0.012 0.001 0.014 -0.009 -0.006 -0.018∗∗
(0.03) (0.001) (0.32) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Common Support 809 808 818 815 815 818
Ps-R2 matched 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
LR chi2 matched 2.37 2.15 1.74 1.72 1.72 1.74
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are from 999 bootstrapped repe-
titions. Note that the Ps-R2 unmatched is always 0.042 and the LR chi2 unmatched is always 47.13∗∗∗.
Perceptions outcomes are rescaled variables which range from 0 (disagree) to 1 (agree). Controls used are:
age, female, large, business life in months, CIT, primary education, university education, Kigali, email use,
books of accounts, previous business, previous training, tax time in days, respondent manager of taxes..
A4 Robustness checks
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Table A13: Program impact on satisfaction with public goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Health Education Water Electricity Security Infrastructure
Training 0.020 -0.018 0.066∗∗ -0.006 0.000 0.005
(0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.015) (0.000) (0.005)
Baseline Satisfaction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 814 817 819 817 819 817
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are marginal effects from
probit regressions computed at the mean of the explanatory variables. The control group are taxpayers who
did not attend the training. Satisfaction outcomes are rescaled varianle which range from 0 (unsatisfied) to
1 (satisfied). Controls used are: age, female, large, CIT, business life in months, primary education, univer-
sity education, Kigali, email use, books of accounts, previous business, previous training.
Table A14: Program impact on probability to declare in year 2
(1) (2)
Declare Y2 Declare Y2
Panel A: Näıve estimation
T 0.106∗∗∗ 0.070∗
(0.037) (0.040)
Declared Year 1 0.637∗∗∗
(0.043)
Survey covariates Yes Yes
Observations 971 969
Panel B: IV Strategy
T 0.107∗∗ 0.014
(0.049) (0.038)
Declared Year 1 0.621∗∗∗
(0.021)
Admin covariates Yes Yes
Observations 2,531 2,531
Control group Y 0.31 0.31
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is measured in year 2. In panel A, coefficients are
marginal effects from probit regressions evaluated at
mean, all weighted by sampling weights. In Panel B,
Training is instrumented by the invite call. Coaching
group has been dropped.
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Table A15: Mid-term impact on tax outcomes: population of new taxpayers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Declare Y2 Declare Y2 Positive Y2 Positive Y2 Log Tax Y2 Log Tax Y2
T 0.232∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗







Admin covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observaitons 15009 15009 15009 15009 15009 15009
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are marginal effects from
probit and tobit regression computed at the mean of covariates. The dependent variable is measured in year 2.
Table A16: Program impact on filing probability - Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No interact. Female Kigali Primary Large Top Know
Training 0.12∗∗∗ 0.07 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Group -0.02 0.00 -0.17∗∗ -0.11 0.19∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Group*Attend 0.15∗ 0.02 0.17∗ 0.11 -0.02
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Knowledge Perceptions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 980 980 980 980 980 980
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Interactions used are with dum-
mies for female, Kigali, primary education and large size. Controls used are: age, female, large, CIT,
business life in months, primary education, university education, Kigali, email use, books of accounts,
previous business, previous training. Coaching group is dropped.
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Table A17: Program impact on tax knowledge - Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
F Increase F Gain K Increase K Gain P Increase P Gain L Increase L Gain
Training 0.245∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.079) (0.042) (0.086) (0.033) (0.079) (0.030) (0.074)
Group -0.066 -0.182∗∗ -0.083∗ 0.02 -0.080 -0.256∗∗∗ -0.075 0.062
(0.054) (0.083) (0.047) (0.064) (0.061) (0.085) (0.118) (0.153)
Group*Training 0.080 0.092 0.126∗∗ -0.070 -0.004 -0.099 -0.122 -0.346∗∗
(0.063) (0.144) (0.058) (0.122) (0.075) (0.124) (0.118) (0.153)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 0.714 0.571 0.714 0.571 0.714 0.571 0.714 0.571
R-sq. 0.208 0.360 0.211 0.360 0.206 0.360 0.208 0.361
Observations 820 815 820 815 820 815 820 815
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Increase is a dummy variable indicating whether the post-
pre knowledge scores difference is positive. Gain is the ratio of post-pre scores difference over the pre-training score. Interactions
used are with dummies for female, Kigali, primary education and large size. Controls used are: age, female, large, CIT, business
life in months, primary education, university education, Kigali, email use, books of accounts, previous business, previous training.
Coaching group is dropped.
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Table A18: Program impact on tax outcomes: population of new taxpayers
(1) (2) (3)
Survey Sample Survey Ref. Pop. Population
Panel A: Probability to Declare
T 0.121∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.024) (0.012)
Admin covariates Yes Yes Yes
Control group Y 0.333 0.337 0.379
Observations 980 2,543 15,009
Panel B: Probability to Positive file
T 0.076∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.014) (0.007)
Admin covariates Yes Yes Yes
Control group Y 0.121 0.122 0.122
Observations 980 2543 15009
Panel C: Log Tax Declared
T 0.383∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.103) (0.068)
Admin covariates Yes Yes Yes
Control group Y 0.929 1.051 1.051
Observations 980 2543 15009
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients are marginal effects from probit (panel A-B) and tobit (panel C)
regression computed at the mean of covariates.
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Table A19: Program impact in rural sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Declare Declare Positive Positive Log Tax Log Tax
Training 0.42∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.15)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Tax Center FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control group Y 0.199 0.199 0.080 0.080 0.533 0.533
Observations 2180 2180 2180 2180 2180 2180
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are
marginal effects from probit (1-4) and tobit (5-6) regressions evaluated at mean. The con-
trol group are taxpayers who did not attend the training. Declare and Positive are dummy
variables with value 1 if the taxpayers declared and positively filed, respectively. Log Tax
is the log(tax+1) transformation of the raw tax amount variable. Covariates are a dummy
for Corporate type of business and a continuous variable for life in month. Tax centers are:
Huye, Muhanga, Nyagatare and Rusizi.
Table A20: Program impact in urban sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Declare Declare Positive Positive Log Tax Log Tax
Training 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.16) (0.15)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Tax Center FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control group Y 0.461 0.461 0.120 0.120 1.078 1.078
Observations 2441 2441 2441 2441 2441 2441
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are
marginal effects from probit (1-4) and tobit (5-6) regressions evaluated at mean. The con-
trol group are taxpayers who did not attend the training. Declare and Positive are dummy
variables with value 1 if the taxpayers declared and positively filed, respectively. Log Tax is
the log(tax+1) transformation of the raw tax amount variable. Covariates are a dummy for
CIT type of business and a continuous variable for life in month. Tax centers are: Kicukiro,
Gasabo and Nyarugenge (see section 2.4.1). Sampling weights are used.
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Table A21: Program impact on tax knowledge - alternative outcomes
(1) (2)
Difference Kling Index




Control group Y 0.55 -0.01
R-sq. 0.377 0.492
Observations 818 818
Panel B: Kernel Matching
Training 1.26∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.03)
Common Support 816 816
Ps-R2 matched 0.002 0.002
LR chi2 matched 1.74 1.87
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard
errors in parentheses. Difference is the ex-post mi-
nus ex-ante difference in knowledge points. Kling In-
dex is the standardized Kling index (Kling, 2007).
Controls used are: age, female, large, business life in
months, primary education, university education, Ki-
gali, email use, books of accounts, previous business,
previous training, tax time in days, respondent man-
ager of taxes. In Panel B, standard errors are boot-
strapped from 999 repetitions.
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Table A22: Program impact on tax amounts
(1) (2) (3)
Raw Wins. IHS
Panel A: Näıve estimation
Training 4,888.42∗∗ 3,279.88∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗
(2,358.82) (1,252.32) (0.14)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 971 971 971
Panel B: Kernel Matching
Training -17,348.36 4,149.42 0.64∗∗
(22,893) (4,899) (0.32)
Common Support 827 827 827
Ps-R2 matched 0.002 0.046 0.056
LR chi2 matched 2.14 25.78 29.18
Panel C: IV Strategy
Training -1,796.7 -7,123.31 0.29
(8,517) ( 21,123) (1.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2378 2378 2378
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in
parentheses. Coefficients are marginal effects from tobit regres-
sions evaluated at mean. The control group are taxpayers who
did not receive any educational input. Raw is the tax declared
in RWF. Wins. is a winsorized transformation of the raw tax
amount at the 99th percentile. IHS is the inverted hyperbolic
sine transformation, defined as log(tax + (tax2+1)1/2). All re-
gressions weighted by sampling weights.
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Table A23: Program impact on prepayments and ETR
(1) (2)
Prepayment ETR




Control group Y 0.545 0.033
R-sq. 0.223 0.215
Observations 151 119
Panel B: Kernel Matching
Training 0.037 -0.008
(0.090) (0.010)
Common Support 149 117
Ps-R2 matched 0.004 0.036
LR chi2 matched 2.76 21.43






∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. Prepayment is a dummy vari-
able with value 1 if the taxpayer made a prepay-
ment ETR is the ratio of tax payable over business
incomes. In Panel A, coefficients are marginal ef-
fects from probit (1) and OLS (2) regressions. Co-
variates and Knowledge and Perceptions used are
those indicated in section 2.4.3. All regressions
weighted by sampling weights. In Panel B, stan-
dard errors are bootstrapped from 999 repetitions.
In Panel C, Training is instrumented by the invite
call. Refer to Table A26 for first-stage results.
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Table A24: Program impact on knowledge and perceptions - PSM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Increase Gain Index Complexity
Panel A: N-N Matching with Replacement
Training 0.28∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ -0.05
(0.05) (0.08) (0.16) (0.05)
Common Support 818 813 818 813
Ps-R2 matched 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.031
LR chi2 matched 34.98 34.54 34.98 34.06
Panel B: Radius Matching with Caliper 5%
Training 0.25∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.12) (0.04)
Common Support 818 813 818 813
Ps-R2 matched 0.032 0.002 0.002 0.002
LR chi2 matched 1.76 1.91 1.76 1.91
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses,
bootstrapped from 999 repetitions.Increase is a dummy variable for a ex-
post increase in knowledge. Gain is the ratio of difference in scorer over
the 0-10 pre-training score. Index is the 0-10 rescaled knowledge index.
Controls used are: age, female, large, business life in months, primary ed-
ucation, university education, Kigali, email use, books of accounts, pre-
vious business, previous training, tax time in days, respondent manager
of taxes. Complexity is a 0-1 index from two indicators of perceptions of
complexity.
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Table A25: Program impact on tax outcomes - PSM
(1) (2) (3)
Declare Positive Log Tax
Panel A: N-N Matching with Replacement
Training 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.33
(0.04) (0.05) (0.31)
Common Support 807 807 807
Ps-R2 matched 0.022 0.099 0.105
LR chi2 matched 26.07 54.84∗∗∗ 55.19∗∗∗
Panel B: Radius Matching with Caliper 5%
Training 0.08∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.29
(0.03) (0.04) (0.38)
Common Support 807 807 807
Ps-R2 matched 0.002 0.047 0.056
LR chi2 matched 2.36 26.02 29.37
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors
in parentheses, bootstrapped from 999 repetitions. Declare
and Positive are dummy variables with value 1 if the tax-
payers declared and positively filed, respectively. Log Tax
is the log(tax+1) transformation of the raw tax amount
variable. Coaching group has been dropped.
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Table A26: Program impact on tax outcomes - IV strategy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Training Declare Positive Log Tax
Panel A: Two-Stages Least Squares
IV Surveyed 0.37∗∗∗
(0.02)
Training 0.15∗∗ -0.01 0.55
(0.05) (0.07) (0.68)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group Y 0.19 0.38 0.14 1.23
R2 0.19 0.22 0.03 0.01
F-stat 349.41 124.4 119.51
Observations 2378 2378 2378 2378
Panel B: Reduced Forms
IV Surveyed 0.10∗∗∗ -0.02 0.10
(0.02) (0.03) (0.38)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.18 0.07 0.06 0.02
Observations 2378 2378 2378 2378
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
IV Surveyed is the instrument, referring to a dummy for whether the
taxpayer is surveyed. Coaching group has been dropped.
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Table A27: Tests for exclusion restriction
(1) (2) (3)
Declare Positive Log Tax
[1em] Attended 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.21)
IV 0.01 0.03 -0.29
(0.02) (0.04) (0.41)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Control group Y 0.33 0.14 0.760
R2 0.217 0.069 0.025
Observations 2378 2378 2378
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coaching group has been dropped.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A28: Placebo test on non-attendees by survey participation
Non-surveyed Surveyed
Mean Obs Mean Obs Difference
Declared 0.34 1332 0.33 390 0.00
Nil-filed 0.67 448 0.68 130 -0.01
Log Tax 2.91 425 2.86 121 0.05
Log Tax>0 9.82 126 10.50 33 -0.68
Tax RWF 109737.24 425 64824.10 121 44913.13
Log income 4.65 448 4.15 130 0.50
Observations 1722
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A29: Filing outcomes mean differences by attrition status
Non-attrited Attrited
Mean Obs Mean Obs Difference
Declared 0.39 820 0.46 125 -0.07
Nil-filed 0.61 323 0.64 58 -0.02
Log Tax 3.43 300 2.40 52 1.03
Tax RWF 44500.24 300 25814.23 52 18686.02
Log income 5.28 323 4.79 58 0.49
Income RWF 11053526.42 323 5179536.07 58 5873990.35
N 945
Observations weighted by sampling weights.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
To File or Not To File? Another
Dimension of Compliance - the
Eswatini Taxpayers’ Survey
Abstract
Non-filing refers to taxpayers who fail to submit a tax declaration, thus becoming ghosts in
the eyes of tax authorities. It is a widespread phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa, and has a
number of detrimental fiscal effects. Non-filing has been largely unexplored in the literature,
which focusses more on active filers. The overall aim of this paper is to shed light on the
determinants of non-filing, building on neoclassical and behavioural theories, as well as to
contribute to the methodological discussion on how to measure tax compliance. Focusing on
Eswatini, the analysis combines survey data from a thousand entrepreneurs with their tax
returns and filing history 2013-2018. I show that economic deterrence, compliance costs and
moral factors, such as intrinsic motivation and peer pressure, are strongly correlated with
actual filing. I also study how my key factors change when controlling for the persistence of
filing behaviour in past years, or using a self-reported measure of compliance. I argue that
tax knowledge plays a major role in understanding the decision to file. In terms of policy,
results show that the tax authority could improve filing rates by adopting both a deterrent
and an assistance-related approach, and also by triggering the role of social norms.
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3.1 Introduction
Tax compliance can be considered as the sequential achievement of three main actions:
filing a return, accurately reporting and paying the tax owed (Slemrod et al., 2001). In
contrast with tax filers who may decide to under declare their income, non-filers choose the
extreme compliance shortcut of not filing a return at all. This study looks at the first step
of compliance, which is a necessary condition for the other two actions to take place. Non-
filing has a number of important implications. First, especially in low-income countries,
non-filing significantly erodes the tax base of already budget-constrained economies, with
detrimental fiscal effects.1 Second, a non-filer eventually becomes a ghost in the eyes of the
tax agency, as he is missing from the tax records and fails to share valuable information with
the authority. Third, non-filing creates economic inefficiencies and horizontal inequalities,
since the effective tax rates faced by filers and non-filers of the same business size evidently
differ. Fourth, non-filing goes against the law, generates unfairness, lowers the moral fibre
of a society and ultimately delegitimises the government.
A growing descriptive evidence has been produced on the extent of non-filers in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). In Rwanda, over three-quarters of individuals supposed to file a
personal income tax (PIT) and half the companies liable to file a corporate income tax
(CIT) failed to do so. Figures from Uganda are even higher, with the average rate of
PIT non-filing being 86% over the period 2014-2018.2 In Malawi, almost 50% of income
taxpayers have filed no tax returns and/or made no tax payments over the period 2014-
2016 (Ligomeka, 2019a). Moore (2020) notes that in 2016 the Nigerian federal revenue
1In the last decades, revenue authorities in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have made impressive progress in-
creasing tax collections with respect to other low income countries (Moore et al., 2018). Yet, mobilised
domestic revenue is clearly not sufficient to finance development (Bird and Gendron, 2007). According
to the International Monetary Fund, on average SSA will need additional resources amounting to 19% of
GDP to finance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in education, health, roads, electricity, and
water by 2030 (IMF, 2019). The IMF target does not seem to be realistically achievable: on average, the
tax-to-GDP ratio in SSA has risen by 2 to 3 percentage points of GDP in the past two decades and there
are still 10 SSA countries with tax-to-GDP ratio still below 15%, most of them fragile states (Akitoby
et al., 2019).
2Figures from Rwanda and Uganda have been computed by the author in parallel studies on tax compliance,
drawing on detailed tax returns data.
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authorities declared the following proportions of non-filing taxpayers: 98% for PIT; 94%
for CIT; and 95% for VAT. Additional descriptive evidence from Kenya shows that only 3.5
million of the more than 9 million registered taxpayers filed their 2018 returns.3 Eswatini,
the country under study, is no exception: more than half (57%) of PIT returns are missing
each year on average over the period 2013-2018; figures for CIT are lower (43%) but still
alarming.
Despite the relevance of non-filers in SSA, non-filing is a neglected area of research with
most of the tax literature being cast on tax filers and their reporting behaviour (Erard et al.,
2018). Addressing tax non-filing requires some understanding of the factors underlying the
taxpayer’s decision whether to file a return or not. It is fair to assume that decisions
related to file a return are substantially different from those based on how much to declare,
conditional on filing. In this paper, I focus on non-filing of PIT, a progressive tax on income
generated by non-incorporated traders, and seek to answer two interrelated questions: (i)
Which economic and behavioural factors explain the decision to file a return in a given
year?; and (ii) Do these factors differently impact the persistence of non-filing behaviour
over time? A third crucial question naturally arises: Are the same factors explaining self-
reported compliance? Note however that this study is of a descriptive nature. Due to the
non-experimental set-up, my results point to strong correlations, and cannot be interpreted
in a causal way.
To shed light on these issues, I combine a detailed taxpayer’s perception survey of over
a thousand taxpayers – the first data collection effort of this type ever carried out in the
country – with rich administrative data provided by the Eswatini Revenue Authority. To
the best of my knowledge, tax return data from Eswatini has not been studied yet, while
most of tax research from Southern Africa comes from the recently expanding work on
tax administrative data from South Africa (Ebrahim et al., 2019). The merging of survey
and tax data is achieved through the use of uniquely identifying Taxpayer Identification
Numbers (TINs). Thanks to the TINs I am able to link, for each taxpayer in the sample,
tax attitudes and perceptions with their filing history in a quite novel way.
With the administrative data available I identify two main categories: active taxpayers
3See https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/lifestyle/profiles/what-to-expect-file-nil-return/
4258438-5232858-oiqmom/index.html, accessed on June 10, 2020
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who file their returns for the 2018 tax year, and non-filers who fail to do so. I am able
to track the filing behavior of PIT payers and define perpetual (or persistent) active/non-
filers as those taxpayers who consistently file/fail to file every year in the period 2013-2018.
I consider it to be important to account for past filing behaviour, since it is commonly
believed that once a filer enters the income tax system, he is likely to remain in the system
(Erard et al., 2018).
In addition, survey data enables me to capture the key factors likely to correlate with
compliance, as derived from the relevant literature on the behavioural drivers of tax com-
pliance. These factors are organised in six groups and follow the recently published World
Bank framework for understanding compliance (Prichard et al., 2019), which suggests three
main paradigms or approaches to revenue authorities in low-income countries in order to
encourage compliance - enforcement, facilitation and trust. The groupings are: (i) economic
deterrence and pecuniary incentives (enforcement paradigm in Prichard et al. (2019)), (ii)
compliance costs when filing a return (facilitation), (iii) trust in the authority and political
legitimacy (trust), (iv) fiscal exchange, or the idea that taxpayers contribute to the public
purse to get in return public services of adequate quantity and quality (trust), (v) social
norms against or in favour of tax evasion (trust), and (vi) intrinsic motivation to comply
(main outcome in the framework of Prichard et al. (2019)). Furthermore, I am able to test
the relevance of a set of ancillary factors, such as risk aversion, tax knowledge, demograph-
ics and business-related characteristics. These factors are used to dig deeper into the main
results and explore the possible mechanisms in place.
My findings suggest that some key factors are highly correlated with compliance, while
others are not. More specifically, four out of the six theoretical motivations are able to
discriminate between active and non-filers, and statistically significantly so. First, the
perception of audit risk is positively related to active filing. Taxpayers who are above the
median of the perceived audit risk distribution are 12% and 11% more likely to file last year
and being perpetually active, respectively. Second, compliance costs are also important
and account for a reduction of 16% in the probability of being active, and of 15% in the
probability of being perpetually so. Third, social norms also seem to affect compliance:
adhesion to a social norm seems to explain a fifth to a third of last year’s and perpetual
compliance, respectively. Lastly, having a high tax morale implies an increase of 21% and
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12.5% of the probability to file last year or persistently doing so, respectively. In contrast
with conventional wisdom, I find that neither trust nor reciprocity motivations covary with
compliance. All results are robust to dimension reduction through principal component
analysis and best subset selection with statistical learning methods, as well as the choice
of the econometric model and the inclusion of context-specific fixed effects.
Also, as a second set of results, I compare the evidence above with the results from
a regression in which the self-reported willingness to comply is the dependent variable –
as in Prichard et al. (2019). This is to show how this self-reported measure, often used
as a proxy for compliance in similar survey studies (more on this in section 3.2.2), is in
reality driven by different factors. My results mean that, while compliance costs and fiscal
exchange correlate with actual and self-reported compliance in the same way, other key
factors, such as social norms and deterrence show different, if not opposite, patterns.
Lastly, I find that lack of tax knowledge, as a component of compliance costs, is strongly
correlated with filing compliance. One extra question answered correctly in the tax quiz is
associated with an increase of 14% and 9% in the probability of filing last year’s tax return
and being persistently active, respectively. Linked to that, background characteristics,
such as employing a tax accountant and having a more mature business, are also crucial
in understanding compliance.
This paper aims to contribute to three main strands of literature, which are discussed in
detail in the next section. First, it tests whether the theory-based formulations (see section
3.2.1) on the drivers of tax compliance are practically relevant in Eswatini. In doing so, it
produces a clearer understanding of the behavioural forces motivating filing behaviour in a
country not studied before. Second, it contributes to the ongoing debate surrounding the
measurement of tax compliance (see section 3.2.2). By merging survey and administrative
data, this study adds an element of novelty to existing evidence, and promotes a third way
of collecting data to measure tax evasion. Third, this study adds to the specific literature
on non-filers. A common starting point is provided by Erard and Ho (2001), who extend
the neoclassical model of tax evasion to account for the existence of non-filers. The authors
then test their model on tax audit data of both filers and non-filers of US federal income tax
returns. Consistent with what found in this paper, the main determinants of non-filing in
the US are the probability of getting caught and the tax burden or compliance costs to file.
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Several papers have studied the drivers of filing experimentally, through tax nudges, both
in high- (Guyton et al., 2017; Meiselman, 2018; De Neve et al., 2019) and middle-income
countries (Kettle et al., 2016; Brockmeyer et al., 2019). Apart from some considerations in
Mascagni et al. (2019) in the context of Rwanda, no robust study on non-filing has been
produced in the African continent.
These results are not only of academic interest but directly relevant to policy debates
within tax authorities on the effective strategies to address poor tax compliance in low-
and middle-income countries. Especially in SSA, the reality seems to be that tax policy, as
written in books, is often very different from tax administration on the ground. While it is
true that international advice is gearing towards simplification of tax systems in SSA, still
very little is known about the practical considerations of African taxpayers. Therefore, it
is of paramount importance for revenue authorities in SSA to extract knowledge on how
taxpayers perceive the tax system, and how perceptions ultimately influence compliance, in
order to implement more successful and realistic policies. In this way, informed, evidence-
based, tax policies are more likely to be compatible both with what taxpayers really believe
and the actual capacity and resources available within revenue authorities. This survey
study attempts to stress that more systematic and robust collection of primary data on
SSA taxpayers constitutes an important direction for research on tax issues in the region.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework
for analysing tax compliance and reviews the methods to measure it. Section 3 describes
the country under study. The methodological approach is addressed in Section 4. Section 5
presents the results, the robustness of which is dealt with in Section 6. Section 7 summarises
and concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Understanding Tax Compliance: Theoretical Foundations
The theoretical framework through which tax compliance should be conceived and ex-
plained is composed by a full-house of motivations, largely referring to two main branches:
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neoclassical and behavioral. These theories are (non-exhaustively) summarised here be-
low:4 they are highly interconnected and, in most cases, more recent formulations build on
pre-existing ones. Testable hypotheses are formulated for each theoretical category, and
are summarised in Table 3.1.
Deterrence As already discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter 2, economic deterrence stems
from the neoclassical standard theory of utility maximisation, as developed by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972). According to this theory, the key drivers of taxpayers’ decisions are
two pecuniary factors which increase the cost of evade: the size of the penalty and the
probability of getting caught. Despite having been criticised of limiting the attention on
monetary factors only and not considering the consensual side of compliance (Andreoni
et al., 1998; Sandmo, 2005), economic deterrence results to be effective in motivating
compliance, both in developed and developing countries.5 A large number of theoreti-
cal deviations from the neoclassical model have been proposed (see section 2.2 of Chapter
2). The key elements of this model (e.g. audits and sanctions) are a cornerstone of tax
administration across the world. However, overtly deterrent strategies, often blindly imple-
mented in low-income countries, may be unsustainable and expensive over the long term.
The enforcement paradigm requires a certain level of credibility in the authority’s action,
which is not necessarily guaranteed in low-income countries (McKerchar and Evans, 2009;
Prichard et al., 2019). In a context of limited budget as in most African countries, including
Eswatini, the key question is then how can compliance be encouraged without recurring
to extensive and costly enforcement strategies, an aspect that will be further tested in
4The tax compliance literature is extensive and we do not attempt to review it all in detail here. For more
extensive reviews, see Alm (2012); Mascagni (2018); Slemrod (2019).
5Exogenously manipulating penalty rates is challenging in real-world settings. Therefore, most evidence
on the impact of fines comes from laboratory experiments Friedland et al. (1978); Beck et al. (1991);
Alm et al. (1992). Relatedly, there is now growing evidence that non-financial penalties (e.g. public
disclosure of one’s tax returns) may also act as a deterrent (Bosco and Mittone, 1997; Fortin et al., 2007;
Lefebvre et al., 2015; Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2016). Evidence from developing countries reinforces the
assumption that fines matter in some cases (Ortega and Scartascini (2016a) in Venezuela; Shimeles et al.
(2017) in Ethiopia, Brockmeyer et al. (2019) in Costa Rica, Bergolo et al. (2019) in Uruguay; McCulloch
et al. (2020) in Nigeria; Fjeldstad et al. (2020) in Tanzania) and not in others (Del Carpio (2014) in Peru;
Carrillo et al. (2017) in Ecuador; Mascagni et al. (2017) in Rwanda).
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Chapter 4.
For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that both a higher perception of the risk of
being caught if evading and having been audited or fined in the past are related to better
compliance outcomes.6
Compliance costs Complying with the tax law can be extremely challenging. It involves
a high degree of technical knowledge on which rules and regulations apply, as well as on
how to practically fill a tax return. The more complex a tax system is, the more difficult
will be for taxpayers to comply (Richardson, 2006). Hiring a tax accountant often helps,7
but the help of more sophisticated agents can be too expensive for small taxpayers or not
enough in too complex tax systems (Chetty and Saez, 2013). Therefore, compliance costs
are believed to be highly regressive, especially in low-income countries (Coolidge and Ilic,
2009). A growing descriptive evidence reports very low levels of tax knowledge in Africa:
using Afrobarometer data on 36 African countries, Isbell (2017) reports that the majority
of respondents have difficulty figuring out what taxes they owe to the government, and
the same confusion is reported when studying a previous round of Afrobarometer data
(Aiko and Logan, 2014). Fjeldstad et al. (2012) show that taxpayers in South Africa and
Tanzania who perceive it as difficult to find out what taxes they are supposed to pay are
less likely to have a tax compliant attitude.
Despite the increasing interest in tax policy – most African revenue authorities have
started implementing strategies to improve tax knowledge (Mascagni and Santoro, 2018) –,
tax knowledge is usually considered only as a background variable by tax researchers, prox-
ied by the taxpayer’s level of education. Only recently tax awareness has been measured in
surveys, even if inadequately. In most cases, tax knowledge and overall compliance costs
are operationalised with single survey items, such as the ease of finding out what taxes and
6A key departure from the neoclassical model is that I focus on the individual perceptions of audit rates,
rather than actual audit rates. The neoclassical model assumes that taxpayers know with what probability
they will be caught by the tax authority. On the contrary, I expect that taxpayers largely misperceive
actual audit rates and substantially overweight a (actually low) probability of audit, as already theoretically
formulated (Webley, 1991; Kirchler et al., 2007).
7It is also true that, although the availability of tax practitioners reduces informational and computational
barriers to tax compliance, their use can also contribute to increase non-compliance by helping taxpayers
take advantage of legal ambiguity Klepper and Nagin (1989); Erard and Feinstein (1994).
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fees should be paid to the government (Fjeldstad et al., 2012; McCulloch et al., 2020). The
investigation discussed in Chapter 2 was the first of its type in measuring tax knowledge in
a more structured way, through a tax quiz (consistently replicated in this study, see section
3.4.1), and in capturing the causal link between tax knowledge and actual compliance. In
the same fashion, I expect that taxpayers with higher tax knowledge and better tax-related
practices, such as having a tax accountant, keeping books of accounts and spending more
time on tax matters, are also more likely to actively file a tax return.
Fiscal exchange As already mentioned in section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2, the fiscal exchange
theory builds on the concept of reciprocity between citizens and the State. In this setting,
tax compliance is encouraged if the State is perceived to be using taxpayer’s money in
a transparent and just way, providing public services in sufficient quantity and quality
(Cowell and Gordon, 1988; Falkinger, 1988; Levi, 1989; Moore, 2013). If taxpayers do not
see the private benefits from contributing, they are more likely to engage in evasion and
adjust their terms of trade with the government. The fiscal exchange theory has been
abundantly developed theoretically and recently tested in low-income countries (Fjeldstad
and Semboja, 2001; D’Arcy, 2011; Bodea and Lebas, 2016; Blimpo et al., 2018). Empirical
evidence to support the theory is, however, ambiguous.8
With the survey data available, I am able to test the hypothesis that taxpayers who
are more satisfied with the quality of public services and feel they are getting something
in return from paying taxes are more likely to comply.
Trust and political legitimacy Closely related to the fiscal exchange theory, the qual-
ity and role of the institutions matters for compliance (Levi, 1989). More specifically,
individuals’ attitudes towards these institutions are crucial in deciding whether to com-
ply or not (Torgler, 2003). Individuals who have a negative perception of the quality of
8Fjeldstad (2004) finds not evidence in favour of the fiscal exchange theory in his analysis of survey data
in South Africa. Likewise, D’Arcy (2011) provides limited support for fiscal exchange using cross-country
Afrobarometer data. Investigating a different wave of the same Afrobarometer data, Sacks (2012) finds
that citizens who are satisfied with their government’s provision of services and goods are more likely to
defer to the tax authority. In a similar fashion, the nudging exercise of Mascagni et al. (2017) proved to
be effective in raising revenues in Rwanda by stressing the link between tax compliance and better public
services.
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the government and the level of fairness in the tax system tend to comply less, both in
the laboratory (Webley, 1991) and in the real world (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann,
1996). At the same time, if citizens judge the government as administratively competent
and transparent in its actions, enforcement tends to be more effective in curbing evasion,
because the State is considered more credible in its fight against it. In the slippery-slope
framework, for example, trust and enforcement coexist and both contribute to create an
environment more conducive to consenting compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008). In this set-
ting, the combination of fairness, equity, reciprocity and accountability produces trust in
the government and foster quasi-voluntary compliance, as recently summarised in Prichard
et al. (2019). The aspect of taxpayers’ trust is of paramount importance in the context of
SSA, where citizens tend to trust more informal institutions such as religious and tradi-
tional leaders than tax officials (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi, 2016) and perceive corruption
in tax agencies as rampant (Isbell, 2017). Levels of trust in SSA are incredibly low when
compared to, say, Nordic countries (Pirttilä, 2017).
In this study, I measure the extent of trust towards the tax authority, as well as per-
ceptions on corruption, fairness and (lack of) transparency. As shown in section 3.3.2,
Eswatini scores fairly poorly in terms of the quality of governance. Therefore, I hypoth-
esise that taxpayers with worse perceptions on corruption, fairness and transparency are
more likely to be non-filers.
Peer pressure It is also documented that one’s behaviour in society is likely to be shaped
by their peers’ behaviour and social norms (Elster, 1989). It derives that tax evasion can
become the norm within a society if it is socially approved by its members, thus becoming
an informal and self-reinforcing rule of behaviour. Theoretical elaborations have stated that
the cost of evading is an increasing function of the proportion of taxpayers who comply
(Myles and Naylor, 1996; Kim, 2003; Fortin et al., 2007). Therefore, it is relevant to consider
a given taxpayer’s decision as not happening in a vacuum, but rather as something taking
place in reference to the group in which the taxpayer lives in. Peer pressure and social
comparison have also been observed empirically, with interesting results.9
9In Peru, disclosing information on the level of compliance in the subjects’ reference group had a large
positive impact on compliance (Del Carpio, 2014). In Guatemala, Kettle et al. (2016) shows that nudging
taxpayers with a social norms message successfully impacted compliance with profit tax. The message
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Against this framework, I test the hypothesis according to which a taxpayer is less
likely to file the more he feels that is accepted to imitate his peers engaging in non-filing.
Individual morality In contrast to the high levels of evasion predicted by the neoclas-
sical model, it has been established that some people never evade, even when the evasion
gamble is better than fair (Baldry, 1986). These taxpayers can be categorised as honest or
intrinsically motivated, since they always believe that evading taxes is the wrong thing to
do. For example, Dwenger et al. (2015) show that compliance is observed even in setting,
such as the local church tax in Bavaria, where tax enforcement is non-existent and private
pecuniary benefits of compliance are likely to be minimal. Individual morality has been
included in the taxpayer’s decision problem either through a component of warm glow from
contributing (Andreoni et al., 1998), or guilt or shame for failing to comply (Gordon, 1989;
Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Reckers et al., 1994; Traxler, 2010). The notion of morality in
compliance is also loosely captured by the term tax morale (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).
Importantly, the extrinsic incentives of a too harsh deterrence approach risk to crowd-out
one’s intrinsic motivation to comply (Frey and Torgler, 2007). A plethora of empirical
studies have attempted to influence tax compliance through appeals to morality. However,
most of these studies have failed to find any significant results.10
This research captures the individual morality of taxpayers in Eswatini and tests
whether it is linked to compliance behaviour. A positive relationship is expected between
the two.
Risk aversion It is well established that risk attitudes are one of the key explanatory
factors of a wide range of individual economic behaviours. Relevant decisions concerning
business investment, technology adoption ad growth (Banerjee and Newman, 1994), taking
referred to the (rather low share of) 64.5 percent of taxpayers that had already paid this tax and invited
non-compliers to join the status quo. In a more developed context such as the UK, Hallsworth et al.
(2017) significantly enhanced compliance through sending a letter informs the taxpayer that “nine out of
ten people in the United Kingdom remit their tax on time. You are currently in the very small minority
of people who have not paid us yet.”
10Among the many: Blumenthal et al. (2001) in the USA; Torgler (2004b) in Switzerland; Fellner et al.
(2013) in Austria; Pomeranz (2015) and Bergolo et al. (2019) in Latin America. Few exceptions can be
found in Bott et al. (2014) for Norway and Mascagni et al. (2017) for Rwanda.
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a loan (Banerjee et al., 2015), insurance (Friedman, 1974; Karlan et al., 2014; Cole et al.,
2017), human capital investment and career decisions (Weiss, 1972) as well as migration
(Bryan et al., 2014) are highly affected by subjective risk preferences. On top of that, risk
aversion declines with income and is significant among the poor (Andrisani, 1978; Cicchetti
and Dubin, 1994; Shaw, 1996).
A number of empirical studies have shown the role played by risk aversion in many
different fields, especially so in developing countries.11 When it comes to tax compliance,
different theoretical considerations have been made concerning risk attitudes (Segal, 1990;
Bernasconi, 1998), in the attempt of deviating from the model of Allingham and Sadmo
(1972), which assumes that all taxpayers have the same level of risk preference. However,
very little, if anything, is known about the relation between risk preferences and tax com-
pliance in the field, even less so in developing countries. In some instances, risk aversion
is questionably proxied by the taxpayer’s perceived probability of being caught evading
(Yücedoğru and Hasseldine, 2016).
Within the risk aversion framework, this paper contributes in two ways. First, it
measures risk aversion more accurately, through an experimental technique widely adopted
in the literature: the Multiple Price List (Andersen et al., 2006). Second, it attempts to link
the experimental measure of risk aversion with actual compliance, deriving the proposition
that more risk-loving taxpayers are more likely to engage themselves in riskier activities,
thus less likely to abide to the law and file their returns.
Demographics Lastly, this study also focuses on the relation between compliance and
a number of demographic variables. A long-standing, mostly US-based, tradition of tax
research suggests that younger, single and self-employed individuals tend to comply less
(Clotfelter, 1983; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Erard and Ho, 2001). Younger and male
individuals also appear to contribute less in laboratory experiments (Baldry, 1986; Alm
and McKee, 2003; Kastlunger et al., 2010). At the same time, some growing evidence
11Pioneering in this field, (Binswanger, 1980) conducted experiments eliciting measures of risk aversion from
farmers in rural India. More recent examples include Attanasio et al. (2012) in Colombia, Voors et al.
(2012) in Burundi, Gilligan et al. (2014) in Nepal, Maertens et al. (2014) and Ward and Singh (2015) in
India, Jakiela and Ozier (2016) in Kenya. See Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) for a recent review of the
literature in developing countries.
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from low-income countries shows that tax systems in Africa can be severely biased against
women, who in turn may have worse feelings about taxes (van den Boogaard et al., 2018;
Siebert and Mbise, 2018; Ligomeka, 2019b; Akpan and Sempere, 2019). In much the same
way as tax knowledge, also the level of education is positively correlated with compliance
(Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976; Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Kinsey and Gramsick, 1993).
These results indicate clearly that demographic characteristics play a non-negligible role
in explaining compliance (Hofmann et al. (2017) for a meta-analysis). Also, they are
important in the way they interact with the perceptions discussed above, as abundantly
documented in the literature (Richardson, 2006; Cyan et al., 2016).
3.2.2 Measuring Tax Compliance: Empirical Approaches
The literature so far has produced different definitions of tax compliance, which can be
considered a spectrum of often hard-to-measure actions, especially when it comes to the
grey area between tax evasion and avoidance (Slemrod, 2007). For the sake of this study,
a relevant dichotomy arises when considering the extensive (failure to file) or the intensive
(income understatement) margin of evasion. Following the categorisation in Halla (2010),
I summarise here below the methods of measurement of (any definition of) tax compliance
as direct or indirect. I also discuss a third approach, which is believed to be more robust
and is the one adopted in this paper.
Direct approaches Direct approaches of measuring (non-)compliance are manifold. A
first example is provided by administrative data, such as data on audits. Assuming that the
agency is capable of unveiling all hidden income through an audit, such an approach would
directly capture the extent of evasion. The most reliable source of data from tax audits is
given by the US Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). Importantly, the
TCMP implemented random in-depth audits from 1963 to 1988. Despite the robustness
of this method (Advani et al., 2019), it is inapplicable to contexts of limited investment in
fiscal capacity such as in low-income countries. Apart from data on audits, tax returns data
is used more and more as a direct approach of measuring evasion. The main advantages
and disadvantages of this approach are addressed at the end of this section.
A second direct approach consists of measuring individual-level tax compliance in a lab-
136
Table 3.1: Theoretical Background
Explanatory category Hypotheses tested
Deterrence 1. Taxpayers who perceive a higher probability of getting caught, are
more likely to file
2. Taxpayers who have been audited or fined, are more likely to file
3. Taxpayers who have had more interactions with the authority, are
more likely to file
Compliance costs 1. Taxpayers with more tax knowledge, are more likely to file
2. Taxpayers who perceive it as easier to file, are more likely to file
3. Taxpayers with a tax accountant/bookkeeping/more time on tax,
are more likely to file
Risk aversion 1. Taxpayers who self-report to be more risk averse, are more likely
to file
2. Taxpayers with a higher CRRA measure, are more likely to file
Fiscal exchange 1. Taxpayers who are more satisfied of the quality of public services,
are more likely to file
2. Taxpayers who think they are getting something in return, are
more likely to file
3. Taxpayers who think taxes can be raised to fund better healthcare,
are more likely to file
Trust and political legitimacy 1. Taxpayers who think bribing is less common, are more likely to file
2. Taxpayers who think the tax system is fair, are more likely to file
3. Taxpayers who think the tax system is transparent, are more likely
to file
Social norms 1. Taxpayers who would not imitate their peers’ evasion decision, are
more likely to file
Intrinsic motivation 1. Taxpayers who believe that evading is always wrong, are more
likely to file
Demographics 1. Female taxpayers are more likely to file
2. Older taxpayers are more likely to file
3. More educated taxpayers can be more or less likely to file
4. Swazi-national taxpayers can be more or less likely to file
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oratory, with early applications dating back to Friedland et al. (1978); Spicer and Thomas
(1982); Alm et al. (1992). Pre- and post- survey data are usually collected to enrich the
analysis (Bosco and Mittone, 1997; Torgler et al., 2010). Lab experiments have been criti-
cised for their lack of external validity (Levitt and List, 2007). The debate is ongoing and
results supporting the comparability of lab and real subjects have recently been produced
(Alm et al., 2015).
The third, and most widely adopted, direct approach refers to capturing compliance
through survey techniques. With this method, researchers directly ask the respondent
whether they fail to comply with taxes. In a more preferable scenario, they find reasonable
approximations of non-compliance through less direct questions. Tax surveys have gained
relevance in low-income countries (see Fjeldstad et al. (2012) for a SSA-based review),
also given the challenges in following the two other methods described above. Relevant
examples of tax surveys are grouped in two categories: (i) cross-country international
business12 or citizen-level13 surveys, and (ii) ad-hoc surveys implemented by researchers in
a single country.14
Despite being expensive, surveys still represent the most powerful tool to capture rele-
vant information, such as tax attitudes and perceptions, which cannot be extracted other-
wise. Further, survey data allows for in-depth descriptive analysis, which often sheds light
on new behavioural patterns and provides the basis for more experimental studies. Lastly,
policymakers are interested in understanding the views of citizens and embedding survey
evidence in policy decisions and future strategies.
At the same time, tax surveys present weaknesses and inconsistencies. The first point
of criticism states that it is difficult to get honest answers about dishonest behaviour
12The most comprehensive of these is the Doing Business (DB) survey conducted by the International
Finance Corporation of the World Bank. DB surveys are run every year world-wide and in most African
countries. DB produces world rankings on the ease of doing business and a number of different sub-areas.
Importantly, a specific module of DB focuses on the ease of paying taxes. Another example is given by
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, firm-level surveys of a representative sample of a country’s private
sector.
13The main examples are provided by Afrobarometer and World Values Surveys.
14Notable examples from low and middle income countries are provided by Gauthier and Reinikka (2001)
in Uganda; Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001); Fjeldstad et al. (2020) in Tanzania; Fjeldstad (2004); Coolidge
and Ilic (2009) in South Africa; Bodea and Lebas (2016); McCulloch et al. (2020) in Nigeria.
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when respondents are motivated to present themselves in a positive light (Ajzen, 1991).
Andreoni et al. (1998) suggest that taxpayers might overstate their degree of compliance in
self-reports and those who have evaded might want to excuse their behavior by declaring a
higher tax attitude. Relatedly, response rates can diverge by income groups and undermine
the sample representativeness: it is more difficult to survey wealthy people and detect their
levels of evasion (Alvaredo and Atkinson, 2010; Higgins and Lustig, 2013; Pirttilä and Tarp,
2019).
The second main critique refers to the operationalisation of the key dependent variable
– tax compliance. It is true that asking for the willingness to pay taxes (often labeled
as tax morale, as in section 3.2.1) is less blunt than enquiring about an illicit behaviour,
and researchers follow this strategy to get higher degrees of honesty. At the same time,
scholars often claim to be measuring tax compliance when they are just capturing an
attitude. Also, it is unclear whether all respondents perceive the concept of compliance in
an unequivocal way and this can undermine the internal validity of the survey instruments.
The relationship between attitudes towards compliance and actual behaviour has been
abundantly questioned in the literature, as reviewed by Onu and Oats (2016). For example,
Elffers et al. (1987) find that there are significant differences between actual tax evasion, as
derived from tax audits of 700 Dutch taxpayers, and survey responses. Likewise, Hessing
et al. (1988) find no correlation at all between self-reports and documented compliance
status with the Dutch tax authorities.
In addition, even if pretending that attitudes are consistent with behaviour, the way
in which tax compliance is usually defined in surveys is not necessarily specific to the
behaviour under study. Many examples can be provided in this regard. D’Arcy (2011) uses
as dependent variable answers to the Afrobarometer question: “For each of the following
statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The tax department always has
the right to make people pay taxes.” This does not necessarily mean that a taxpayer is
compliant, rather whether she believes that the State has the authority to collect taxes.
Using another rounds of Afrobarometer data, both Levi et al. (2009) and Sacks (2012)
adopt the same dependent variable to study the willingness to comply. Blimpo et al.
(2018) create an index of tax morale to proxy tax compliance, in which the same question
on government authority is included, together with one on trust in tax officials. In contrast,
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McCulloch et al. (2020) prefer to use the question “Which of the following options is closest
to what you think about people not paying taxes on income?”, where the options are: not
wrong at all; wrong but understandable; and wrong and punishable. In conclusion, some
confusion exists in the operationalisation of survey items and greater consensus is needed
in order to improve the reliability and comparability of empirical tax research (Fjeldstad
et al., 2012).
Indirect approaches Indirect approaches aim to provide macro-level estimates on tax
evasion by inference from key observable indicators, such as currency demand or national
income and product accounts. These observable indicators are what Slemrod (2019) defines
traces-of-income. If performed correctly, indirect approaches can provide approximation of
tax evasion cross-country and for a reasonably long period of time. The pioneering work
of Pissarides and Weber (1989) uses food consumption as a proxy for income, and ends
up inferring that self-employed individuals understate their income more than employees.
Other examples of indicators are given by hoarding of high-value currency (Feige, 1990),
the ratio of currency to money (Tanzi, 1980) and electricity consumption.
As explained in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), indirect approaches are questionable in
their methodology. For what concerns currency demand, it is usually difficult to estimate it
accurately. When comparing national accounts measures of income and income reported to
the tax authority, it is often the case that national income estimates of several key forms
of income are based on tax return data itself. In addition, there are often inconsistent
definitions of income for tax purposes and for national accounts.
The third way: surveys and administrative data The third solution, which aims
at overcoming some of the weaknesses mentioned above, consists of merging survey and
tax return data. While tax surveys have been implemented for decades, tax authorities
of low-income countries have only recently inaugurated a collaboration with researchers in
which a wealth of administrative data is shared and analysed (Mascagni et al., 2016). This
collaboration has been fuelled by the impressive evolution of IT within revenue authorities,
which produces a massive amount of tax data every day. Gathering and understanding
such data has become a priority for making informed tax policy decisions.
There is a lot that can be learned from administrative data (Mascagni et al., 2016).
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First, it captures actual filing behaviour, as opposed to biased survey self-reports. Second,
the availability of tax returns across many years offers the opportunity to study trends
in compliance over time, and to have a more comprehensive view of compliance patterns.
Third, collaboration with international researchers builds technical capacity within the tax
agencies themselves with the ultimate goal of improving internal processes.
Based on tax data, rigorous experiments and impact studies from SSA and the devel-
oping world have recently been published.15 It is also fair to stress that administrative
data comes with its own drawbacks. First – linking back to the introduction to this sec-
tion and Chapter 1 –, income data from tax returns only captures the information that
taxpayers decide to disclose to the revenue authority. All income derived from informal
activity is therefore excluded. Second, administrative data, despite being anonymised be-
fore being shared, is highly confidential and often accessed by a small group of academics
only, so reducing possibility of replication. Third, administrative data is available only for
those who are registered in the first place, thus does not cover the informal sector. Survey
data can address this concern by framing the sample to include non-registered taxpayers.
Lastly, as Slemrod (2019) points out, results that provides an unfavourable picture of the
way in which a tax authority operates are more likely to encounter resistance from senior
management and eventually not be published.
This study represents one of the few examples of tax research which combines alterna-
tive data sources.16 The merging takes place based on the taxpayer identification number
(TIN), a unique identifier assigned to each taxpayer at the time of registration.
15See Mascagni (2018) for a comprehensive review. Relevant studies from Africa include Eissa and Zeitlin
(2014); Mascagni and Mengistu (2016); Mascagni et al. (2017); Almunia et al. (2017); Mascagni et al.
(2019); Santoro and Mdluli (2019); Mascagni et al. (2020). Field experiments from other developing
context include: VAT payments in Chile (Pomeranz, 2015), individual municipal taxes in Argentina
(Castro and Scartascini, 2013), firm taxes in Ecuador (Carrillo et al., 2017) and corporate income tax in
Uruguay (Bergolo et al., 2019).
16Other studies include Mascagni et al. (2019) for Rwanda; Del Carpio (2014) in Peru; Bergolo et al. (2019)
in Uruguay. When considering high-income countries, it is worth mentioning Lefebvre et al. (2015) in




The Kingdom of Eswatini17 is a landlocked country in Southern Africa, bordered by
Mozambique to the north-east and South Africa to the north, west and south. Eswa-
tini is classified as a lower-middle income country with a GDP per capita in 2017 of $3,243
in PPP, according to the WB Development Indicators. Its main local trading partner is
South Africa, and the countries’ currency, the Lilangeni (SZL), is pegged to the South
African Rand.18 Economic growth is estimated to have slightly risen to 2.4 per cent in
2018 from 2 per cent in 2017, although growing fiscal challenges resulted in a projected
growth rate of just 1.3 per cent for 2019 (World Bank, 2018). However, the country faces
major development challenges. Based on the international poverty line of $1.90 a day, and
the lower-middle income poverty line of $3.20 a day, it is estimated that 38 per cent of
the Swazi population live in extreme poverty, and a total of 60.4 per cent are poor overall.
This is accompanied by an unemployment rate of 23 per cent in 2018. Health issues are
difficult to address, with HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis widespread in the country. As of
2018, Eswatini has the twelfth lowest life expectancy in the world, at 58 years. The pop-
ulation growth rate is 1.2 per cent, with a total population of 1.2 million in 2018 (World
Bank, 2018).
3.3.2 Tax system in Eswatini
The Eswatini Revenue Authority (SRA) is a semi-autonomous institution established by
the Revenue Authority Act in 2008, as part of the government’s reform strategy for revenue
administration. SRA officially took over the function of revenue collection on 1 January
2011. The SRA collects both direct taxes, representing about 57 per cent of tax revenues
17Formerly known as Swaziland. The name change took place in April 2018. While in most places the
paper reflects this change, several documents and reports issued prior to this change still make reference
to Swaziland. The revenue authority is called Eswatini Revenue Authority but SRA is still its acronym.
18The country is highly dependent on South Africa, which provides around 85% of its imports and a market
for about 60% of exports.
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in 2017/18, and indirect taxes, amounting to 43 per cent of revenues (SRA, 2018). The
main direct income taxes are taxes on companies (16% of total revenues) and taxes on
individuals (36%), which is labelled here as personal income tax (PIT). The main indirect
taxes are VAT (30%) and fuel taxes (12%). Concerning the focus of this study, PIT is
a tax on income generated by individuals, and has a progressive structure – a maximum
marginal rate of 33 per cent and exemptions for income below SZL41,000 (US$2,848).
Three main categories of individuals are targeted by PIT: non-business employees taxed
at source (PAYE), directors of companies and sole traders, with the latter being the focus
of this study. From the analysis of PIT returns in 2012-2017, the relevance of the three
categories in terms of number of returns lodged is as follows: PAYE (41%), sole traders
(37%) and director of companies (21.5%).
In terms of filing obligations and deadlines, income tax returns must be submitted
according to a staggered timeline. Non-VAT-registered small and medium enterprises are
expected to furnish their CIT returns by 31 October each year, PIT payers have to file
by 30 November, and large companies and CIT/PIT entities who are registered for VAT
must submit their returns by 31 December. The tax year ends on 30 June. Importantly
for this study, the law mandates that every registered taxpayer is required to file his return
regardless of whether he is operative during the year. Strict sanctions are imposed by
law for non-filing and for false assessment. Anyone who fails to furnish a return within
the stipulated period may be liable on conviction to a fine of SZL10,000 (US$719) and/or
imprisonment for a period of up to one year. Those making false assessments with an
intention to evade are liable to a fine of SZL50,000 (US$3,591) or imprisonment up to five
years. These amounts are discouraging, given that the average monthly turnover (total
sales) of the taxpayers in the sample is of about SZL32,500. However, lack of human
resources means that audit probability is likely to be low for small taxpayers and high
for the most profitable cases. According to (ATAF, 2017), in 2017 auditors accounted for
6.5% of total tax administration staff, well below the SSA average of 12% and the 30%
international benchmark (Gallagher, 2004).
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3.3.3 Tax performance and tax compliance
Revenue collection has continued to show a steady increase year on year since the inception
of the SRA. A growth of 8 per cent was recorded in 2017/18, compared to an average of
13 per cent over the past five years, as indicated in Appendix Figure A1 (SRA, 2018).19
In terms of tax-to-GDP ratio, the country registered a positive trend from 12.3 per cent
in 2011/12 to 14.7 per cent in 2017/18, but this is still far from OECD’s 25 per cent. As
shown in section 3.3.2, Eswatini – like Rwanda – collects proportionally more income tax
than other African countries.
Table 1.1 from the introductory chapter reports key fiscal and governance indicators
for Eswatini and, at the same time, reproduces the indicators for Rwanda in order to allow
for cross-country comparisons. According to ATAF (2017), the 2015 tax-to-GDP ratio in
Eswatini is about half that of Southern Africa and lower than Rwanda’s. Eswatini scores
worse in terms of governance outcomes, both when considering the Corruption Perception
Index and the World Bank Governance indicators. For the latter, Eswatini underperforms
in terms of voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory
quality and corruption – all institutional factors presumably linked to voluntary tax com-
pliance. The quality of governance in Eswatini seems to be poorer both when compared to
Rwanda, which may be seen as an outlier in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also, more tellingly,
when benchmarking against the rest of Southern Africa. In much the same fashion, scores
for government integrity and judicial effectiveness are worse than the regional average,
while the tax burden is higher. The World Bank Doing Business indicators depicts a con-
text more in line with Southern Africa, but still far from Rwanda: while Rwanda ranks
38th in the world for the ease of doing business, Eswatini is 122nd; when considering the
ease of paying taxes, however, Eswatini performs slightly better, being 77th in the world
(Rwanda ranking 38th). Less than a third of adults in labor force have a bank account,
compared to 42% in the region.
SRA (2018) reports 53,208 registered taxpayers in 2017/2018. Taxpayers registered
for income tax account for 83 per cent of the total. The positive trend in registrations
19Total revenue collection amounted to SZL8.453 billion ($617 million) in 2017/18. The reduced growth
rate in 2017/2018 reflects the slow economic growth observed in the domestic economy in recent years
and the fiscal challenges faced by the government, which is a major driver of the economy (SRA, 2018).
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reflects the efforts of SRA to foster formality, as well as other service-oriented initiatives.20
However, the informal sector still represents about 41 per cent of Eswatini national income,
compared to 32% in Southern Africa (Table 1.1).
When it comes to revenues from income taxes, Appendix Figure A2 shows the trend of
PIT and CIT collection over time. While CIT collection reported a 14 per cent below-target
gap in 2017/2018, individual income tax performed fairly well, being 13 per cent above
target. However, this performance was underpinned by higher PAYE collections mainly
due to an increase in employee numbers in the Public administration and Manufacturing
sectors (SRA, 2018). It is fair to assume that compliance of individual businessmen was not
the key driver of this positive trend.21 Hence, studying the drivers of individual businesses’
compliance assumes an important value for tax policy as well.
Initial evidence on personal income tax compliance gaps can be gathered from SRA
administrative data. I have access to the universe of 31,414 PIT payers registered up to
December 2017 and the PIT returns for the period 2013-2018, lodged by a total of about
24,000 individuals. As explained in the introduction, I focus my attention on two main
filing categories: active taxpayers and non-filers. The data shows:
• Active taxpayers: conditional on filing, the 6-year average of active (non-nil) PIT
returns is 74 per cent.22 Perpetually active taxpayers amount to 61 per cent of the
filing population (or 14,637 units). Relevant to this study, sole traders as a subgroup
of PIT payers are below the average rate of PIT filing at 70 per cent.
• Non-filers: the 6-year average of missing PIT returns is 57 per cent – 54 per cent for
sole traders. This implies that more than half of all PIT payers (or 24,386) who were
supposed to file a return in a given year failed to do so. In the last tax year, 72%
20A noteworthy example of this approach is given by Operation Bakhumbute. This was a door-to-door
compliance campaign, which aimed to increase the taxpayer base and remind taxpayers of their tax
obligations. The operation was carried out on 733 businesses in the Lubombo, Shiselweni and Manzini
districts. About 20% of the businesses visited were found not to have registered with SRA for tax purposes.
These businesses were educated on their compliance obligations, furnished with registration forms and
advised on the registration process. Following initial engagement with these businesses, follow-up visits
ensured that they actually registered.
21This view is also shared by SRA, as emerged from preliminary discussions with the senior management.
22The remaining returns are nil, lodged by the so-called nil-filers (Santoro and Mdluli, 2019).
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of the taxpayers expected to file failed to do so. Considering the persistence of this
behaviour over time, as many as 10,035 are persistent non-filers, meaning that they
never filed a return after registration. In other words, about a third of all registered
PIT payers never lodged a tax return.
In conclusion, taxpayers’ compliance with personal income tax is far from optimal:
every year, about half the returns are missing. Remarkably, non-filers outnumber active
taxpayers every single tax year. This study attempts to explain why.
3.4 Research Design
3.4.1 Data
Administrative data Access to administrative data has been granted by SRA, with
whom I signed a confidentiality agreement (see Chapter 1). More specifically, I have access
to the taxpayers’ registry, which contains information on the universe of taxpayers regis-
tered with the SRA for any tax type, and the PIT returns for the period 2013-2018, which
provide information on the filing behaviour of the study population. Each taxpayers is as-
signed a taxpayer identification number (TIN), which is consistent across all SRA datasets
and used to merge the registry and tax returns.
Administrative data serves two main purposes. First, it is needed to identify and
locate the taxpayers to be targeted. Second, it assists in the unequivocal categorisation of
taxpayers into the two main mutually-exclusive categories, active vs non-filers. The filing
behaviour is classified by looking at the most recent tax year, 2018. This means that an
active taxpayer positively filed the 2018 tax return, while a non-filer failed to do so in
the same year. More specifically, the population of non-filers for a given year is a moving
target, as non-filers are potential filers who have not yet filed. Therefore, the categorisation
into non-filing depends on the specific time at which the data is observed, in this case the
end of July 2019, or nine months after the filing deadline of 30 November 2018. Relatedly,
I am able to observe the filing behaviour over a 6-year period and create the perpetual
sub-category – taxpayers who keep filing in the same way every year.
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As discussed in section 3.2.2, administrative data is more effective than survey data
in capturing tax compliance accurately. In this case, the filing behaviour is measured
exclusively from tax returns. It is also true that tax data has limitations (see section 2.4.1
of Chapter 2 and section 3.2.2), but in this case the quality of the SRA taxpayers’ registry
is higher than in other contexts, especially when it comes to identifying information such
as phone numbers and location.
Survey data First-hand survey data has been collected by the author over a one-month
period, with fieldwork starting on 7 November and ending on 8 December 2019. The survey
has been programmed to be run on tablets through SurveyCTO software. The survey
team consisted of ten enumerators and one team leader. Interviews were administered in
person, with the enumerators first contacting the potential respondents on phone numbers
extracted from SRA administrative records. The survey protocol was strictly followed,
and taxpayers had to provide an informed consent before starting the interview and were
free to quit at any time. The average duration of the questionnaire was about 40 minutes.
Data collection and entry were accompanied by back-checks and other validation processes,
consistently with academic best practice.
The content of the questionnaire was produced by the author with the support of
SRA. The final questionnaire consisted of 9 modules, as summarised in Appendix Table
A1 and described more in detail in section 4.3.2. After the pre-interview module 1 and
the consent form in module 2, relevant background information was collected both at the
taxpayer (module 3) and business level (module 4). Module 5 focused on attitudes towards
risk, both through a self-reported measure of riskiness and an experimental measure for
risk aversion. After that, module 6 collected other important information on key factors
linked to compliance: tax knowledge (through a mini-quiz on tax of 5 questions) and
compliance costs, enforcement likelihood, perceived corruption, moral attitudes towards
compliance and perceptions on fairness, fiscal exchange and peers’ behaviour. Module 7
explored satisfaction with public services while module 8 captured past interactions with
the revenue authority.23
In some instances, the survey script replicated standard questions from well-established
23To reduce errors of recall, questions on business activity and interactions with SRA refers to the last 12
months only, i.e. from October 2018 up to the time of the survey.
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international surveys, such as the Afrobarometer, the World Values Survey and the Inter-
national Social Survey Programme.24 At the same time, questions on tax knowledge, an
aspect which is usually neglected in existing international surveys, have been mostly de-
rived from the tax quiz used in the tax training study in Rwanda (section 2.4.1 of Chapter
2), where it proved to effectively capture (lack of) tax literacy. Overall the quality of the
data is good: 95% of interviews are classified by the enumerator as having gone ‘somewhat
well’ (26%) or ‘very well’ (69%).
3.4.2 Sample selection
The final sample consists of 1,009 PIT-registered taxpayers. The sample was supposed to
equally represent active and non-filers, even if non-filers in 2018 amounted to the 70% of
the population. In order to increase the power of within-category analysis, active have
been overrepresented. The target of equal split has been successfully reached in the field:
the final sample contains 513 active (51%) and 491 non-filers (49%). About 60% (613
taxpayers) are persistent in their behaviour: 76% of active (395) and 44% of non-filers
(218) have been filing in the same way every time.
The sample has been randomly extracted from the taxpayer registry as at July 2019.
Inclusion criteria include: (i) phone number is available so that the respondent could be
contacted by the survey team and a meeting could be arranged,25 (ii) to be registered
anytime before January 2018, so to be liable to file a tax return for the tax year 2018 and
therefore be categorised as active or non-filer,26 (iii) to be located in Eswatini,27 (iv) to
be required to file for income tax,28 and (v) the type of business. In relation to the latter
point, all taxpayers in the sample fall in the category of sole traders, meaning that they
24For instance, questions on trust towards the authority and transparency in government spending are
derived from the Afrobarometer series.
25Less than 3% do not have any phone number available and therefore have been excluded.
26About 4.8% of the population registered after December 2017 and have therefore dropped from the
sampling.
27For less than 1% of the taxpayers in the registry, the location is not available or is from outside the
country, mostly South Africa.
28Exempted entities are very few in Eswatini, 57 only. All of them are corporate taxpayers (mostly churches,
NGOs, and the like).
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are entrepreneurs running a business. Other categories, such as non-business employees,
high-net worth individuals and directors of companies, even if liable to remit PIT, have
been disregarded as it can be assumed that their tax compliance decision is affected by
different motivations and constraints. Instead, sole traders are fully responsible for their
own compliance behaviour and are the ones who decide whether to declare or not and, if yes,
how much. Moreover, it is fair to believe that their own perceptions and attitudes towards
taxation have an immediate effect on their compliance behaviour. Therefore, studying sole
traders is more interesting both from a research and a policy perspective.
The sample contains both urban and rural taxpayers. All four districts in Eswatini
have been covered and the sample is geographically representative – at least at the district
level.29 Appendix Figure A3 reports the location of each respondent, using different colours
for the two compliance types. The main agglomeration of respondents refers to the main
cities, Mbabane, Manzini and Lobamba, while more rural areas spread across the four
corners of the country.
3.4.3 Estimation strategy
Main specification
Results are estimated through a linear probability model, according to the following OLS
specification:30
Yi = αi + βiZi +XiΓ + εi (3.1)
Where the outcome Y is the compliance behaviour of taxpayer i, i.e. a dummy for active
29The coverage of each district is as follows: (i) Hhohho 37%, (ii) Lubombo 16%, (iii) Manzini 38%, and
(iv) Shiselweni 9%. These shares are very similar to those of the overall population of PIT payers: 38%,
15%, 39%, 8%, respectively. Therefore, no sampling weights will be used throughout the analysis.
30The linear probability model provides easier interpretations for the marginal effects on the probability of
actively filing, compared to probit and logit. While the assumption of homoskedascity does not hold in a
LPM, calculating robust standard errors controls for that (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Moreover, LPM
does not restrict predicted values within the 0-1 interval, but the share of such values is not high, ranging
from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 10% of the sample. The section on robustness show that, as a
matter of fact, my results do not change (quantitatively or qualitatively) if I use a probit model.
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filing status. As already stated in section 3.4.1, two compliance outcomes are considered:
(i) whether the taxpayers actively filed in the most recent year, and (ii) whether he is a
perpetually active or a perpetually non-filing taxpayer. With outcome (ii), I intend to run
a robustness check in order to control for endogeneity issues such as reverse causality: it
could well be that the fact of being active last year has affected the explanatory variables
(even if the survey took place about 10 months after the most recent filing deadline) and,
by focusing on the perpetual sample only, it is fair to assume that the outcome variable
is constant over time. Additionally, I aim to compare the determinants of the extensive
margin of compliance with those of self-reported compliance. The latter is built from
answers to the question on whether tax evasion is justifiable (see section 3.4.3).
The vector Zi refers to the set of key explanatory factors under study. These factors
are grouped following the theoretical formulations on tax evasion (section 3.2.1): (i) de-
terrence, (ii) compliance costs, (iii) trust and political legitimacy, (iv) fiscal exchange and
reciprocity, (v) social norms and (vi) intrinsic motivation. The control vector Xi includes
both taxpayer-level and business-level characteristics. The operationalisation these factors
is explained more in detail in section 3.4.3. For the sake of this study, the coefficients of
interest are given by the βi. Each explanatory factor Zi will be used with and without
controls.
Each factor is regressed either alone, in a bivariate regression setting, or together with
all the other factors, in a multivariate regression setting. In this way, I control for the bias
caused by the potential interactions between the right-hand-side (RHS) variables. The lack
of significance that I could find for a factor, say trust, may be driven either by the fact that
there is truly no relationship taking place, or by the fact that trust is also correlated and
explained by a number of other RHS variables, such as reciprocity, accountability, fairness
and social norms. This would be a case of bad controls (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). If
bivariate and multivariate coefficients do not differ much, as happens in this case, it is a
sign that such a bias is not undermining my results. Finally, the option of robust standard
errors is used to control for heteroscedasticity.
In the same fashion, a probit specification will be run and marginal effects computed.
As shown in section 3.5.3, results do not change when a probit model is used.
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Independent variables
Deterrence Deterrence is captured in multiple ways. First, the perceived risk of being
audited is measured. I have information on both an individual’s likelihood of being audited
and the likelihood of a peer, or a business like the respondent’s one. Dummy variables indi-
cating a perceived risk audit higher than the median are created to ease the interpretation
of results.31 Second, survey module 8 enquires about interactions with the SRA. Indicators
such as distance from SRA, ever having been audited (and number of audits), ever having
been fined (and number of fines), ever having interacted with the authority (number of
interactions) will be used as alternative predictors.
Compliance costs As a measure of compliance costs, I adopt two survey items. First,
perceptions on compliance costs are gathered through answers to questions on how difficult
it is to file and how difficult it is to get in touch with SRA to get tax-related information.
Second, in order to further probe the role of complexity perceptions, I consider tax knowl-
edge as a specific proxy for compliance costs – as in Chapter 2. While perceptions of
complexity are somehow subjective, the answers to a tax quiz can provide a more objec-
tive measure of tax ignorance and compliance costs. In order to capture the quality of tax
knowledge, both a raw index and a standardised index (Kling et al., 2007) are created from
the five-item quiz on tax. Additionally, background characteristics on taxpayers’ practice,
such as having a tax accountant and the time spent on tax in a month, are used as further
indicators of compliance costs in the mechanisms section 3.6.
Fiscal exchange A specific survey module captures the respondents’ satisfaction with
the government’s provision of six public services.32 The first component from a principal
component analysis is gathered as an overall satisfaction index. Further, (lack of) fiscal
exchange is also captured by two other survey items: (i) disagreement with the fact that
the government can decide to make people pay more taxes in order to increase spending
31The median, rather than the average, is usually chosen as threshold so to create two groups of similar sizes
and control for skewed distributions. However, the data at hand are not extremely skewed and median
and average are often very similar. In the case of audit likelihood, the median is 60% while the average
is 62%.
32Primary schools, tertiary education, infrastructure, electricity, healthcare and security.
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on public health care, and (ii) feeling of not getting anything in return from paying taxes.
Trust and political legitimacy I use a number of variables in order to capture political
legitimacy. First, I measure trust in the revenue authority as a rank response for the
extent of mistrust towards the SRA. Second, perceptions on corruption are captured by
individuals’ agreement with the fact that businessmen are sometimes required to make
gifts or unofficial payments to get things done with regard to taxes. I also collect a more
quantitative variable, as the share of total annual sales that businesses pay in informal
payments or gifts to public officials for tax purposes. Third, I ask how fair the respondent
feels the amount of income taxes she remits is. Fourth, to proxy for transparency in the
governance, I measure how easy it is for the respondent to find out how the government
uses the revenues from people’s taxes.
Peer pressure I use perception of other people’s tax compliance as proxy to measure the
influence of other people’s behavior on the respondent’s tax compliance. Specifically, I use
two measures: (i) a more quantitative one, asking for the perceived share of businesses in
the respondent’s area understating their income, and (ii) a more qualitative one, enquiring
about the level of agreement with the statement: “If my neighbours do not pay taxes, it is
fair for me not to pay them either.”
Individual morality As a measure of the intrinsic motivation to comply, I capture the
level of disagreement with the following statement: “It is right for some people not to pay
the taxes they owe on their income.” This variable is often used as a proxy for compliance.
For this reason, I also use it as a dependent variable to test whether the factors impacting
actual compliance differ when it comes to self-reports.
Risk aversion Survey module 5 captures risks aversion both through a self-reported
attitude towards risky situation on a 1-10 scale and a more experimental measure.33 The
experimental exercise is also known as multiple price list (MPL), previously used by Holt
and Laury (2002) and Harrison et al. (2007), among others. This measure has rarely been
33The 1-10 quantitative variable is transformed in a dummy for self-reported riskiness above median. Again,
median (5) and average (5.1) are very similar in magnitude.
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used in relation to tax compliance (see section 2.3) and is discussed more in detail in the
Appendix section A1.1.
Demographics and business characteristics A large number of background char-
acteristics are collected, which serve as controls: (i) demographics, such as gender, age,
education and country of origin; (ii) business background information on being currently in
operation, having run a previous business, location, sector, level of competition (both with
formal and informal businesses), change in the size of the business in the last year, and total
sales in a given period34; (iii) taxpayers’ related practices on bookkeeping, having a bank
account, using emails to communicate with clients and suppliers. While these factors are
used as controls in the main specifications (section 4.4.3), they are also explicitly studied
in section 3.6.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Anatomy of Survey Sample
Response rates and attrition Implementing face-to-face interviews with small en-
trepreneurs, whose opportunity cost of giving up their time for a 40-minute survey is
presumably high, is challenging. A large group of replacements is allocated to each enu-
merator in order to swiftly address non-responses. Importantly, the replacement order is
randomised by the survey software. This means that taxpayers in the replacement group
are comparable to those in the main sample. In many instances, enumerators had to replace
hard-to-reach respondents. At the end of data collection, about a third (31%) of taxpayers
in the main sample were successfully reached, while the remaining two-thirds (69%) were
randomly picked from replacements. Appendix Table A3 shows that the group of taxpayers
consenting to be surveyed is comparable to those who refused, except for minor deviations:
consenting taxpayers show slightly fewer years of filing, look smaller in terms of log tax
declared and are 4 percentage points less likely to be perpetual non-filers. On the other
34From Anderson et al. (2019), I first ask the respondent to choose a reference period: week, month or year.
Then I enquire about the total sales in an typical period, meaning not the best and not the worst.
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hand, the geographical distribution is nicely balanced. This evidence is supportive of the
fact that heterogenous attrition is not a main threat to the analysis.
Summary statistics Before enquiring the regression tables, it is worth exploring the
sample descriptively. Appendix Tables A4 to A7 report the summary statistics for the
survey items observed in this study. As derived from Table A4, the average taxpayer in
the sample is a married male (60%), aged between 41-50, a Swazi national, without higher
education.35 While the majority in the sample employ tax accountants (57%), keep at
least some form of records (65%) and have a business-related bank account (58%), only a
fifth of the sample use emails to communicate with clients or suppliers (20%).
When it comes to business-level characteristics, it is striking to realise that the vast
majority of the sample reports to be in operation (74%). This is true for non-filers as
well, 56% of whom state they have had at least one business transaction in the last year
(compared to 90% of active). This may already hint to the fact that non-filers are indeed
operative but not declaring to the fiscus as requested by the tax code (section 3.3). This
is also suggested by data on reported monthly sales, with non-filers reporting an average
of $1,028 USD ($1,180 USD excluding zeros). While this amount is significantly lower
than actives’ ($3,130 USD or $3,474 USD excluding zeros), the fact that non-filers are
openly disclosing this information raises the question of whether they are just unaware of
their filing responsibility. Appendix Figure A4 reports the distribution of reported sales
by group, indicating the group averages with vertical lines. Also, the average business is
about 6 years old, working in the wholesale/retail trading sector (56%) and, in most cases
(80%), competing with informal businesses.36
Relatedly, a striking majority (74%) suffer from high competition, both from formal
and informal activities, and half of the sample saw a reduction in business profits in the
last year. The geographical distribution is the one already shown in Figure A3 and reflects
the higher economic relevance of the two main business districts in the country, Hhohho
and Manzini. Lastly, it is interesting to see which reasons push our traders to register
with the authority and spot any difference between active and non-filers. Appendix Figure
35About two thirds of the sample have, at most, a high-school qualification.
36When fielding the questionnaire, enumerators made sure to explicitly refer to those businesses who are
not registered with the SRA and therefore remitting no formal taxes.
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A5 displays the results. While it seems that actives perceive a stronger sense of State
legitimacy and feel more scared of breaking the law, non-filers seems to have registered
out of a hope of growth opportunities, as well as to access government services and attract
more clients.
For risk preferences (Table A5), the negligible levels of indifference and inconsistency
represent a positive assessment of the quality of the lottery data. The sample is on average
slightly risk averse, with a coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) of 0.17.37 About
40% of the sample still opts for the safest choice A in the last lottery round, in which
option B is far more convenient (see Table A2). Furthermore, Table A6 reports the level
of interactions with the authority. About 15% had been audited since registration, while
a higher share received a fine (25%). At the same time, as many as 40% of the sample
have had other types of interactions in the last year, with more than two interactions on
average.
In the same fashion, Table A7 summarises the key explanatory factors of the study. It
is worth noting that the perceived audit probability is high in general, and much higher
when referring to other businesses (83%) than when referring to the taxpayer himself (62%),
as also displayed in Figure A6. This is likely to suggest the existence of computational
biases from bounded rationality, as framed in detail by the prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Dhami and al Nowaihi, 2007). Also, compliance costs seem to be large,
with the average number of correct answers in the tax quiz being 1.6 out of a maximum of
5, and as many as two thirds of the sample reporting difficulty to file. As another dimension
of the compliance costs, for a sizeable 40% of the sample it is difficult to get in touch with
the authority to get assistance.
At the same time, indicators of trust and political legitimacy depict a situation in
which the majority (55%) think that businesses are bribing tax officials, about half the
sample sees the tax system as unfair and 74% believe that the government processes are
not transparent. This evidence somehow confirms the poor scoring at the international
level from Table 1.1. This is also reflected in the relatively high level of mistrust towards
the revenue authority, with an average score of 2.5 out of 4. Relatedly, about 58% of the
sample disagree with the fact that taxes can be increased to finance health care. In much
37See Appendix section A1.1 for more information on the CRRA.
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the same vein, half the sample believes to get nothing in return from contributing to the
public purse. Social norms also seem to point towards a context in which tax evasion is
present, with the perceived average frequency of businesses evading being 40%. However,
when it comes to measuring peer pressure and neighbour effect, just 12% believes that it
is fair to emulate a neighbour who is cheating on taxes.
Finally, despite this initial evidence on deteriorated tax attitudes and perceptions, the
vast majority of the sample (82%) reports a surprisingly high intrinsic motivation, believing
that tax evasion is not the right thing to do. This factor will also be used as a dependent
variable when exploring how the behavioural determinants differ across actual and self-
reported compliance.
3.5.2 Regression results
In this section, I report the results from the model discussed in section 4.4.3. In the regres-
sion tables below, the columns All show results for last year’s filing behaviour (all taxpayers
in the sample), while the columns Perpetual consider the persistent filing behaviour (the
subset of perpetual taxpayers).
Which factors explain actual tax compliance? Table 3.2 below shows the results
from my main specification. Columns 1 and 2 do not control for any background variables,
while columns 3 and 4 control for both demographic and business level features. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Also, Appendix Figure A7 plots the coefficients from
columns 5-6 to ease comparisons across groups.
From the table, some statistically significant patterns emerge. First, perceptions on the
general audit probability are negatively related to the probability to file, both with and
without controls: being below the median of the perceived audit probability distribution is
associated with a reduction in filing probability of 6-7 percentage points when all controls
are added (col. 3-4), significantly so at the 5% level. This translates in a reduction of the
probability of being active last year of 12% and of being perpetually active of 11%.
As a second set of results, compliance costs play a major role. Taxpayers who think that
filing a tax return is somewhat or very difficult are 8-9 percentage points less likely to file.
The coefficients are always significant at the 1% level and are meaningful in magnitude:
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compliance costs account for a reduction of 16% in the probability of being active and of
15% in the probability of being perpetually so. Relatedly, the difficulty in getting assistance
from the SRA is weakly associated with the failure to file for last year’s return while it
turns insignificant for the persistent behaviour.
Third, social norms seem to covary with compliance: while the perceived share of
evaders in the community is not significant, the consideration of peers’ behaviour seems
to be positively correlated with filing, with coefficients highly statistically significant and
doubling for persistent filers. Therefore, it seems that it is not so much the perceived
incidence of evasion in the community that matters for compliance, but rather the moral
adherence given to the existing norms surrounding compliance. The magnitude is also
strikingly sizeable: adhesion to a social norm seems to represent a fifth (col. 3) to a third
(col. 4) of last year’s and perpetual compliance, respectively.
Finally, the intrinsic motivation to comply also explains a non-negligible share of the
filing probability. Having a high tax morale implies an increase of 11 percentage points in
filing probability, falling to 8 percentage points for persistent taxpayers.
Besides these significant results, the importance of factors related to trust and polit-
ical legitimacy, as well as to fiscal exchange, is not confirmed in this exercise. Perceived
corruption, lack of transparency and mistrust towards the agency do not play any role in
explaining compliance. The only exception is with the perceived unfairness, which implies
a noticeable reduction in filing probability (6-8 percentage points, or about 12-13%) for
last year’s compliance only (col. 1-3), but is never significant for perpetuals. More in
general, perpetuals are arguably not moved by any consideration on trust and legitimacy
when complying with the law. Also, fiscal exchange motivations perform poorly. Neither
satisfaction with public services nor feelings of reciprocity show a significant coefficient. If
anything, expecting nothing in return from paying taxes is positively correlated with being
a persistently active taxpayers. The immediate consideration would be that perpetuals are
so intrinsically motivated up to the point in which they: (i) are not affected by corrup-
tion, unfairness, lack of trust/transparency in the system, and (ii) do not expect to receive
anything back from their contributions.
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Active Filing Behaviour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Perpetuals All Perpetuals
Deterrence
Risk audit below median -0.11∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Compliance costs
Difficult to file -0.10∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Difficult to get in touch -0.07∗∗ -0.06 -0.05∗ -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Trust and political legitimacy
Bribing above median 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Unfairness -0.08∗∗ -0.06 -0.06∗∗ -0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
No transparency 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
No trust above median 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Services -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
No fiscal exchange 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Nothing in return 0.01 -0.00 0.04 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Social norms
Evaders % above median 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Peer pressure 0.11∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Intrinsic motivation
High tax morale 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Demographics No No Yes Yes
Business Char. No No Yes Yes
Mean of Y 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644
R-sq. 0.057 0.077 0.326 0.486
Observations 1009 613 1009 613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetu-
als refer to the total sample of taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers only,
respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The operationalisaton of de-
terminants is discussed in section 3.4.3.
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What about the drivers of self-reported compliance? After the analysis on actual
compliance, it is prudent to see if the key factors motivating it are also explaining self-
reported compliance. In the first instance, it is worth mentioning that 82% of the sample
never or almost never justify evasion. In most survey studies studying tax behaviour,
this subsample is mistakenly considered as compliant. However, also non-filers, who are
non-compliant in practice and may want to excuse their behaviour by declaring a high
tax attitude (Andreoni et al., 1998), seem to never justify evasion: 77% of them think so,
compared to 86% of filers.
Table 3.3 studies the correlations with the high tax morale dummy – the indicator used
as a proxy for self-reported compliance (see section 4.4.3) – of the same factors explored
in Table 3.2.38 Column 1 reports LPM coefficients without controls, while column 2 adds
taxpayer-level and business-level background characteristics. Interestingly, some of the
explanatory factors from Table 3.2 remain statistically significant: compliance costs and
peer pressure strongly influence the probability of having a higher tax morale. Those who
believe that it is difficult to file are 7 percentage points less likely to have a high tax
morale (col. 2), hinting at the fact that a complex tax system often frustrates taxpayers,
discouraging them from complying.39 In addition, difficulty in getting in touch with SRA
contributes to hamper compliance. While communication issues only weakly correlate with
actual filing (Table 3.2), probably due to other major constraints with compliance, they
strongly covary with the (un-)willingness to contribute and add up to the negative relation
expressed by the difficulty to file. At the same time, peer pressure is strongly negatively
correlated with self-reported compliance: those who feel the pressure of their peers are 35
percentage points (or 43%) less likely to be compliant. It results that, while peer pressure
is pushing taxpayers to file their return (see Table 3.2), it produces a totally opposite
impact on intrinsic motivations. The reason could be that tax morale and peer pressure
are substitutes and while they both explain actual compliance, they offset each other when
it comes to self-reports.
Consistently, variables on trust still remain not significant, with the exception of the
lack of trust which appears to have a weak negative relation. Relatedly, the absence of
38Given that there is no trend over time for tax morale, no perpetual category exists in this case.
39Similar results have been produced in developed economies, mostly in lab settings (Roberts et al., 1994;
Eriksen and Fallan, 1996).
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reciprocity mechanism positively moves with tax morale by 6 percentage points (col. 2), in
much the same vein as the results for actual compliance (Table 3.2). This evidence suggests
that the fiscal exchange theory does not find a confirmation in the Eswatini context. Maybe
due to cultural or historical reasons, the reciprocal link between contributions and public
services does not seem to hold in this setting.
As a last consideration, the deterrence indicator shows no association with tax morale,
in line with the evidence on the crowding out effect of pecuniary incentives, such as penalties
and fines, on intrinsic motivations (Frey and Feld, 2002).
Results remain consistent when considering as self-reportedly compliant only the 69% of
the sample who has a very strong willingness to comply, as shown in Table A8.40 Likewise,
results do not change if I remove the share (77%) of non-filers who self-report positive
attitudes towards compliance, since this mismatching could probably bias the direction of
impacts – as shown in Table A9. If anything, the significant coefficients from Table 3.3 get
even larger, while the non-significant factors remain so.
This exercise confirms that considering survey-based measures as a proxy for compliance
can often be misleading. In the case of Eswatini, while compliance costs and reciprocity
motives impact actual and reported compliance in the same way, other key factors such as
peer pressure and perceptions on deterrence have different, if not opposite, effects on the
two outcomes.
40In the words of Onu (2016): if a taxpayers feels very strongly that being fully compliant is the right thing
to do, then it is likely that her attitudes will predict behaviour more than someone who feels equally
favourable towards compliance, but does not have an equally strong attitude. To corroborate this line
of reasoning, I focus on taxpayers with a very strong attitude. However, despite the evidence that the
strength of attitudes is a valuable information to consider (Sparks et al., 1992), coefficients from the
new regression remain highly consistent with those in Table 3.3. The only change is that the (lack of)
fiscal exchange mechanism loses significance, while the perception of bribing turns to be significant at
the 5% level and reduces the tax attitude by 10 percentage points. This could suggest a slight change in
motivations when the strength of the self-reported attitude increases.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Self-reported Compliance
(1) (2)
Deterrence
Risk audit below median 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Compliance costs
Difficult to file -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Difficult to get in touch -0.10∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02)
Trust and political legitimacy




No transparency 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
No trust above median -0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Services 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
No fiscal exchange 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Nothing in return -0.04 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03)
Social norms
Evaders % above median -0.06∗ -0.05
(0.03) (0.03)
Peer pressure -0.41∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Demographics No Yes
Business Char. No Yes
Mean of Y 0.817 0.817
R-sq. 0.199 0.295
Observations 1009 1009
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors
in parentheses. All and Perpetuals refer to the total sam-
ple of taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers
only, respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from




Dimension reduction and best subset selection In an attempt to check for the
robustness of the main results, Table 3.4 reports coefficients when all above factors are
included in the same specifications, grouped by conceptual indexes through Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA). The first component is retained as it explains most of the variance
in the model (see Appendix Table A10). In this model, demographics and business-related
characteristics are explicitly presented, thus adding a new layer of information to what
shown in Table 3.2. Also, the role of such background characteristics will be explored more
in detail in section 3.6.3. From Table 3.4 some clear patterns emerge, which closely confirm
those in Table 3.2. While demographics play a role (more on this in section 3.6.3), the
high deterrence index is again strongly significant, together with the index representing
less compliance costs. Consistently, both the strong social norm and high tax morale in-
dexes are again significantly covarying with filing behaviour. In line with Table 3.2, fiscal
exchange and trust indexes do not show any significant relation.
As an additional robustness exercise, I recur to statistical learning methods for selecting
the best subset of predictors (James et al., 2013). The exercise consists in running a number
of different subset selection methods on a randomly selected training set (half of the sample)
and validating the results on a test set (the remaining half of the sample). Models with
lower test mean squared errors (MSE) are preferred (Friedman et al., 2001). Once the best
model is chosen, the most relevant predictors are retained and then applied in the original
linear probability model (see section 4.4.3). Appendix Table A11 shows the result of this
exercise as applied to the probability of being an active filer in the last return. Column 1
reports the original model from Table 3.2. Column 2 shows the results from running a linear
probability model on the training set. Column 3 to 8 report the estimation from a number
of statistical learning methods, in which only the relevant predictors are kept, while the
others are dropped. These methods are backward stepwise selection (James et al., 2013) in
col. 3 and lasso (Tibshirani, 1996) in col. 4 to 8. The different lasso models differ by the
way in which the optimal penalisation term (lambda) is chosen.41 All such methods are run
41In col. 4, lambda optimal is derived from cross-validation over the whole sample; the Akaike Information
Criteria in col. 5 (Akaike, 1974), the AICc (Sugiura, 1978; Hurvich and Tsai, 1989) in col. 6; the Bayesian
Information Criteria (Schwarz, 1978) in col. 7; and the EBIC (Chen and Chen, 2008) in col. 8.
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on the same training set and validated over the same test set. The lowest value of the test
MSE is reached with the cross-validation lasso, which therefore is the preferred method to
select the best subset of predictors. Using this subset, the specification in column 9 shows
the impact on the probability to file.
The main result of this exercise is that all the significant factors from the original model
are retained: deterrence, compliance costs, unfairness, peer pressure and tax morale. Two
out of three factors related to fiscal exchange are kept but they do not exert any significance
impact. Other factors related to corruption, transparency and distrust are all dropped.
I repeat the same exercise for being a perpetual active (tables omitted for brevity). In
this case, the same factors as in the previous exercise are selected, with the main difference
that now unfairness loses its significance, in much the same vein of what seen in Table 3.2.
Alternatives to LPM As an additional robustness check, I re-run the main specification
using alternative econometric models. Appendix Table A12 reports the coefficients from a
probit regression. The specifications in each column have the same structure as those in
Table 3.2. For the sake of better interpretation, I report marginal effects evaluated at the
mean of the regressors. In this fashion, coefficients can be seen as percentage change in
the outcome variable. As shown in the table, results remain consistent both in the level of
significance and magnitude. Again, factors such as perceived risk, difficulty in filing, peer
pressure and tax morale are significantly affecting the probability to comply. Remaining
factors such as trust and reciprocity, on the other hand, show no significant impact.
The same specifications have been run using a logit model. Results remain consistent
and the table is omitted for brevity.
Controlling for enumerators’ ability and day of the week The data collection has
been carried out by a team of ten enumerators. Despite being adequately trained, the
survey team may differ in intrinsic motivations and skills. Heterogeneity in enumerators’
performance can have an impact on the estimates discussed above, biasing them upwards
or downwards. For this reason, I re-run the specifications from Table 3.2 by including
enumerators’ fixed effects, thus controlling for such heterogeneity. Results are shown in
Appendix Table A13. When enumerators’ effects are kept constant, coefficients are largely
consistent, both in terms of significance and magnitude. This finding confirms that differ-
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Table 3.4: Active vs Non-filers - Indexes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Perpetuals All Perpetuals All Perpetuals
Demographics 0.03∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02 0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Business Char. 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Profitable business -0.02 -0.01 -0.03∗ -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
High deterrence 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Less compliance costs 0.07∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Fiscal Exchange 0.02 0.04∗ 0.02 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Less Trust 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Strong social norm 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
High tax morale 0.15∗∗∗ 0.08 0.15∗∗∗ 0.09∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Mean of Y 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644
R-sq. 0.016 0.025 0.091 0.097 0.098 0.111
Observations 1009 613 1009 613 1009 613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetuals refer to the total sam-
ple of taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers only, respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates
from a LPM. The construction of PCA component is presented in Appendix Table A10.
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ences in enumerators’ ability are not likely to be driving the results.
A similar check has been run by controlling for the day of the week on which the survey
took place. This exercise is run in order to address the fact that, as shown in Kahnemann
et al. (2004), the context of the interview itself can cause a bias. Results do not change
and are reported in Table A14.
Bivariate vs multivariate analysis As mentioned in section 4.4.3, the key explanatory
factors are included both separately and jointly so to partially address concerns on bad
controls (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). While the main results in Table 3.2 refer to a multi-
variate regression analysis, it is useful to consider also the stand-alone correlation of factors
taken separately. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 compare the coefficients of regressors in bivariate and
multivariate specifications, for both last year’s filings and perpetuals, respectively. It is
reassuring to see that coefficients from multivariate analysis do no differ much from those in
bivariate regressions. If anything, the multivariate coefficients are slightly reduced in size
with respect to their stand-alone counterparts. The only factor which exhibits a significant
jump in magnitude is peer pressure. A future avenue of research could focus on why the
relevance of social norm is enhanced when considered together with alternative behavioral
factors.
External validity of survey results As a final robustness check, I test for the external
validity of my survey instrument and results. I compare the results from this study with
those I get from running the same analysis on PIT payers from Rwanda. In a parallel and
ongoing study fielded in January 2020, me and ICTD co-authors collected survey data from
a random and nationally representative sample of 1,172 sole traders in Rwanda, 63% of
which are active - i.e. they filed a positive tax return in 2018 - and the remaining 37% non-
filers. The survey tool has been kept as close as possible to the one in this study in order
to enhance comparabiliy. Few exceptions refer to missing information on Nothing in return
and No transparency variables.42 All other key determinants are asked and operationalised
in the same way as those in this study.
Table 3.5 reports the comparison of LPM estimates between Eswatini in col 1-2 - the
42The questionnaire in Rwanda has been carefully agreed upon after consultations with the Rwanda Revenue
Authority. Hence, it is has been difficult to include every single question from the Eswatini survey.
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Figure 3.1: Last year’s filing - bivariate vs multivariate analysis
Figure 3.2: Persistent active filing - bivariate vs multivariate analysis
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same estimates from Table 3.2 – and Rwanda (col. 3-4). Unfortunately, the analysis
could not be run on perpetuals, given the lack of adequate information on taxpayers’ filing
history in Rwanda. In some cases, results are impressively similar, while in other cases
small differences arise. First, deterrence-related factors are strongly significant in Rwanda
as well and have the same positive effective on filing as in Eswatini. Second, compliance
costs also play a role, but whether in Eswatini the difficulty in practically filing a return is
more prominent, in Rwanda it is the difficulty to get in touch with the authority to ask for
assistance what matters - as it does in Eswatini as well. Third, trust and reciprocity motives
are negligible in the Rwandan context, while perception of unfairness was a key driver of
filing in Eswatini.43 Fourth, consistently with Eswatini, neighbour effects are present in
Rwanda as well. Lastly, the intrinsic motivation to comply significantly correlates with
filing in Rwanda, with a surprisingly similar coefficient magnitude to the one derived in
Eswatini.
In conclusion, this exercise confirmed some key patterns in the determinants of com-
pliance across two quite different countries. Rwanda, despite being an equally small and
landlocked country, has a ten times larger population size than Eswatini. The open ques-
tion still remains, however, on whether results will be consistent in even larger African
countries and I consider this as a future research avenue to follow.
43This can be due to the higher difficulty in getting truthful responses on trust-related questions in Rwanda,
as discussed in Chapter 2.
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Active Filing Behaviour - External Validity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eswatini Eswatini Rwanda Rwanda
Deterrence
Risk audit below median -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.08∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Compliance costs
Difficult to file -0.10∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Difficult to get in touch -0.07∗∗ -0.05∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Trust and political legitimacy
Bribing above median 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Unfairness -0.08∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
No transparency 0.02 -0.01 - -
(0.04) (0.03) - -
No trust above median 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Services -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No fiscal exchange 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Nothing in return 0.01 0.04 - -
(0.03) (0.03) - -
Social norms
Evaders % above median 0.01 -0.01 -0.09∗∗ -0.09∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Peer pressure 0.11∗∗ 0.10∗∗ -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.10)
Intrinsic motivation
High tax morale 0.15∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Demographics No Yes No Yes
Business Char. No Yes No Yes
Mean of Y 0.513 0.513 0.634 0.634
R-sq. 0.057 0.326 0.043 0.152
Observations 1009 1009 1172 1172
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients




3.6.1 More on deterrence and risk preferences
One of the main findings from Table 3.2 refers to the role played by deterrence. In the
attempt to further explore this result, I consider here two sets of additional variables. I
first focus on the level of taxpayers’ interactions with the revenue authority and, second,
look at risk preferences. In Appendix Table A15, I regress the active filing dummy over
a set of variables indicating the extent and intensity of taxpayers’ interactions with the
SRA. Results are not always consistent across specifications but some considerations can
be derived. First, the fact of filing a return increases the likelihood of doing it again, in line
with the recent evidence on paying taxes as a habit (Dunning et al., 2017; Mascagni et al.,
2019).44 Also, deterrence factors such as the fact of being audited and the number of audits
positively explain active filing, even if only for last year’s returns. Given the low number of
auditors in the authority (see section 3.3.2), this could suggest that more resources could
be channeled to audits. The experience of being fined has also a positive impact, while
it seems that the frequency of pecuniary sanctions eventually backfires. Lastly, it seems
that taxpayers are not benefitting much from interacting with the authority. Interestingly,
those taxpayers that receive information on tax matters from SRA officials are less likely
to file.45 This adds up to the negative impact on filing of the difficulty of getting in touch
with the authority, as displayed in Table 3.2 and calls for improvements in the way the
SRA communicates with its clients.
When it comes to risk preferences, Appendix Table A16 shows that neither the exper-
imental risk measure or the self-reported risk attitude seem to play any role in motivating
compliance. It is true that, descriptively, CRRA risk averse taxpayers are more likely to
perceive a higher probability of audit, 65%, than risk loving taxpayers, 58%. However, the
44This finding is confirmed further by looking at filing behaviour for tax year 2019, after the survey. 90% of
taxpayers filing in 2018 filed again in 2019, while just 20% of non-filers did the same. When considering
perpetual taxpayers, this difference is exacerbated even more, with 91% of persistent active and 12% of
persistent non-filers filing in 2019.
45About 28% of the sample report to get tax-related information either formally or informally from SRA
officials.
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model in Table A16 rejects any significant correlation. Results are similar when I substitute
the CRRA with a dummy for risk aversion.
3.6.2 The role of tax knowledge
One of the main findings of this study is that compliance costs matter. Ease of filing a
return is a key predictor of the probability of actually doing so. It is interesting to dig
deeper to understand the role of such costs and consider one important component of them
– tax knowledge. Tax knowledge is included in the (highly significant) compliance costs
principal component used in Table 3.4 and it is therefore important to consider its stand-
alone impact. Higher tax knowledge seems also to be correlated with better perceptions
on the ease to file, as depicted in Figure A9: taxpayers who believe it is somewhat or very
easy to file report a 20% higher knowledge score than those who think it is somewhat or
very difficult, with the difference being significant at the 1% level. As explained in section
3.4.1, the survey data contains answers to a quiz on tax, from which a tax knowledge index
is formed. In Table 3.6, I study the impact on filing of either the raw knowledge score,
ranging from 0 to 5 (col. 1-4) or the standardised score (Kling et al. 2001), expressed in
terms of standard deviations (col. 5-8).
Most notably, Table 3.6 shows that the indicator of tax knowledge is always statistically
significant in explaining compliance, from the least to the most complete specification (col.
1-4). One extra question answered correctly in the tax quiz is associated with an increase
in the probability of filing last year’s tax return of 7 percentage points (or 14%) when all
controls are added (col. 3). The same figure is of 6 percentage points (or 9%) for perpetuals
(col. 4). Consistently, a standard deviation increase in the Kling index implies an increase
in filing of a similar magnitude (col. 7-8).
In the same fashion, Appendix Figure A10 plots the predictive marginal increase in
the probability to file by each index score, ranging from 0 to 5. The increasing pattern
is consistent for both last year’s filing and perpetual filing. It results that tax knowledge
plays a greater role in explaining persistent compliance over time, with taxpayers scoring
the maximum being almost 100% likely to be perpetual filers.
As an additional investigation, I also run the main specification using as regressors each
of the five tax knowledge questions composing the score. This can help shed light on the
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Table 3.6: Active vs Non-filers - Tax Knowledge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Perpetuals All Perpetuals All Perpetuals All Perpetuals
Knowledge score 0-5 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Standardised score 0.19∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Demographics No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Business Char. No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Mean of Y 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644
R-sq. 0.059 0.090 0.313 0.456 0.042 0.061 0.309 0.452
Observations 1009 613 1009 613 1009 613 1009 613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetuals refer to the total sample of taxpayers and the
subsample of persistent taxpayers only, respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The construction of the knowledge
scores is discussed in section 3.4.3.
awareness of which aspect of the system is more critical in order to comply. Results are
displayed in Appendix Table A17, both without (Panel A) and with controls (Panel B).
Results are quite informative, as answering correctly to some specific questions strongly
predicts filing behaviour, while it does not for others. Namely, question 1 (inactive should
file anyway), 4 (filing deadline) and 5 (tax type the taxpayer is registered for) are always
statistically significant. On the other hand, questions on the size of the penalty for missing
a declaration (Q2) and income understatement (Q3) are never significant.
This evidence is illuminating in the sense that it seems that non-filers are not aware of
very basic tax-related rules, such as the requirement to always file or even their own tax
type, while possibly more complex concepts such as the penalty amounts do not discrim-
inate between them and active.46 The fact that knowledge of the penalty structure does
not affect compliance is due to the extremely low level of knowledge of the main penalty
amounts across all taxpayers. Stunningly, only 2.6% and 1.5% of the sample are aware
of the penalty amounts for failing to file and false declarations, respectively. Evidence of
under or overestimation of penalty amounts is almost inexistent, since the vast majority
just answer that they do not know (88% and 94%) rather than providing an estimate. This
46Very much consistently, recent evidence collected in a nation-wide survey of 2,000 taxpayers in Rwanda
shows exactly the same pattern (Mascagni and Santoro, forthcoming)
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means that deterrence is shaping compliance more through the perceived audit probability
(as in Table 3.2) than through the penalty structure. In turn, audit probability is probably
overestimated given the limited resources available to the authority (section 3.3).
Lastly, a note of concern consists in the possibility of reverse causality being at play
here. For example, if intrinsic motivation in paying taxes is a significant predictor of
compliance – as is the case here – then this might lead to acquiring more knowledge about
the tax system. However, the data contradicts this hypothesis. The 83% of the sample
with a high intrinsic motivation show, if anything, a lower tax knowledge score (1.54) than
those with a low motivation (1.62). Another concern could come from the fact of being in
the system for a longer period, which could in turn affect tax knowledge. Also this concern
is not reflected in the data. First, the coefficients of tax knowledge in Table 3.6 are not
consistently higher when restricting the analysis to perpetuals. If anything, magnitudes
get smaller when controls are added. Second, the 15% of the sample who had a previous
business before the current one report slightly lower scores (1.53) than those who are at
their first experience (1.56). Third, even if it is true that years since registration and tax
knowledge have a positive correlation, the magnitude of it is quite small, 0.11, and in any
case a variable indicating years since registration is included as a control in my model.
3.6.3 The relevance of background characteristics
As a last set of supplementary results, I study the importance of two sets of background
characteristics: (i) demographic and individual tax practice related covariates, and (ii)
business-level covariates. As already discussed in section 3.2.1, abundant empirical evidence
has been produced stressing the relevance of such variables, who are often considered just
as background controls. Consistently, based on the R2 of the regression tables above,
demographics and business characteristics appear to be explaining a lot of the variability
in the model, even more than the variables of interest. For this reason, it is important to
understand how they correlate with active filing as this would be valuable information for
risk management and audit strategies.
Table A18 reports the coefficients of taxpayer-level features in columns 1-2, business-
level features in columns 3-4 and both groups together in columns 5-6.47 Among the
47In order to avoid multicollinearity, some variables such as using e-mails, book-keeping and suffering from
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first set of variables, demographics in columns 1-2 seem to play a key role in affecting
compliance. As expected, age is positively related to filing behaviour, as well as having
higher education, even if they lose significance in the more complete models of columns 5-6.
In line with the existing evidence, being married seems to positively affect filing behaviour,
but for last year’s declaration only. Gender and nationality do not have any strong impact,
even if the sign of the coefficient seem to suggest that female and Swazi national are less
likely to comply, unexpectedly.
Furthermore, individual tax-related practices decisively influence the outcome: the fac-
tor has tax accountant remains highly significant across all different specifications. It results
that having a tax accountant increases the probability of being active by 16 percentage
points when considering last year’s filing (col. 5) and 21 percentage points when consider-
ing the persistent behaviour (col. 6). These coefficients are sizeable and among the largest
found across all sets of results: having a tax accountant translates into being 31% more
likely to file in a given year and 33% more likely to be persistently active. This finding is in
line with the strong impact of the perception on the difficulty to file from Table 3.2, as well
as with the corresponding principal component index from Table 3.4. Unsurprisingly, also
the time spent on tax matters is positively correlated with actively filing, even if weakly
so. The same is true for having a bank account for the business.
Additionally, when considering business-level characteristics, being operative has a size-
able impact on filing of about 31-32 percentage points (col. 5-6), or 61% for last year’s
filing and 50% for persistent filing. The coefficient of being operative is the largest in
magnitude among all those observed in this study and points to the fact that taxpayers file
their taxes only when operative, contrarily to what the law prescribes. From the role of the
corresponding tax knowledge question in Table A17, it can be assumed that inoperative
businesses do not file partly because they are not aware that it is required by the law.
Also, it can be noticed that older firms are more likely to file, probably due to the
fact that they are more likely to be operative and run by older taxpayers, who are more
compliant. Trading sector is also presumably a sector with more frequent operations taking
place, hence its significant role in explaining compliance. Despite being smaller in size,48
competition with informal businesses have been removed since highly correlated with the variables used
in this exercise.
48The average turnover for trading activities is of USD 1,383, somehow smaller than that of other service
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taxpayers in the trading sector are more likely to be operative than the others, 75.5%
versus 72%. It is worth specifying that this sector encompasses a wide range of activities,
such as transport, storage, accommodation and food services, who serve the open public
and are therefore more exposed to inspection (Monteiro and Assuncao, 2012). While the
probability of being actually audited is lower for traders (13%) than taxpayers in all other
sectors (17.5%), traders are much more likely to have been fined (28%) than the others
(21.5%), statistically significantly so at the 5% level. Relatedly, 59% of traders have an
audit risk perception above median compared to 54% of taxpayers in other sectors.
3.7 Conclusions and policy recommendations
In this paper, I have explored the factors that correlate with taxpayers’ compliance in
Eswatini building on rich attitude and perception data from a nationally representative
sample of one thousand sole traders. The data collection represents the first exercise of
this type ever carried out in the country. Since self-reported compliance is likely to be
inaccurate, I link the survey data to tax returns data from the Eswatini Revenue Author-
ity, which enables me to identify compliant (active/filing) and non-compliant (non-filing)
taxpayers. To the best of my knowledge, tax data from Eswatini has never been explored
in the literature. Also, I compare the relevance of theoretically founded motivations to
actually file a return with those explaining self-reported compliance and the intensive mar-
gin of compliance. As a robustness check, I employ dimension reduction and best subset
selection methods and a discrete probit model, as well as control for enumerators’ ability.
The results provide a complex and nuanced picture of tax compliance in Eswatini
that can be summarised in the following points. First, standard deterrence motives are at
work, with higher perceptions of the audit probability being strongly associated with active
filing. Interestingly, a stronger sense of state legitimacy and fear of getting caught is more
prevalent in active vis-a-vis non-filers when it comes to the reasons they registered with the
activities (the second most common sector, 26% of the sample), with about USD 2,400 of turnover, and
many times smaller than real estate (USD 15,000), construction (USD 8,971), agriculture (USD 6,184),
manufacturing (USD 5,769).
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authority in the first place (Figure A5). Second, other non-standard determinants are also
crucial in shaping taxpayers’ compliance. In particular, compliance costs, social norms and
intrinsic tax morale positively covary with filing behaviour. Third, some important non-
pecuniary factors, such as trust in the authority, political legitimacy of the State and fiscal
exchange, which have proved to be essential in similar studies, do not seem to be important
in Eswatini. These three sets of results also confirm – at least in part – the validity of the 3-
tiered World Bank framework for understanding tax compliance, as formulated in Prichard
et al. (2019). Consistently with the framework, factors related to enforcement (audit risk)
and facilitation (ease to file, tax knowledge) paradigms are at work. For what concerns
the third paradigm in the framework, the one based on trust, results are more inconclusive,
with only a strong influence of peers taking place. As a last result, self-reported tax
compliance is driven by partly different factors than actual tax compliance. While this is
true for Eswatini, this finding may also suggest that, more in general, researchers should
be cautious in using self-reports as a proxy for actual compliance.
The limitations of this study need to be acknowledged. First, I cannot be completely
confident that I am capturing causal relationships. Despite the extensive use of fine con-
trols, the robustness to alternative estimation methods, and the restriction on persistent
filing behaviour to address unobserved variability over time, I cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that other unobservables may be linked to both the explanatory factors and the
outcome variable.
Second, mostly due to time constraint in implementing the survey, some additional
background information is missing, such as the extent to which taxpayers in my sample
also pay local fees or informal contributions to non-state actors, information on political
engagement and pro-social behaviour in the community, or a more refined measure of
risk preferences. Related to the latter point, the fact that the coefficient of risk aversion
as derived from the lottery is not significantly explaining compliance may be linked, for
example, to the absence of real-stake lottery decisions.
Third, mostly due to budget constraints, the main focus of this study is on the extensive
margin of compliance only, i.e. the probability to file a return, while I cannot explore
the drivers of the intensive margin of compliance, i.e. income underreporting. Extensive
and intensive compliance are likely to be explained by different set of motivations and
175
I leave this to future research. In the attempt to explore the intensive margin at least
descriptively, I am able to link the survey data with tax returns for the tax year 2019,
submitted after the survey. I then compare the self-reported business income as extracted
with the questionnaire (see Figure A4) with what is actually declared in the tax return.
Surprisingly, (i) the vast majority of taxpayers in the sample, 79%, reports a lower income
than what was declared in the survey; (ii) a minority of 7% and 14% declare the same
or a higher income, respectively; (iii) non-filers are more likely (85%) to under-declare
than active (74%) but both figures remain high; (iv) the gap is increased when comparing
persistent non-filers (88%) with persistent active (73%); (v) the average underreporting
is higher for active (USD 31,000) than non-filers (USD 9,500). This initial evidence calls
for further research on such discrepancies: while evasion can surely be part of the story,
additional explanations such as poor record-keeping and computational constraints might
affect these results.
On a different note, my study focusses on registered taxpayers only, and I do not study
informal traders. Determinants motivating the compliance of registered taxpayers may be
different than, for example, those pushing informal traders to register. At the same time, it
could be argued that non-filers in my sample resemble informal traders in the fact that the
majority of them (56%) report being in operation despite not sharing any information with
the authority. Future research could be devoted to study how registered and non-registered
entities differ (see Chapter 5).
Despite the weaknesses, this study points to some important policy recommendations.
First, it shows the revenue authority that enforcement is important. The SRA should
continue stressing its role as a monitoring agency. A wiser use of the limited resources
would imply that increased auditing efforts can be directed towards non-filers, who can
be automatically detected on the database and contacted by tax officials. The system
could automatically trigger follow-up messages or reminders to non-filers, signalling that
the authority is aware of their failure to file and has the technical resources to track their
behaviour.
Second, the authority should focus more on improving taxpayers’ awareness and knowl-
edge. Educational initiatives could also be tailored to non-filers more specifically, given that
they lack the knowledge of very basic concepts. Survey data show that lack of knowledge is
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an important obstacle to filing for 89 per cent of non-filers, while the same figure for active
payers is 72%. Consistently, knowledge of the tax system (46%) and how to file a return
(30%) are the most urgent aspects for which taxpayers would like to receive assistance from
the authority. This can happen through a variety of options. In the sample under study,
while fewer taxpayers use online tools (12%), more rely on direct relations with tax officials
(29%) and the majority use more traditional methods such as radio/TV (57%) as the main
channel of getting tax-related information. While this evidence highlights the importance
of radio/TV and direct interactions with taxpayers, it is important to target resources
carefully towards channels that are likely to have the biggest impact – especially in the
context of typically under-resourced taxpayer education departments. More experimental
studies, such as randomised controlled trials, can better test the effectiveness of alternative
strategies, such as one-to-one coaching vs radio programs (Chapter 2). This shift towards
a service-based paradigm should also affect the way the SRA provides information to tax-
payers, as it seems that currently getting information from the authority is not correlated
with active filing. This is also linked to the fact that non-filers, when they interact with
SRA officials, are less likely to discuss about filing a return (25%) than active taxpayers
(35%). Overall, 40% of the sample see it difficult to get in touch with the authority to
receive assistance. Similarly, communication with taxpayers (46%) is the most frequently
mentioned area in which taxpayers believe the authority is underperforming. This calls for
an improvement in the communication strategy: as it results from Table 3.2, non-persistent
taxpayers are negatively affected by communication issues, meaning that they may easily
turn to non-filing if not promptly reached by the authority.
Third, another possible avenue of intervention is provided by a major focus on the
social norms of compliance. The SRA could exploit the fact that filing taxes seems to
be motivated by adhesion to a social norm and could adopt a new way of communication
which stresses this aspect.
Fourth, while it seems that trust, transparency and reciprocity motives are not impor-
tant, the authority should not neglect them and possibly find better ways of emphasising
these concepts in its communication strategy.
Fifth, the tax administration itself could adapt its strategies to the fact that a gap exists
between self-reported intentions and actual filing behaviour. Knowing what drives willing-
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ness to comply is as important as knowing what motivates the decision to file. From the
results in Table 3.3 it seems that, once again, assisting taxpayers with effective educational
and communication strategies might increase their intrinsic motivation to comply.
In conclusion, this paper will hopefully encourage more researchers to engage in primary
data collection in relation to tax and development. Eswatini is a small country and it is
an open question whether these lessons can be applied to other contexts. Cross-country
comparisons will surely be beneficial in gaining a better understanding of what drives
compliance in Africa. At the same time, this paper makes the point for a stronger reliance
on tax administrative data, which revenue authorities in SSA produce every day. An
important future direction for research consists in exploiting the combined potential of
survey and administrative data, so to gain direct knowledge of the practical life of taxation






Table A1: Taxpayer’s Perception Survey
No. Module # Questions
1 Pre-interview identifying information 5
2 Consent form 4
3 Respondent’s demographics 4
4 Business’ characteristics 23
5 Risk preferences 9
6 Tax Attitudes and perceptions 28
7 Satisfaction with public services 6
8 Interactions with revenue authority 12
9 Post-interview quality assessment 4
Module 1 and 9 were filled by the enumerator herself.
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A1.1 Risk Preferences
In the Multiple Price List experiment, each respondent is presented with a choice between two
lotteries, A or B. Appendix Table A2 shows the payoffs structure implied in the experiment.49
At the beginning of the experiment, the two lotteries have a relatively large difference in
expected values, such as SLZ 3,000 in lottery 1. As one proceeds down the matrix, the
expected value of lottery A stays the same, while that of B increases, so that the difference in
payoff is now in favour of B. The logic behind the test is that only risk-loving subjects would
take lottery B in the first and second row, and only risk-averse subjects would take lottery A
in the last three row.50 In line with the relevant literature, risk attitude is operationalised with
the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), which is calculated for each lottery choice, as
shown in Table A2.51
49It is worth stressing that the last four columns of the table were not shown to the respondent.
50A risk-neutral respondent should switch from choosing A to B when the difference between the two payoffs
is about zero, so she would choose A for the first two/three rows and B thereafter.
51The CRRA utility is defined as U(y) = (y1−r)(1 − r), where r is the CRRA coefficient. With this parame-
terization, r = 0 denotes risk-neutral behavior, r > 0 denotes risk aversion, and r < 0 denotes risk loving.
When r = 1, U(m) = ln(m). More details in Harrison et al. (2005).
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Table A2: Lottery Choices and Risk Aversion Classification
Lottery A Lottery B Risk profile
Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff Diff. CRRA interval CRRA est. Risk category
1 11000 0.5 16000 0.5 0 3000 r < -0.85 -1.23 very risk loving
1 9500 0.5 16000 0.5 0 1500 -0.85 < r < -0.33 -0.59 risk loving
1 8000 0.5 16000 0.5 0 0 -0.33 < r < 0 -0.16 slightly loving to neutral
1 6500 0.5 16000 0.5 0 -1500 0 < r < 0.23 0.16 neutral to slightly averse
1 5000 0.5 16000 0.5 0 -3000 0.23 < r < 0.40 0.31 risk averse
1 3500 0.5 16000 0.5 0 -4500 0.40 < r < 0.54 0.47 very risk averse
1 2000 0.5 16000 0.5 0 -6000 0.54 < r < 0.67 0.60 highly risk averse
All currency units are Swazi Lilangeni (SZL). At the time of the experiment 1 USD=15.02 SZL. The last three columns in this table, showing the difference
in expected values of the lotteries and the implied CRRA intervals, were not shown to subjects. Based on expected utility theory and assuming constant
relative risk aversion, the CRRA parameter r refers to a utility function U(x) = x1−r(1 − r)−1. The CRRA intervals refer to the choice of switching to




Table A3: Mean differences by consent to the survey
Refuse Consent
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Difference
Perpetual Active 0.74 984 0.76 518 -0.02
Perpetual Non-filer 0.49 1481 0.44 491 0.04∗
Hhohho 0.34 2465 0.37 1009 -0.02
Lubombo 0.14 2465 0.16 1009 -0.02
Manzini 0.41 2465 0.38 1009 0.03
Shiselweni 0.11 2465 0.09 1009 0.02
# Years filing 2014-2018 4.39 2465 4.30 1009 0.09∗∗
VAT registered 0.01 2465 0.02 1009 -0.01
Log Tax declared 5.00 984 3.63 518 1.36∗∗∗
N 3,474
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Table A4: Summary Statistics - Background Variables
N Mean SD Min Max
Taxpayer-level
Female 1009 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Age group max=7 1009 4.27 1.24 0.00 7.00
Higher education 1009 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Swazi national 1006 0.95 0.21 0.00 1.00
Married 576 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00
Has tax accountant 1009 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00
Days spent on tax 1009 4.72 6.27 0.00 31.00
Time on tax > median 815 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Book-keeping 1009 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Email for business 1009 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Bank account 1009 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Business-level
Operative 1009 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Years since registration 1009 6.33 3.31 0.00 12.00
Had a previous business 1009 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Log(USD turnover) 1009 1.77 1.36 0.00 5.12
Hhohho 1009 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Lubombo 1009 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Manzini 1009 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
Shiselweni 1009 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Wholsale/retail trade 1009 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Compete with informals 871 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
High Competition 1009 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Less business 958 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Table A5: Summary Statistics - Risk Preferences
N Mean SD Min Max
Self-reported riskiness 1009 5.12 2.66 1.00 10.00
CRRA 903 0.17 0.84 -1.23 0.98
Risk averse 990 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
Switch-point to risky lottery 903 4.02 2.78 0.00 7.00
% A for choice 1 920 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00
% A for choice 2 915 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
% A for choice 3 913 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
% A for choice 4 907 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00
% A for choice 5 904 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
% A for choice 6 899 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
% A for choice 7 900 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Indifference 1009 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Inconsistency 1009 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Table A6: Summary Statistics - Interactions with SRA
N Mean SD Min Max
# Years filing 2014-2018 1009 4.30 1.22 1.00 5.00
Distance to SRA (km) 1009 40.41 34.27 0.43 129.45
Ever audited 957 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
# audits 78 1.50 0.66 1.00 3.00
Ever fined 960 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
# fines 171 1.70 2.05 1.00 16.00
Interacted with SRA 968 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
# interactions 326 2.28 2.94 1.00 30.00
N 1009
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Table A7: Summary Statistics - Key Factors
N Mean SD Min Max
Deterrence
Risk audit below median 988 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Audit % general 988 83.05 25.03 0.00 100.00
Own audit % 988 61.94 33.58 0.00 100.00
# fined businesses 986 1.43 2.83 0.00 20.00
Compliance costs
Knowledge score max=5 1009 1.56 0.95 0.00 5.00
Standardized score 1009 -0.00 0.54 -0.75 3.52
Difficult to file 1009 0.65 0.47 0.00 1.00
Difficult to get in touch 1009 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Trust and political legitimacy
Bribing 649 0.55 0.49 0.00 1.00
% bribe over sales 413 13.43 19.85 0.00 100.00
Unfairness 1009 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
No transparency 1009 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Poor SRA performance 933 2.51 1.18 1.00 5.00
No trust max=4 961 2.51 1.07 1.00 4.00
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Primary schools 1009 3.07 1.34 1.00 5.00
Tertiary Education 1009 2.57 1.28 1.00 5.00
Roads/bridges 1009 2.35 1.33 1.00 5.00
Electricity 1009 2.54 1.39 1.00 5.00
Healthcare 1009 2.77 1.34 1.00 5.00
Security/police 1009 2.79 1.34 1.00 5.00
No fiscal exchange 1009 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Nothing in return 1009 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Social norms
% neighbours evading 401 39.73 31.98 0.00 100.00
Peer pressure 1009 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Intrinsic motivation




Table A8: Determinants of very strong Self-reported Compliance
(1) (2)
Deterrence
Risk audit below median -0.01 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Compliance costs
Difficult to file -0.06∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Difficult to get in touch 1-4 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Trust and political legitimacy




No transparency -0.00 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
No trust above median -0.06∗∗ -0.03∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Services 0.01 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
No fiscal exchange 0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Nothing in return -0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Social norms
Evaders % above median -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
Peer pressure -0.40∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Demographics No Yes
Business Char. No Yes
Mean of Y 0.699 0.699
R-sq. 0.145 0.265
Observations 1009 1009
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in
parentheses. All and Perpetuals refer to the total sample of
taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers only, re-
spectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The
operationalisaton of determinants is discussed in section 3.4.3.
188
Table A9: High Tax Morale - Tax Perceptions - No Mismatchers
(1) (2)
Deterrence
Risk audit below median -0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Compliance costs
Difficult to file -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Difficult to get in touch 1-4 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
Trust and political legitimacy




No transparency -0.00 -0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
No trust above median -0.08∗∗ -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Services -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
No fiscal exchange 0.10∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Nothing in return -0.04 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Social norms
Evaders % above median -0.09∗ -0.07
(0.06) (0.05)
Peer pressure -0.41∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Demographics No Yes
Business Char. No Yes
Mean of Y 0.706 0.706
R-sq. 0.239 0.399
Observations 629 629
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in
parentheses. All and Perpetuals refer to the total sample of
taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers only, re-
spectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The
operationalisaton of determinants is discussed in section 3.4.3.
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Table A10: PCA Indexes - First Components
Demo Business fixed Doing business Deterrence Compliance costs FE Trust Social norms Morale
Variables and Coefficients
Siswati 0.56 Business age -0.13 Operative 0.58 Audit Y/N 0.43 Knowledge 0.48 No FE 0.57 Bribing Y/N 0.31 Nonfilers 0.69 High morale 1
Educ. -0.68 Years filing -0.11 Low comp. 0.02 # audits 0.37 Easy to file 0.32 Nothing back 0.58 Bribe % 0.14 Nilfilers 0.69
Age 0.21 Previous -0.07 Increasing 0.13 Fine Y/N 0.43 Accountant 0.29 Satisf. -0.59 No trust 0.54 Evaders % -0.08
Female 0.42 Trade 0.13 Turnover 0.51 # fines 0.40 Time on tax 0.32 No transp. 0.26 Neighbours 0.20
Dist. SRA 0.57 Bank 0.61 Interact Y/N 0.38 Books 0.54 Unfairness 0.51
Hhohho -0.63 # interactions 0.35 Email 0.35 Poor SRA 0.51
Lubombo 0.36 Own audit 0.13
Manzini 0.19 Others’ audit 0.09
Shiselweni 0.27 # peers 0.23
Eigenvalues
1.55 1.56 1.81 2.24 3.31 2.50 2.01 1.85 -
Variance explained
0.26 0.26 0.36 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.23 1
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Table A11: Active vs Non-filers - Statistical Learning Results - Last Year’s Behaviour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Original LPM LPM Stepwise CV Lasso AIC AICC BIC EBIC New LPM
Deterrence
Risk audit below median -0.06∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Compliance costs
Difficult to file -0.08∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Difficult to get in touch -0.05∗ -0.05 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Trust and political legitimacy
Bribing above median 0.01 0.06
(0.05) (0.07)
Unfairness -0.06∗∗ -0.07∗ -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
No transparency -0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.05)
No trust above median 0.01 0.05
(0.03) (0.04)
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Services -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
No fiscal exchange -0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.04)
Nothing in return 0.06∗ -0.03 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Social norms
Evaders % above median -0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
Peer pressure 0.10∗∗ 0.06 0.06 0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Intrinsic motivation
High tax morale 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.11∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Business Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1009 505 505 1009 505 505 505 505 1009
RMSE out - 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 -
RMSE in - 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 -
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetuals refer to the total sample of taxpayers and the subsample of
persistent taxpayers only, respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The operationalisaton of determinants is discussed in section
3.4.3, while each statistical learning method is presented in section 3.5.3.
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Table A12: Determinants of Active Filing Behaviour - Probit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Perpetuals All Perpetuals
Deterrence
Risk audit below median -0.12∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.07∗ -0.10∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Compliance costs
Difficult to file -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.14∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Difficult to get in touch -0.06∗∗ -0.03 -0.06∗ -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Trust and political legitimacy
Bribing above median 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.07
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Unfairness -0.09∗∗ -0.06 -0.09∗∗ -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
No transparency 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
No trust above median 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Services -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
No fiscal exchange 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Nothing in return 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Social norms
Evaders % above median 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.10
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
No peer pressure 0.11∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Intrinsic motivation
High tax morale 0.16∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Demographics No No Yes Yes
Business Char. No No Yes Yes
Mean of Y 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644
Observations 1009 613 936 547
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetu-
als refer to the total sample of taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers only,
respectively. All coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions evaluated at the
mean. The operationalisaton of determinants is discussed in section 3.4.3.
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Table A13: Active vs Non-filers - Tax Perceptions - Enumerators Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Perpetuals All Perpetuals
Deterrence
Risk audit below median -0.13∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Compliance costs
Difficult to file -0.08∗∗ -0.08∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Difficult to get in touch -0.07∗ -0.05 -0.05∗ -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Trust and political legitimacy
Bribing above median 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.06
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Unfairness -0.10∗∗∗ -0.08∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
No transparency -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
No trust above median 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Services -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
No fiscal exchange -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Nothing in return 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Social norms
Evaders % above median -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Peer pressure 0.10∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Intrinsic motivation
High tax morale 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.09∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Enumerator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics No No Yes Yes
Business Char. No No Yes Yes
Mean of Y 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644
R-sq. 0.074 0.102 0.334 0.495
Observations 1009 613 1009 613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetu-
als refer to the total sample of taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers only,
respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The operationalisaton of de-
terminants is discussed in section 3.4.3.
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Table A14: Active vs Non-filers - Tax Perceptions - Survey Day Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Perpetuals All Perpetuals
Deterrence
Risk audit below median -0.12∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Compliance costs
Difficult to file -0.10∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Difficult to get in touch -0.06∗ -0.05 -0.03∗ -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Trust and political legitimacy
Bribing above median 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Unfairness -0.08∗∗ -0.06 -0.06∗∗ -0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
No transparency 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Fiscal exchange and reciprocity
Services -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
No fiscal exchange 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Nothing in return 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Social norms
Evaders % above median -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Peer pressure 0.11∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) ) (0.04) (0.04)
Intrinsic motivation
High tax morale 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics No No Yes Yes
Business Char. No No Yes Yes
Mean of Y 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644
R-sq. 0.065 0.086 0.330 0.489
Observations 1009 613 1009 613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetu-
als refer to the total sample of taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers only,
respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The operationalisaton of de-




Table A15: Active vs Non-filers - Interactions with Revenue Authority
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Perpetuals All Perpetuals
# Years filing 2014-2018 0.03∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Far from SRA 0.02 -0.02 0.07∗∗ 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Ever audited 0.18∗∗ 0.10 0.10 0.00
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
# audits 0.07 0.07 0.10∗ 0.05
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
# audited peers 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Ever fined 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
# fines -0.03∗ -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Interacted with SRA 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
# interactions 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Info from SRA staff -0.05 -0.07∗ -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Demographics No No Yes Yes
Business Char. No No Yes Yes
Mean of Y 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644
R-sq. 0.102 0.157 0.331 0.467
Observations 1009 613 1009 613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Per-
petuals refer to the total sample of taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers
only, respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The operational-
isaton of determinants is discussed in section 3.4.3.
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Table A16: Active vs Non-filers - Risk Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All Perpetuals Perpetuals All All Perpetuals Perpetuals
CRRA Lottery -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Risk reported > median -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Demographics No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Business Char. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Y 0.513 0.513 0.644 0.644 0.513 0.513 0.644 0.644
R-sq. 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.300 0.301 0.447 0.448
Observations 1009 1009 613 613 1009 1009 613 613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetuals refer to the total sample of taxpayers and
the subsample of persistent taxpayers only, respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The operationalisaton of risk
variables is discussed in section A1.1.
Table A17: Active vs Non-filers - Single Tax Knowledge Questions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Q1 All Q1 Perp. Q2 All Q2 Perp. Q3 All Q3 Perp. Q4 All Q4 Perp. Q5 All Q5 Perp.
Panel A: without Controls
Single question 0.22∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.14 0.20∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
R-sq. 0.032 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.028 0.047 0.024 0.046
Panel B: with Controls
Single question 0.12∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.08∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Mean of Y 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644
R-sq. 0.309 0.451 0.300 0.447 0.300 0.447 0.304 0.449 0.305 0.453
Observations 1009 613 1009 613 1009 613 1009 613 1009 613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetuals refer to the total sample of taxpayers and the subsample
of persistent taxpayers only, respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. The operationalisaton of the knowledge items is discussed in
section 3.6.2.
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Table A18: Active vs Non-filers - Demographics and Business Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Perpetuals All Perpetuals All Perpetuals
Female -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Age group max=7 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Higher education 0.03 0.07∗ 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Swazi national -0.11 -0.04 -0.09 -0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Married 0.09∗∗ 0.07 0.07∗ 0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Has tax accountant 0.19∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Time on tax > median 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Bank account 0.16∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Operative 0.38∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Years since registration 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Had a previous business 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Log(USD turnover) 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hhohho 0.16∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Manzini 0.08∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Wholesale/retail trade 0.04 0.02 0.06∗∗ 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
High Competition 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Less business -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Mean of Y 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644 0.513 0.644
R-sq. 0.160 0.271 0.253 0.365 0.302 0.450
Observations 1009 613 1009 613 1009 613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All and Perpetuals refer to the total sample
of taxpayers and the subsample of persistent taxpayers only, respectively. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a
LPM. The operationalisaton of determinants is discussed in section 3.4.3.
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A5 Figures
Figure A1: Revenue collection in SZL ’000 and revenue growth
Source: SRA (2018)
Figure A2: PIT vs CIT shares over GDP
Source: ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2020)
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Figure A3: Survey sample location
201
Figure A4: Self-reported monthly sales (USD) by study groups
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Figure A5: Reasons for registering with the authority
Figure A6: Perceived audit risk on respondent himself vs on other taxpayers
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Figure A7: Determinants of Actively Filing a Return
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Figure A8: Determinants of Actual and Self-reported Compliance
Figure A9: Actual tax knowledge and reported ease to file
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Figure A10: Active Filing and Tax Knowledge, Predictive Margins
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Chapter 4
How to Best Nudge Taxpayers? A
Tailored Letter Experiment in
Eswatini
Abstract
Very little is known about why taxpayers in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remit their taxes. In
collaboration with the Eswatini Revenue Authority, this study implements a nation-wide
randomised controlled trial nudging more than 20,000 income taxpayers with behaviourally-
informed mailings. This study attempts to shed new light on which are the drivers of
SSA taxpayers’ compliance and how can these be leveraged by resource-constrained tax
authorities. While the tax nudge literature has boomed in OECD countries and Latin
America, only a handful of studies can be found in SSA; this paper contributes significantly
to these. First, thanks to the wealth of administrative data available, this study is the first
of its kind to target three different categories of taxpayers at the same time – non-filers, nil-
filers and active – while most of the existing literature focusses on positive filers. Second,
I tailor the content of letters to be specific to each taxpayer category. Third, I am able
to target both companies and individuals and explore heterogeneity of results along a
number of dimensions, including past filing behaviour. I find that non-filers significantly
respond to the nudges, while nil and active filers do not. The best performing nudges
build on the deterrence and taxpayer-assistance paradigms. Perverse responses are found
from large companies. With the causal evidence produced, I am able to formulate policy
recommendations on how to best target the complex ecosystem of income taxpayers.
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4.1 Introduction
As one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), domestic revenue mobilisation is a
fundamental objective of revenue authorities in low- and middle-income countries.1 In sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), while revenue authorities are progressively increasing tax collections
with respect to other low-income countries (Moore et al., 2018), the tax-to-GDP ratio has
risen by only 2 to 3 percentage points of GDP in the past two decades (Akitoby et al.,
2019).
As one of the key challenges to revenue collection, taxpayer compliance is far from being
optimal. Some simple statistics clearly reflect the gravity of the problem. In Eswatini, the
country under study, every year about half of income taxpayers fail to file (non-filers),
while, among those that submit a return, about a quarter report zero income and zero tax
(nil-filers). In addition, taxpayers are quite persistent over time in their filing behaviour.
For example, 18 per cent and 10 per cent of the population of registered taxpayers in
Eswatini either never filed or perpetually filed nil, respectively, since their registration
with the authority.
These figures are economically relevant given that income taxes represented 35 pr cent
of total tax revenue in 2018 (ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 2020). Similarly alarming figures are
found in other SSA countries like Rwanda, Uganda, Malawi, Ethiopia and Nigeria (Chapter
1). In terms of their detrimental repercussions on domestic revenue mobilisation, non- and
nil-filing (as long as the latter entails evasion) pose immediate challenges to already budget-
constrained revenue administrations. At the same time, also active filers can be under-
declaring their liabilities. The negative consequences of these filing decisions ultimately
create economic inefficiencies and horizontal inequalities. More broadly, when tax evasion
is involved, these decisions generate unfairness, lower the moral fibre of a society and
eventually delegitimise the government.
In order to enhance revenue collection, revenue authorities usually implement tradi-
tional enforcement strategies, such as audits and penalties.2 These strategies are however
1According to the International Monetary Fund, on average SSA will need additional resources amounting
to 19% of GDP to finance the SDGs in education, health, roads, electricity, and water by 2030 (IMF,
2019).
2Additional, more sophisticated enforcement strategies, which are less likely to be implemented in revenue
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costly, especially for revenue authorities in SSA who are historically constrained by limited
budget and enforcement capacity (Besley and Persson, 2013; Pomeranz and Vila-Belda,
2019). In a context in which State legitimacy is already low as in SSA (Isbell, 2017), a
deterrence-based compliance strategy may be detrimental – because it could reinforce dis-
trust and taxpayer resistance (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2001), and delegitimise the revenue
administration even more. For these reasons, it has been argued that the optimal mix of
tax instruments can diverge from what traditional public finance theory prescribes when
tax capacity and State legitimacy are limited (Best et al., 2015).
More flexible and potentially highly cost-effective interventions, such as tax nudges,
can represent a feasible alternative to foster voluntary compliance.3 Tax nudges are
behaviourally-informed tax compliance interventions that respect the taxpayer’s freedom
of choice and leave economic incentives intact while attempting to improve taxpayer’s be-
haviour. Tax nudges, by building on the theoretical formulations of behavioural economics,
also represent a theory-grounded tool to shed light on the pecuniary and non-pecuniary fac-
tors driving compliance and promptly suggest which of them governments should prime for
revenue mobilisation. While tax nudges have been implemented in high-income countries
for decades, limited evidence has been produced from low- and middle-income countries –
and even less so in SSA (see section 4.2). It is likely that the drivers of voluntary com-
pliance are likely to be different in SSA for a number of reasons, ranging from limited
taxation capacity of revenue bodies (Mascagni, 2018; Moore et al., 2018) to low level and
quality of public services (D’Arcy, 2011; Bodea and Lebas, 2016; Blimpo et al., 2018), from
distrust into the State processes and tax officials (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi, 2016; Isbell,
2017; Pirttilä, 2017), to poor knowledge of the tax system (Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Aiko and
Logan, 2014; Isbell, 2017; Mascagni et al., 2019). However, very little is known on why
African taxpayers comply with or evade their taxes.
Against this background, this study attempts to fill the gap in knowledge answering
to the first-order question on which are the key drivers of compliance. As one main con-
tribution, this study stems from a close research collaboration with the Eswatini Revenue
authorities with lower than optimal administrative capacity, refer to third-party information reporting,
changes in the remittance regime, shaming through public disclosure, and take-up of benefits.
3Thaler and Sunstein (2008) define nudges as “choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a pre-
dictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives”.
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Authority (SRA), which provided access to a wealth of administrative data, assisted dur-
ing the challenging implementation of the experiment and fully embraced the goals of the
study. I am thus able to provide robust evidence from a lower-middle-income country in
SSA, Eswatini, which has not been studied before (see section 4.3.1) and implement a
field experiment in a region, Southern Africa, where there has not been a great progress
in this sense (Ebrahim et al., 2019). I attempt to address this question by implement-
ing a nation-wide Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) that sent behaviourally-informed
experiment letters to more than 20,000 income taxpayers. Tax compliance decisions of
income taxpayers are particularly interesting from both a theoretical and practical point of
view, since their tax evasion is particularly difficult to uncover – especially in contexts with
lower tax capacity of the revenue authority – given that they self-report their income and
have strong economic incentives to underreport it to reduce tax liabilities (Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Sandmo, 2005). This challenge becomes even
more delicate for revenue mobilisation purposes, since income tax (net of PAYE) usually
represents the second largest contributor, after VAT, to tax revenue both in Eswatini and
in SSA (ATAF, 2017).
The second contribution of this paper is that, departing from the existing evidence (see
section 4.2), I tailor the content of letters to be specific to taxpayers’ filing behaviour, thus
considering three filing categories: non-filing – failure to file a return –, nil-filing – filing a
return with zero turnover, taxable income and tax liability – and positive filing, plus the
additional category of income filers reporting divergent information in their VAT returns.
The reasoning behind targeting is that, for instance, a nudge teaching how to file is more
likely to benefit non-filers than the other two filing categories who, presumably, already
know how to submit a return – so compliance costs nudges are only sent to non-filers. In
the same fashion, the threat message displays only the relevant articles of the tax law that
apply to the specific filing category, so to make the threat more salient and realistic. It is
also interesting to understand whether the same type of soft nudge, such as the one on fiscal
reciprocity, has a different impact on different taxpayers, such as non-filers and active, or,
as with non- and nil-filers, whether a more service-oriented communication informing about
the steps for deregistering from the system (an option which, in theory, is optimal for both
categories) spurs similar or different reactions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
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time these three filing categories have been targeted in the same study. By targeting these
categories in the same RCT, I test different theoretical motivations for each filing behaviour
and present a broader, more complex picture of tax compliance than the existing literature,
which mostly focusses on positive filers.4 Given the negative repercussions that incomplete
compliance has on revenue collection in SSA, both researchers and tax administrators from
the African continent need to understand what drives these different behaviours.
A third contribution is given by the fact that, consistently, I consider filing outcomes
that are specific to each category and study both the extensive (filing a return) and intensive
(remitting a given tax amount) margin of compliance. Furthermore, I am able to target
both companies and individuals and explore their different reactions to nudges, while most
similar studies focus on either incorporated agents or individual traders (see section 4.2).
Relatedly, thanks to the nationwide nature of the RCT, I am also capable of exploring the
heterogeneity of results along different dimensions; some of these, such as previous filing
behaviour, are poorly documented in the literature and highly policy-relevant.
The experiment letters represent a simplified, one-page version of standard SRA com-
munication, and differ only in terms of the key message printed in a box at the centre
of the page, and the envelope colour – this is different from ordinary SRA mailings to
make the letter more salient (BIT, 2012). Following a stratified randomisation algorithm,
non-filers are randomly assigned to five different treatment arms, that is deterrence, as-
sistance on filing, assistance on deregistering, reciprocity and social norms. The smaller
group of nil-filers is allocated to deterrence and assistance on deregistering arms. Due to
the small sample size of nil-filers, I needed to make a choice on which treatment arms to
test. Aiming at being consistent with the little experimental evidence existing on nil-filers
(Mascagni et al., 2020), I opted for deterrence and de-registration as the main possible
drivers of behavioural change for nil-filers. Active taxpayers are nudged with deterrence
and reciprocity messages while taxpayers with VAT discrepancies are allocated to a deter-
rence letter highlighting the amount of the discrepancy.5 For each category, a randomly
created control group provided counterfactual outcomes.
4There are a few notable exceptions, summarised in section 4.2.
5The deterrent letters sent to different categories varied. Only the penalties and fines associated with the
particular behaviour (such as failure to file or false statement) of the taxpayer in one category is responsible
for are made salient. More details in section 4.4.
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Using detailed administrative data on anonymised income tax filing for tax year 2019,
as well on VAT, PAYE and previous years’ income tax filing,6 with the support of survey
data from 1,000 sole traders collected in Chapter 3, I present four sets of results. First, the
best performing treatments are those targeting non-filers. Compared to a very low filing
rate in the control group (6.9%), which is suggestive of the persistent nature of non-filing
over time, I find that filing rates increase the most, by 2.6 percentage points or a sizeable 38
per cent, when a deterrent tone is used. Similarly, more service-oriented nudges reducing
the compliance costs of filing and providing information on deregistration, as well as moral
appeals, boost the probability of filing by 1.3 percentage points or 20 per cent over the
control group. Among the latter, the social norm nudge, despite referring to a rather low
descriptive norm (66% filing rate from peers) significantly increases filing. These results are
remarkably in line with what was found in a meta-analysis of tax compliance experiments
run by Atinyan and Asatryan (2019), who find that deterrence nudges are more effective in
improving filing rates that non-deterrence ones by an average of 1.5-2.5 percentage points.
In addition, thanks to the provision of letter delivery reports from the national post
office, I am able to measure the actual treatment effect on the treated. When partial (45%)
letter pick-up is taken into account, estimates of impact increase accordingly and keep their
statistical significance, with (i) the deterrence letter doubling filing rates, (ii) the service-
oriented arms increasing filing by 60 per cent, and (iii) the moral appeals improving filing
by 156 per cent over the control group. These results may seem extremely large but, as
explained above, are to be compared with a very low control group average, meaning that
the majority of nudged non-filers still persist in the same behaviour. Importantly, non-filers
are also significantly filing more past returns. In terms of immediate revenue considerations,
nudged non-filers are not remitting more tax than controls, even if individuals are actually
paying more taxes. In line with similar findings discussed below, the nudge backfires for
non-filing companies – who remit less tax. Tax remitted was not the main outcome for
non-filers in my pre-specified plan, as I gave priority to the extent to which they become
visible to the authority. Non-tangible benefits from increased filing are achieved, which go
beyond quantifiable extra revenue.
6To the best of my knowledge, this was the first time tax data was used for research in Eswatini, adding to
the existing pool of tax studies in Southern Africa which mostly come from the analysis of administrative
data from South Africa (Ebrahim et al., 2019).
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Unfortunately the experiment letters do not encourage nil-filers to start filing positive
tax, or, active taxpayers to increase their liabilities. If anything, the fiscal exchange nudge
actually backfires for active companies, who reduce their tax due. This could be due to
the fact that, according to survey data gathered in Chapter 3, active taxpayers have a
lower average satisfaction with six different public services than non-filers. However, it is
worth mentioning that letters actually increase the probability of active taxpayers filing
positive tax, and much more significantly for companies – suggesting that they particularly
shape the response of those taxpayers who are about to turn to nil-filing.7 Once nudged,
potential nil-filing companies eventually file positive, even if they do not remit more tax
compared to the control group.
This last piece of evidence connects with a second set of results, referring to the signif-
icant differences in response between companies and individuals. For instance, non-filing
companies are more likely to respond (41% increase) to the threat nudge than individuals
(25%), who in turn react more when taught how to file. At the same time, individual
non-filers are more prone to increase tax due, once filing, than companies – who actually
decrease their liabilities. This evidence could suggest that companies are more likely to
enjoy the service of tax accountants and therefore the lack of tax knowledge is not a rele-
vant constraint for them. To support this hypothesis, I provide additional evidence on the
probability of filing on time, according to which individual taxpayers, not companies, are
more likely to file on time when reminded about the deadline through the compliance costs
nudge. Another explanation for the negative response of companies could be companies’
dissatisfaction with a taxpayer service deemed of inadequate quality – a one-page to-do
list – which would have increased the annoyance of the recipients and hence their negative
reaction.8
Third, and relatedly, allowing for heterogeneity provides a more complex picture of
taxpayer responses, making the argument for a more tailored enforcement strategy. I
explore different dimensions, thanks also to the wealth of administrative data available: (i)
non-persistent taxpayers, i.e. those that are more unstable in their filing behaviour and
7As shown in Santoro and Mdluli (2019), nil-filing is more likely to take place among companies than
individuals.
8An opposite explanation could be that non-filing companies in the control group mistakenly remit too
much tax to the authority. However, it is not clear why this is not the case for control group individuals.
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shift between the three filing categories over time, are more likely to file and even increase
their tax due with respect to chronic/persistent taxpayers, (ii) newly registered taxpayers
are less likely to respond than older ones, probably due to the fact that a one-page letter
is not adequately incisive in shaping their filing decisions; (iii) rural taxpayers respond
more to deterrent letters than to softer-toned ones, which in turn perform better in urban
settings; and (iv) business size also matters – the largest active taxpayers are more likely
to reduce tax amounts when nudged.
Fourth, it is worth stressing that nudges could lead to perverse responses. As a mecha-
nism behind the back-firing effect of the fiscal exchange letter, active taxpayers significantly
report more income and, at the same time, increase expenses and deductions. This com-
pensating response implies that the final tax due does not change or even decreases. Similar
responses have been observed in the literature (Ariel, 2012; Carrillo et al., 2017; Slemrod
et al., 2017; Mascagni et al., 2017) and further attention should be devoted on how to avoid
them.
Despite poor impact at the intensive margin, the overall cost-benefit ratio of the trial
is of 1:11 and extra revenue associated with the experiment amounts to US$0.2 million.
As explained in section 4.7, the extra revenue comes mostly from current and past returns
of non-filers, as well as from the extra positive tax raised from those active payers who are
prevented from nil-filing.
The results of this study have both practical and theoretical relevance. On a practical
level, I attempt to inform the SRA’s, and other similar revenue administrations’, commu-
nication and enforcement strategies with robust causal evidence and policy recommenda-
tions grounded in the local reality (see section 4.7). Following the economists as plumbers
framework of Duflo (2017), this study builds on collaboration with local policymakers to
evaluate specific details of actual policies, and highlights margins for policy improvement
that diverge from textbook models of tax compliance. In doing so, I broaden the current
understanding of both researchers and tax administrators on two widely under-researched
taxpayer profiles – non- and nil-filers. As summarised in section 4.2, these two profiles are
widespread in high-income countries (Erard et al., 2018; Meiselman, 2018) and Latin Amer-
ica (Kettle et al., 2016; Brockmeyer et al., 2019), and have only recently been documented
in SSA (Mascagni and Mengistu, 2016; Almunia et al., 2017; Ligomeka, 2019a; Mascagni
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et al., 2020). Further practical considerations arise from the very low letter take-up of
individual non-filers who, when exposed to the treatment, are extremely responsive to the
different nudges and therefore might need to be reached with alternative methods than
mailings, such as SMS or phone-calls – but rigorous research on other delivery methods is
needed to prove their efficiency.
On a theoretical level, I empirically test the validity of predictions on the drivers of com-
pliance in a largely under-studied African country. The conceptual framework elaborated
in Prichard et al. (2019) is directly tested in the field. According to the framework, the
combination of three measures – enforcement, facilitation, and trust – is the way forward
to encourage quasi-voluntary compliance in developing countries, in addition to generating
political support for reform and building stronger fiscal contracts. The results presented
in this paper, albeit focusing only on tax compliance, show a mixed picture of the frame-
work’s effectiveness. While the neoclassical approach of Allingham and Sandmo (1972),
based on pecuniary motives and deterrence, seems to be working for non-filers and, par-
tially, for active taxpayers (for the latter, on the probability of positive filing only), it is
also ineffective in increasing the tax remitted by nil-filers and actives. At the same time,
a service oriented approach, originally formulated in Alm et al. (2010) and empirically
tested mostly with lab experiments,9 is highly impactful, especially for individuals who
arguably face larger costs than firms in dealing with the tax system. Lastly, recurring to a
non-pecuniary, trust-based approach (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014) improves compliance of
non-filers but backfires with active taxpayers. The latter effect is probably due to higher
dissatisfaction of active taxpayers in how tax revenue is spent, as documented in Chapter
3, and questions the effectiveness of the fiscal exchange theory in contexts of misuse of
public funds and inadequate quality of public services. Future avenues of research should
continue testing the conceptual framework of compliance in similar developing settings.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the existing
evidence on tax nudges from both developed and developing countries, with a focus on SSA.
Section 4.3 describes the institutional context, while the field experiment is addressed in
detail in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the results. Section 4.6 explores the mechanisms
9See Alm et al. (1992), Kosonen and Ropponen (2015), Vossler and McKee (2017), McKee et al. (2018).
Field experiments are much less common. See Chetty and Saez (2013) and Mascagni et al. (2019).
215
underlying the main results and the final section concludes.
4.2 Tax nudges: what works and what does not?
4.2.1 Tax nudges in Western countries and Latin America
Natural field experiments on taxpayer communication first appeared in high-income coun-
tries. Apart from early applications (Schwartz and Orleans, 1967), modern tax experiments
build on the seminal work of Blumenthal et al. (2001) and Slemrod et al. (2001) in Min-
nesota, USA. The authors nudge as many as 60,000 individual taxpayers and show both
that the threat of audit increases compliance, even if for small taxpayers only, and that
public services and descriptive norms letters have no effect. Soon after these initial tri-
als, a large number of nudge experiments blossomed in Europe10, Australia11 and USA
as well.12 Nudge interventions have become mainstream in HICs thanks to the increased
collaboration between researchers and revenue authorities, which granted access to their ad-
ministrative data and invested a great amount of internal resources in the implementation
of the nudges.13 Overall, these studies show that enforcement is unambiguously effective in
promoting compliance across different settings, with the exception of Ariel (2012), while the
evidence from moral appeals and civic duty is rather inconclusive.14 Also, reminders per
se seem to be effective. For a more complete review of experiments in HICs, the interested
reader could see Hallsworth (2014).
Outside of HICs, tax nudges have been increasingly implemented in the last decade,
especially so in Latin America. These studies make an important contributions to the
10See Torgler (2004b), Hasseldine et al. (2007), Kleven et al. (2011), Fellner et al. (2013), Bott et al. (2014),
Hernandez et al. (2017) and De Neve et al. (2019)
11See Wenzel and Taylor (2004) and Biddle et al. (2017).
12See Chirico et al. (2016), Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2016) and Meiselman (2018).
13In the most advanced settings, specific nudge units have been launched within institutions, such as the
Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) in the UK and the White House’s Social and Behavioral Science Team
(SBST) in the USA. According to DellaVigna and Linos (2020), there are more than 200 such units
globally.
14A noteworthy exception is the Hallsworth et al. (2017) study on norms nudges, in which sizeable impacts
on tax payments can be find.
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literature as they both manipulate message content in a novel way and also offer a more
nuanced picture of nudges’ effectiveness, when implemented in a less than optimal insti-
tutional context as the one in HICs. For instance, in Peru, disclosing information on the
level of compliance of the subject reference group has a large positive impact on compli-
ance with property tax (Del Carpio, 2014). In the same fashion, Kettle et al. (2016) run
a large (N=43,387) nationwide RCT in Guatemala targeting non-filing income taxpayers
with four different behaviourally informed tax letters. The authors show that the best
performing nudges are a deterrent message framing non-filing as a deliberate choice and
a social norms message. The latter surprisingly tripled tax receipts by referring to the
(rather low share of) 64.5 percent of taxpayers that had already paid this tax and invited
non-compliers to join the majority.15 In other instances nudges do not boost compliance
but incentivise negative, albeit fully rational, responses. In Ecuador, Carrillo et al. (2017)
emailed about 10,000 corporate income tax (CIT) payers on the extent of discrepancies
in their income tax return with third-party sources. While most firms failed to respond,
those who increased revenue also reported higher costs on less verifiable items of the tax
returns, ending up in minimally increasing tax liability.
A number of interesting lessons emerge from Latin America, which are also likely to be
valid in SSA.16 First, it results that deterrent nudges can be limited in low-enforcement
environments, or, if anything, work only in specific contexts. In most lower- and middle-
income countries, revenue authorities have limited budget resources to dedicate to audits
with the risk of nudging taxpayers with threats that cannot be backed by credible enforce-
ment (Carrillo et al., 2017). In others, the mere fact of being contacted by the tax authority
by written communication, regardless of the content, has a positive impact on compliance
(Ortega and Sanguineti, 2013). For this reason, in-person visits, putting tax collectors in
direct contact with taxpayers, despite being costly, are also more effective (Ortega and
15The descriptive norm communicated in Kettle et al. (2016) is slightly lower than the one tested in this
study (see section 4.4.2).
16Outside Latin America, Chetty et al. (2014) nudged more than 23,000 VAT firms in Bangladesh with
8 different version of letters, associated with different combinations of recognition cards, information
disclosure to peer groups and descriptive information on compliance levels (the social norm nudge in this
study). They show how impact differs by the ex-ante compliance levels, with an increase in tax payments
of 17% in high-compliance clusters and zero effect in low-compliance clusters for those firms exposed to
the possibility that information on their compliance could have been shared with their peers.
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Scartascini, 2016a). Furthermore, explicitly stating the amount of fines according to the
tax code reinforces impact (Castro and Scartascini, 2013).17 Deterrent signals can also
act as scarecrows and exploit inconsistencies in utility maximisation, especially in small
taxpayers. In Uruguay, Bergolo et al. (2019) show that the threat of audit generates fear
and induce probability neglect (Sunstein, 2003).18 Second, it is also true that impacts
can last over time, as shown by Kettle et al. (2016) in Guatemala and Brockmeyer et al.
(2019) in Costa Rica, where enforcement emails increase tax payments two years after the
trial.19 Third, average effects may mask differences across individuals (Castro and Scar-
tascini, 2013). Heterogenous impacts are highly common in these studies and dimensions
such as past filing behaviour, income levels and peers’ compliance rates tend to differently
influence taxpayers’ responses.
4.2.2 Tax nudges in sub-Saharan Africa
Despite having become the norm in Europe and North America and being increasingly
tested in Latin America, evidence on tax nudges from SSA is almost non-existent. So far,
only a handful of studies have rigorously tested tax nudges in the region and are therefore
worth mentioning.20
Shimeles et al. (2017) study the impact on profit tax paid of letters delivered to 3,120
businesses in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, testing both a threat and a more persuasive nudge.
While the threat emphasises the risk of being audited and the penalty regime, the persua-
sion letter is patriotic in tone and lists flagship projects funded by taxes, in much of the
same way as the fiscal exchange nudge in this study (see section 4.4.2). Increases in tax
paid are remarkably large, 38 per cent for the threat and 32 per cent for the persuasion let-
17Both these aspects are tested in this trial as well, as discussed in section 4.4.2.
18Loewenstein et al. (2001) elaborate that individuals experiencing fear react quickly, intuitively and sub-
optimally and thus neglect the underlying probabilities of a given event.
19It is not clear why impacts are sustained over the medium-term in some specific contexts, while, in the
majority of cases, nudges are short-lived. One possible explanation can be due to the extent of credibility
associated with the nudge, which is based on trust towards the revenue authority and is highly country-
specific. Further research should be devoted to this aspect.
20It is also true that similar tax experiments are currently carried out in SSA, but to the best of my
knowledge the results are not yet publicly available.
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ter, and highly significant. A major explanation for these large impacts may be that letters
are hand-delivered by tax officials, thus augmenting taxpayers’ perception of being under
the agency’s radar and, consequently, their response. However, hand-delivering letters can
be expensive and not feasible when the nudge strategy needs to be scaled up.
In another original field experiment run in Rwanda, Mascagni et al. (2017) test the
impact on tax due of different message contents (deterrence, fiscal exchange or reminder)
and delivery methods (letter, email or SMS), for a total of nine treatments. The authors
target a total of 13,000 CIT and PIT payers located in the capital city Kigali. Results
show that non-traditional channels of communication, such as SMSs and emails, are more
effective than physical letters, while softer types of nudges, i.e. reminders and fiscal ex-
change, outperform deterrence. At the same time, smaller taxpayer are more responsive
to a deterrent tone than larger ones.21
In a follow-up study, Mascagni et al. (2020) explicitly target about 7,000 income tax
nil-filers by exploring two main reasons behind this important but understudied behaviour,
much in line with what is studied in this trial: (i) tax evasion, which is tested with a threat
SMS, and (ii) the need to deregistering from the system, which is tested with a more service-
oriented SMS. An SMS reminding about the filing deadline is also added. The authors
show that nudged nil-filers are more likely (2.3%) to switch to positive filing after receiving
the deterrence message, even if significance dissipates after controls are added. Likewise,
informing about the deregistration procedure has a significant effect on the probability of
deregistering, even if small in magnitude (just under 1%). Importantly, the reminder SMS
significantly reduces nil-filing and this could hint to the fact that reminders can be seen as
a form of friendly deterrence.
Against the limited evidence on tax nudges in SSA, this paper contributes significantly
in at least three ways. First, thanks also to the limited size of the country, all income
taxpayers in Eswatini have been involved in the trial, or about 40,000 units, while studies
in Ethiopia and Rwanda focus on capital cities only. Targeting the entire population of
income taxpayers, this study allows for a more in-depth study of taxpayers’ response in
urban and rural areas, for which it is reasonable to expect different levels of compliance
rates due to a number of factors, including higher tax knowledge in more sophisticated and
21This particular dimension of heterogeneity is explored in section 4.6.
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urban settings as well as limited reach of the tax agency and lower audit probability in
more remote areas. I explore variation across additional dimensions as well, such as income
deciles, demographics and compliance history (see section 4.6).
Second, against much of the literature which focuses on a specific type of taxpayer
(active/non-filer, individual/companies only) the reach of nudges is improved and three
different filing categories are targeted in the same trial, following the rationale delineated
in section 4.1. This approach goes in contrast with the studies discussed above, all of which
primarily focussed on measuring the impact of different types of nudges on the same filing
category. The policy relevance of this aspect of the study is important, since the SRA
and other SSA tax authorities can better learn to direct their limited resources to those
taxpayers who are more likely to respond. The nation-wide feature of this study discussed
above enhances the generalisability of the results in the eyes of the tax agency, who will
benefit from a comprehensive, albeit multifaceted, picture of taxpayers in Eswatini.
Thirdly, given its relevance in Eswatini (see section 4.3), the persistence of a filing be-
haviour over time is explicitly included in the analysis and the subgroup of perpetuals is
identified, as opposed to non-perpetuals – taxpayers moving across the three filing cate-
gories over time. The study of perpetuals is important as past behaviour is likely to be a
key determinant of actual compliance (Dunning et al., 2017; Tourek, 2020). Survey data
from Eswatini also shows that perpetual non-filers are more rooted in their negative atti-
tudes and perceptions than non-perpetual ones (Chapter 3). To the best of my knowledge,
this dimension has not been explored in the literature thus far.
4.3 Anatomy of tax compliance in Eswatini
4.3.1 Institutional context
As already mentioned in section 3.3 of Chapter 3, the Kingdom of Eswatini is a lower-
middle-income country in Southern Africa with an income per capita of $3,243 in PPP
(2017).22 Economic growth is estimated to have slightly risen to 2.4 per cent in 2018 from
22Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
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2 per cent in 2017, although growing fiscal challenges resulted in a projected growth rate
of just 1.3 per cent for 2019 (World Bank, 2018).23 The country is highly dependent on
South Africa, which provides around 85 per cent of its imports and a market for about
60 per cent of exports. Its tax-to-GDP ratio (14.7%) is slightly below the average in SSA
(15.0%), while being substantially lower than the 34.2 per cent average in OECD countries
and about half of that of Southern Africa.24
The Eswatini Revenue Authority (SRA) is a semi-autonomous institution established
by the Revenue Authority Act in 2008, officially taking over the function of revenue collec-
tion on 1 January 2011. For a summary of the main direct and indirect taxes collected in
the country see section 3.3 of Chapter 3. This experiment targets income taxpayers regis-
tered for corporate income tax (CIT)25 and personal income tax (PIT).26 More specifically,
PIT is remitted by three main groups: (i) sole traders (37.5% of all PIT registered pay-
ers), (ii) directors of companies (21.5%) and (iii) non-business employees taxed at source
through PAYE (41%). In this study, I exclude PAYE payers, for the inherently different
tax remitting mechanism, since employees do not self-report their earnings, and compliance
factors shaping it. Removing PAYE, it results that income taxes represent a sizeable 35
per cent of total tax revenue in 2018 (ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 2020). As explained more in
detail in section 4.4.1, as at July 2019 about 55,000 taxpayers were registered for income
23However, the country faces major development challenges and human development indicators may result
weak compared to other middle-income countries. Based on the international poverty line of $1.90 a day,
and the lower-middle income poverty line of $3.20 a day, it is estimated that 38 per cent of the Swazi
population live in extreme poverty, and a total of 60.4 per cent are poor overall. This is accompanied by
an unemployment rate of 23 per cent in 2018. Health issues are difficult to address, with HIV/AIDS and
tuberculosis widespread in the country. As of 2018, Eswatini has the twelfth lowest life expectancy in the
world, at 58 years. The population growth rate is 1.2 per cent, with a total population of 1.2 million in
2018 (World Bank, 2018).
24Table 1.1 of Chapter 1 reports key fiscal and governance indicators for Eswatini and Southern Africa.
25CIT is levied at a standard rate of 27.5 per cent, and imposed on taxable income from corporate business
activities. Taxable entities include companies, whether incorporated or not, as well as foreign-incorporated
entities of a similar nature, whether resident or non-resident; permanent establishments of non-residents;
trusts and partnerships. Some entities are exempted from CIT; exemptions must be authorised by SRA’s
Commissioner General.




In terms of filing obligations and deadlines – already mentioned in section 3.3 of Chapter
3 but worth to be discussed again for their practical relevance in this experiment –, income
tax returns must be submitted according to a staggered timeline. Non-VAT-registered
small and medium enterprises are expected to furnish their returns by 31 October each
year, individuals have to file by 30 November, and large companies and VAT registered
entities must submit their returns by 31 December. The tax year ends on 30 June. Filing
can take place either in person or through the online e-tax system.27
Importantly for this study, the law mandates that every registered taxpayer is required
to file their return regardless of whether they are operative during the year. Strict sanctions
are imposed by law for non-filing and for false assessment. Anyone who fails to furnish
a return within the stipulated period may be liable on conviction to a fine of SZL10,000
($719) and/or imprisonment for a period of up to one year. Those making false assessments
with an intention to evade are liable to a fine of SZL50,000 ($3,591) or imprisonment for up
to five years.28 These amounts are discouraging, representing about a quarter of the total
annual income of PIT payers and 9 per cent of the total turnover of companies. Overall,
also thanks to a sparser population, the enforcement capacity of the tax administration
seems to be higher than the SSA average: according to ATAF (2017), Eswatini has a
ratio of labour force to tax administration staff of less than 500:1, while most countries in
Africa have a ratio of about 3,600:1. However, this positive indicator is somehow muted
by the fact that, as mentioned in Chapter 3, in 2017 auditors accounted for 6.5% of total
tax administration staff, well below the SSA average of 12% and the 30% international
benchmark (Gallagher, 2004).
27The revenue authority is encouraging taxpayers to register for the online system (registration is not
compulsory and there are no specific thresholds to be eligible for it) which would reduce compliance
costs and facilitate the sharing of information with the authority. However, as of July 2019, when
the randomisation took place, only 2,700 taxpayers were on the e-tax system (two thirds of which are
companies in urban areas, which suggests that registration can be associated with lower compliance costs
and higher tax knowledge), out of the 55,000 in total (see section 4.4.1). One of the treatment arms
for non-filers also aims to push taxpayers to register for the online system, in the hope of reducing their
compliance costs.
28However, more drastic measures such as imprisonment are rarely, if ever, implemented.
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4.3.2 Patterns of compliance
Appendix Figure A1 shows the trend of PIT and CIT collection over time, according to
which CIT collection reported a 14 per cent below-target gap in 2017/2018, while indi-
vidual income tax performed fairly well, being 13 per cent above target.29 Apart from
broader indicators of revenue collection, a closer look at tax returns data can help better
identify the patterns of compliance in the country. Filing categories are directly observable
from administrative data in a quite straightforward fashion, even if the algorithm used in
this paper is rarely embedded in the monitoring and data mining processes of SSA tax
authorities. Administrative data provides a picture of what taxpayers decide to disclose to
the authority – unreported income is not observed – and it does not include the informal
sector, which by its very nature is invisible to the authority.30 The following patterns of
compliance can be derived in the period 2013-2018 as at March 2019 (about 3 to 5 months
after the most recent filing deadline):
• Active taxpayers: conditional on filing, the six-year average of active (non-nil) returns
is 70.5 per cent for CIT and 74 per cent for PIT payers. Figure 4.1 displays the trend
over time as a share of all filing taxpayers (in turn a subset of all taxpayers required
to file, see non-filers below), which is quite stable for CIT and more oscillatory for
PIT payers. Perpetually active taxpayers amount to 52 per cent and 61 per cent of
the CIT and PIT filing population (5,214 and 14,637 taxpayers, respectively). Out
of the total 68,000 income taxpayers registered with the authority, less than a third
persistently file non-zero returns.
• Nil-filers: the share of nil-returns is derived from the share of active described above.
Every year in 2013-2018, about 29.5 and 26 per cent of CIT and PIT returns are
nil, thus remitting zero tax. This amounts to 4,707 (45%) and 9,327 (32%) CIT and
PIT payers filing nil at least once over the period, respectively. When considering
29However, this performance was underpinned by higher PAYE collections mainly due to an increase in
employee numbers in the public administration and manufacturing sectors (SRA, 2018).
30Although the most recent estimate of informality in Eswatini is five years old, and it may have reduced,
the informal sector made up roughly 40% of national income on average for years 2005-2015 according to
estimates of Schneider and Medina (2018), a much higher share than the overall regional average of 32%
(Table 1.1).
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the persistence of this behaviour over time, 2,895 and 4,185 CIT and PIT payers file
nil every year in which they file a return. The share of perpetual nil-filers is sizeable:
they represent the 29 per cent and 17 per cent of CIT and PIT filing populations
and, overall, more than 10 percent of all registered taxpayers. For a more detailed
discussion on CIT nil-filers in Eswatini, see Santoro and Mdluli (2019), who show
that nil-filing is more prominent in some sectors (construction, ICT and services)
than others (public administration) and much more frequent in younger firms (46%)
– firms in their first year after registration – than less younger ones (26%). Also,
survey data collected in Chapter 3 shows that the main reason behind nil-filing seems
to be that the firm is not operative yet.31 Eswatini is not an exception in SSA and
further evidence on nil-filing has been produced in other countries as well.32
• Non-filers: failure to file – despite being compulsory by law and punished with fines
(subsection 4.3.1) – seems to be a much more widespread phenonemon in Eswatini,
if not the rule. For CIT and PIT respectively, the six-year average of missing returns
is 43 per cent and 57 per cent, as the share of all taxpayers eligible to file an income
tax return (see Figure 4.1, right). This implies that more than a third of CIT payers
(5,334) and more than half of PIT payers (24,386) supposed to file a return in a given
year fail to do so. Considering the persistence of this behaviour over time, as many as
2,339 companies and 10,035 individuals are persistent non-filers, meaning that they
have not filed a return since registration. In sum, about 18 per cent of all registered
taxpayers have never lodged a tax return while about half of all taxpayers failed to file
at least once. Again, this behaviour is not peculiar to Eswatini only. Non-filing has
3188% of the sample agree with this hypothesis, while 63% think it hides evasion.
32In Rwanda, 53 per cent and 19 per cent of CIT and PIT returns are nil in 2013-18 (Mascagni et al.,
2020), while Mascagni et al. (2019) show that 35 per cent of VAT returns from July 2016 to June 2017
have both zero VAT on sales and zero VAT on purchases. In Ethiopia, about 23 per cent of CIT returns
filed in 2006/2013 are from nil-filers (Mascagni and Mengistu, 2016). Likewise, in Uganda 27 per cent of
PIT returns are nil over the period 2013-201833 and, according to Almunia et al. (2017), 15 per cent of
VAT returns in 2012-2015 are nil.
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been documented in high-income countries34 and Latin America.35 Most relevantly,
non-filing is common practice in SSA as well.36
In conclusion, compliance with income tax in Eswatini is far from optimal. Only about
a third of the total taxpayer population regularly files positive returns and remits non-zero
taxes. The remaining two-thirds are characterised by high instability in filing patterns. The
majority of taxpayers either intermittently file, and then only in some cases file positive
taxes, or mostly just fail to submit a return.
A first consideration is that deregistering from the tax system does not seem to be the
preferred option, with only a few hundreds taxpayers exiting the system every year (see
Appendix Figure A2). Either due to lack of knowledge, which is addressed experimen-
tally through a specifically tailored letter, or an over-optimistic hope to grow in the future
(Santoro and Mdluli, 2019), most of nil- and non-filers keep remaining formally registered
despite not contributing any tax. Another anecdotal explanation for the negligible extent
of deregistrations is that the taxpayer has to clear all pending tax obligations when dereg-
istering, thus involving remittance of past tax due or the extra compliance cost of filing all
missed returns (Santoro and Mdluli, 2019).
Second, nil-filing seems to be more common for CIT payers while non-filing is the
34Meiselman (2018) shows that non-filing nears 50 per cent for local taxes in Detroit, USA, while the share
of non-filers for the US federal individual income tax is about 7 per cent for the period 2000-2012 (Erard
et al., 2018).
35In Guatemala, the share of non-filers of income tax in 2013 is 39 per cent (Kettle et al., 2016); in Costa
Rica, 50 per cent of registered firms failed to file in the period 2006-2014 (Brockmeyer et al., 2019); in
Venezuela, the non-filing rate for the municipal income tax is 20 per cent (Ortega and Scartascini, 2016a).
36In Rwanda, over three-quarters of individuals supposed to file for the fiscal year 2018 failed to
do so, while about half of companies did the same. Figures from Uganda are even higher, with
the average rate of PIT non-filing being 86% over the period 2014-2018 (figures from Rwanda and
Uganda have been computed by the author in parallel studies on tax compliance, drawing on de-
tailed tax returns data). In Malawi, almost 50 per cent of income taxpayers have filed no tax re-
turn and/or made no tax payment over the period 2014-2016 (Ligomeka, 2019a). Additional de-
scriptive evidence from Kenya shows that out of the over nine million registered taxpayers, only
3.5 million filed their 2018 returns (see https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/lifestyle/profiles/
what-to-expect-file-nil-return/4258438-5232858-oiqmom/index.html, accessed on June 10, 2020).
Lastly, Moore (2020) notes, non-filing rates in Nigeria are exceptionally high: 98% for PIT; 94% for CIT;
and 95% for VAT.
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Figure 4.1: Compliance trends 2013-2018: Active (left) and Non-filers (right)
Note: active taxpayers (left) are measured as a share of all filing taxpayers. Non-filers (right) are measured as a
share of all taxpayers required to file for income tax.
preferred choice of PIT payers – where non-filers outnumber active taxpayers every single
tax year (Chapter 3). At the same time, an additional layer of complexity is due to the fact
that nil-filing seems to be correlated with non-filing. As discussed in Santoro and Mdluli
(2019), non-filers who eventually end up filing are more likely to declare nil, as they are




Different data sources have been used in this study. On one side, detailed administrative
data represent the most important source in order to run the impact analysis. On the
other, two additional sources, the post office delivery reports and the survey data collected
in Chapter 3, proved to be extremely useful for estimating the impacts on the actually-
treated subgroup and to provide more information on the mechanisms at play, respectively.
I have direct access to administrative data, granted by a confidentiality agreement
signed with the revenue authority. I merge together different types of datasets. First, I
refer to the taxpayer registry, which contains background information on the universe of
registered taxpayers, such as size, location, sector of activity. The registry is also used to
gather contact information of the taxpayers to be nudged. By the end of July 2019, when
the sample randomisation took place, the registry contained a total of 55,462 taxpayers,
30 per cent of which are companies and the remaining individuals. Second, I use income
tax returns of corporations (CIT) and self-employed (PIT) during the period 2013-2019,
in which: (i) tax year 2018 serves as a baseline year to identify the filing categories, (ii)
year 2019 is used to observe outcomes after the intervention, and (iii) years 2013-2017
are considered to measure pre-trends in behaviour. Returns data amounts to about 6,000
companies and 12,000 self-employed filing per year on average. This data includes all
line items from the tax return form with particular detail, including the main financial
variables, such as turnover, gross profits, and tax liability. Third, VAT returns for the
same period are observed as filed by the subpopulation of about 4,000 VAT registered
entities in the country. Fourth, information on deregistrations from the tax system are
available. A unique taxpayer identification number (TIN) is assigned to each taxpayer,
which is consistent across all datasets and used as a key identifier in merging them.
Administrative data serve two main purposes. First, it is needed to identify, locate
and randomly assign the taxpayers to the treatment arms. Second, the data allows to
measure pre-treatment compliance and identify the three categories under study. The
filing behaviour is classified by looking at the most recent tax year, 2018. This means that
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a taxpayer labelled as active positively filed a 2018 tax return, while a nil-filer reported
zero and a non-filer failed to file in that year. Furthermore, I am able to observe the
filing behaviour in the previous 5-year period and create the perpetual sub-category, i.e.
taxpayers who keep filing in the same way every year: for each filing category – non-filers,
nil-filers, active filers – there will be a relatively large subgroup of perpetual non-/nil-
/active filers who have been consistently filing in the same way since registration. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the first time that (any type of) tax data in Eswatini has
been used for research purposes.
Additional relevant data come from the delivery reports of the post office. Uncollected
letters (more on the delivery process below) within a period of 2 weeks since delivery were
returned back to the post office who unambiguously linked each letter to a recipient’s TIN.
With this data, I am able to know whether letters have been effectively collected and
identify the taxpayers actually treated by the nudge. This piece of information is essential
to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE), or treatment on the treated, as
explained more in depth in section 4.4.3. Unfortunately, the post office has still not released
the data on the actual dates of pick-up but only information on whether the letter has been
returned uncollected or not. It is also not clear whether a letter is returned to the post
office because the postman failed to deliver it to the designated box or because the recipient
did not collect from their mailbox.37
As a final source of data, I recur to the taxpayer perception survey fielded in November
2019 on 1,009 PIT payers, evenly split by active and non-filers. The survey was meant to
be representative of the PIT payers population. Furthermore, it is directly linked with tax
returns data through taxpayer identification numbers. The data gathered in this effort are
used to study the determinants of compliance in Chapter 3 parallel study and represent
a source of information used to explore the mechanisms of impact more in depth (section
4.6).
37For more information on the process of delivery, see the paragraph on logistics below.
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4.4.2 Study Design: Letter Message Experiment
Experiment letters and testable hypotheses Using the terminology of Harrison and
List (2004), my RCT can be labelled as a natural field experiment, since the taxpayers
under study do not know that an experiment is occurring. The letter experiment consists
of a one-page letter mailed to the taxpayer. I experimentally manipulate the content of
the letter by highlighting alternative key messages in a box at the centre of the page, so to
make it more salient to the recipient (BIT, 2012). For the same purpose, a clear subject
line is added to the letter, such as Comply to avoid penalties and fines for failure to file.
Everything apart from the box and the subject line, such as the headings and footers, the
introductory 2-line paragraph and the final text with information on how to communicate to
SRA (phone number, fax number and email address) remain constant across all treatment
arms.38 Also, the format of the letter mirrors that of SRA standard mailings used in
their regular correspondence with taxpayers. To enhance credibility, experiment letters
have been signed by the SRA Director of Compliance. Finally, in line with practitioners’
recommendations (BIT, 2012) the letter is kept simple and easy to understand. Convoluted
and wordy sentences are removed. Letters are personalised in the sense that they mention
the name of the taxpayer at the top of the page, and use active language, addressing the
reader as you.
An example of the experiment letter is provided in Appendix Figure A3. While the
text may seem long, it is also true that I needed to strike a balance between the need
to be concise/effective and the need to convey complete, exhaustive information. This is
not different from what usually happens in the literature. The length of this experimental
letter is shorter than in Carrillo et al. (2017), Ortega and Scartascini (2016a), Bergolo
et al. (2019), and more in line with Del Carpio (2014), Pomeranz (2015) and Mascagni
et al. (2017).
The SRA standard letter was extended along five dimensions: threat/deterrence (T1),
taxpayer assistance on how to comply (T2) and how to deregister from the system (T3),
a reciprocity appeal stressing the fiscal exchange aspect of taxation (T4) and social infor-
mation (T5). The control group is assigned to an untreated mailing condition (T0) and
38In the introductory 2-line paragraph an element of tailoring is introduced, by which the SRA communi-
cates to a given taxpayer that it is aware of the taxpayer’s filing category.
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does not receive any letter. Mostly due to power reasons, I was not able to test the impact
of a placebo letter - the impact of receiving correspondence from the authority - as often
done in similar studies (Del Carpio, 2014; Ortega and Scartascini, 2016a). Also, it would
have been complicated to isolate the effect of a placebo letter in a context in which the tax
agency does not usually send mailings to taxpayers (more on this below). Furthermore,
what is usually adopted as placebo letter is a neutral message reminding about the filing
deadline, so presumably acting as a facilitation nudge in contexts where tax knowledge
is very low (Chapter 2). Despite the lack of a placebo group, I attempt to measure the
impact of receiving any letter in section 4.6.1.
The deterrence nudge T1 emphasises the size of the penalties associated with a given
wrongdoing and increases the pecuniary costs of evading. It could also be the case that
taxpayers are overestimating such costs and then the intervention would imply a downward
revision of this component, thus making evasion even more likely. However, survey evidence
from Chapter 3 shows that about 98 per cent of the sample does not know how much these
penalties amount to. An element of targeting is introduced as the content of T1 changes
by filing category. For non-filers, the penalties on failing to declare are highlighted, while,
for nil- and active filers, penalties on false declarations are included. The nudge message
for non-filers consists in adding the following paragraph:
• SECTION 66 of the INCOME TAX ORDER (1975): a taxpayer who fails to submit a
return within the stipulated period commits an offence and may be liable on conviction
to a fine of E10,000, or imprisonment for a period of up to one year, or both.
• SECTION 40 of the INCOME TAX ORDER (1975): a taxpayer who defaults in sub-
mitting a return for any year of assessment is liable to pay additional tax of an amount
equal to twice the tax chargeable in respect to his taxable income for such year of
assessment.
Please, comply with your tax obligations and to ensure your declarations are correct
to avoid fines and penalties.
Nil- and active filers received the same message with the only difference of the fines
imposed on false statements (SZL50,000 or imprisonment up to five years) and a final
sentence saying that if all information you reported is complete and correct, you do not
need to make any changes. Taxpayers with VAT discrepancies are showed the turnover
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reported in both the income tax and VAT returns, as well as the amount of the discrepancy
arising between the two. Consistently, the following hypothesis on T1 is derived:
H1: receiving a deterrence letter T1 increases both the probability to file for non-
filers and the tax declared for nil-filers and active. The impact should extend
to previous years’ returns and spill over other taxes, such as VAT. It should
also be larger for smaller taxpayers, given that the cost of evading is now made
more salient and is proportionally higher for them.
The compliance costs nudge T2, delivered to non-filers only, communicates all the
steps necessary to file a return, including a reminder of the upcoming filing deadline and
indications on how to register for the e-tax system (section 4.3). The overall goal is to reduce
the compliance costs that make it extremely difficult for taxpayers to comply with tax rules
(Slemrod 2007). Compliance costs can be seen as the burden taxpayers have to bear to
be compliant, which includes the time and cost associated with preparing tax returns,
filing, paying, acquiring the relevant tax knowledge and interacting with tax authorities.
These costs are likely to be large in Eswatini. Survey evidence in Chapter 3 shows that
83.5 per cent of the non-filers in the sample do not know when the next deadline is,
compared to 31 per cent of surveyed active taxpayers. More broadly, active filers perform
35 per cent better than non-filers in a six-item tax quiz embedded in the survey.39 This
evidence demonstrates how compliance costs could be more relevant for non-filers, hence
the targeting on this category. The tone is friendly and instructive, with no reference
to penalties for non-compliance. A blank tax form, as well as a blank form for e-tax
registration are enclosed with the letter. Both for its content and attachments, T2 can
be seen as a more complete educational nudge than the reminder-only type of messages
usually tested in the literature (see section 4.2). The following text is introduced:
You just have to follow these simple instructions:
1. Obtain the CIT/PIT Income Tax Return form from a SRA Service Center countrywide
or download it from the SRA website. For your convenience, also find the tax return
form attached to this letter.
2. Fill in the attached form correctly so that your taxes can be calculated
39The difference in knowledge is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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3. Follow instructions on the tax rate applicable to get the correct tax payable
4. Sign and submit the Tax Return to any SRA Service Center before the deadline XXX40
Alternatively, you can also save time and travel costs of coming to SRA to physically submit
your Income Tax Return by filing online. All you need to do is to register for e-tax with
SRA. Fill in the e-tax registration form attached and submit tax return online before the
deadline. Please, note that e-tax registration takes 5 days and only after receiving registration
confirmation from SRA you will be able to file online. Please, follow the steps above and file
your past and future returns. Learn how to file in order to be a compliant taxpayer.
The following hypothesis is formulated:
H2: receiving a compliance costs letter T2 increases the probability to file for
non-filers. The impact should extend to previous years’ returns as well. It
should also be larger for smaller taxpayers, given that compliance costs are
usually regressive in nature.
The deregistration nudge T3, targeted at non- and nil- filers, similarly shows the service-
oriented side of the tax authority. In T3, I explain which are the steps to follow to exit the
tax system in a clear and direct way, as the current deregistration process may be considered
confusing to go through without assistance. Similarly to T2, a blank deregistered form
is included in the mailings. The goal is to reduce taxpayers’ ignorance and perceived
complexity associated with deregistering:
If your business is not operating, you can easily deregister from SRA. You just have to follow
these simple instructions:
1. Obtain a de-registration certificate for the business from the Registrar of Companies
office at the Ministry of Commerce.
2. Visit any on the SRA service centers with the following documents:
• De-registration certificate
• A signed Taxpayer Declaration Form which is obtainable from SRA.
• If the business is also registered for VAT, it is a mandatory requirement for you to
bring the original copy of your VAT registration certificate.
40The deadline varies according to the taxpayer’s type (see section 3.3).
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3. Once your documents have been accepted, you will receive confirmation on your de-
registration status from an SRA official within 5 working days. As you deregister you
are also reminded to comply with all your past tax obligations (tax returns and any
payments due).
In case you are no longer trading and don’t plan to be operative in the future, deregistering
with SRA is advisable as you will no longer have periodic obligations to file returns or make
payments for the deregistered TIN. If your business is dormant but you still intend to keep
your business registered with SRA, you can disregard this message and continue to file your
returns as required.
The following hypothesis stems:
H3: receiving a deregistration letter T3 increases the probability to exit from
the system. The impact should be larger for perpetual non- and nil-filers, since
it is more likely that they ceased operations, thus it is optimal for them to just
deregister.
The fiscal exchange nudge T4 is targeted at PIT non-filers and active payers41 and
appeals to the taxpayers’ morality by stressing the importance of tax revenue in order
to finance national development. First, the recipient is told that their contribution di-
rectly affects all Emaswati’s lives. Second, the text gives examples of flagship development
projects. These projects have been directly financed by the taxpayers’ money and help
to make the reciprocity link between taxes and public services more concrete. Lastly, the
message ends with an open question rhetorically addressing the taxpayer:
Your tax payment contributes to the funding of publicly financed services that make the lives
of Emaswati better.
For example, public infrastructures are directly funded by the taxes you pay: last year, the
Lower Usutu Smallholder Irrigation Project in Lubombo Region has been successfully con-
structed and is now fully operational. In addition, rural electrification, rural water and many
other development projects, which the Government has embarked on, are financed by the taxes
you pay. Therefore, tax compliance by all stakeholders has positive effects on the lives of
Emaswati. Please, declare your taxes correctly.
Are you going to support the building of a better Eswatini for all?
41Originally intended to nil-filers as well, it was not implementable because of the too small final size of
the nil-filing subgroup. The same is true for CIT non-filers.
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In relation to T4, the following hypothesis is testable:
H4: receiving a fiscal exchange letter T4 may increase or decrease compliance,
depending on the level of satisfaction with government spending.
Lastly, the social norm nudge T5, mailed to PIT non-filers only for reasons of sample
size, gives information about the extent of filing in the taxpayers’ region in the period
2013-2018. Following Cialdini and Goldstein (1991), the descriptive norm, i.e. what others
do, rather than the injunctive norm, i.e. what others believe or approve, is communicated.
The main idea is to to encourage non-filers to join the compliant majority by increasing the
moral costs of non-compliance (Myles and Naylor, 1996; Traxler, 2010; Frey and Torgler,
2007) mostly through feelings of shame and guilt for being part of a small minority of
evaders (Elster, 1989; Wenzel and Taylor, 2004). T5 is framed with respect to the region
level, rather than the national level, to make the norm more specific to the individual’s
context or group to which she belongs (Hallsworth et al., 2017). A reference level of
compliance of 66 per cent is presented. This compares to survey evidence from Chapter
3 showing that the perceived extent of compliance is about 53 per cent. In this sense, T5
may update upwards the taxpayers’ perception and ideally push them to join the majority.
A the same time, T5 risks to back-fire for some taxpayers if the compliance rate revealed
in the message is lower than what previously thought by them. T5 reads:
Do you actually know that the majority of your peers in Eswatini regularly submit their dec-
laration for Personal Income Tax (PIT)?
According to SRA’s administrative records, in the period 2013-2018 two thirds (66%) of PIT
payers living in your Region declared their income tax. You are currently part of the minority
of PIT taxpayers in your Region who are yet to declare for this tax for the year 2018.
Please, declare all your taxes and be part of the majority.
Relatedly, hypothesis H5 is formulated:
H5: receiving a social norm letter T5 may increase or decrease compliance,
depending on the perceived descriptive norm on compliance held ex-ante.
The final hypothesis tested considers that the mere fact of receiving a letter from the
authority may increase perceived enforcement and thus compliance:
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H6: receiving any letter from the authority signals that the taxpayer is under
the authority’s radar and therefore increases both the probability to file for non-
filers and the tax declared for nil-filers and active. Spillover and heterogenous
effects should work in the same direction as in H1.
Sample The sample is extracted from the registry data described in subsection 4.4.1.
Inclusion criteria are applied, such as: (i) the taxpayer has registered by December 2017,
so to be liable to file an income tax return for the year 2018 and therefore allow for
categorisation in a filing category;42 (ii) the registration status is labelled as active, meaning
that the taxpayer did not deregister and exit the tax system by December 2017 (therefore
she is still liable to file), as well as the taxpayer is not exempted from income tax;43
(iii) she has been uniquely identified and duplicates are removed;44 (iv) she has valid
address information and is located in Eswatini. A clean population of about 40,000 income
taxpayers is derived from the original taxpayer registry.
The population of taxpayers is then merged with CIT/PIT returns for 2018 and cat-
egorised according to their filing behaviour. Crucially, non-filers are those taxpayers that
appear as registered with the authority but for which a CIT/PIT return is not found in
2018. Non-filers are, in principle, potential filers who have not submitted their returns yet.
The share of non-filing is therefore a moving target and depends on the specific date at
which the data is analysed. In this study, sample creation and randomisation took place at
the end of July 2019, hence non-filers had not file yet by that time, about nine months after
deadline. At the same time, active and nil-filers are observed directly from the CIT/PIT
tax returns data. In line with the compliance patterns in the country (see section 4.3), non-
filers and PIT payers represents the majority of taxpayers. Given the limited size of the
target population, no further sampling strategy is pursued and the randomisation involves
all 40,000 income taxpayers. As explained above, the latter represent the cleaned total of
actively registered agents who are all liable to file a return, since it does not contain dupli-
42Nine percent of the observations are removed, as registered in 2018 or 2019. Also, an additional 20% of
taxpayers are discarded since they are not registered for income tax.
43About 2,000 taxpayers are dropped as officially suspended, plus only 32 entities are officially exempted.
44Duplicates can occur when the taxpayer is registered for multiple taxes or due to technical mistakes in
the registration process. About 12,000 duplicate observations are dropped.
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cates, deregistered or exempted taxpayers. In this sense, the experiment can be considered
already at scale and representative of the entire taxpayer population in the country.
The summary statistics of key characteristics of the sample, as derived from the tax
authority records, are reported in Table 4.1 below. Some relevant differences emerge across
groups. First, non-filers are less likely to be incorporated than nil- and active taxpayers, in
line with what described in section 4.3.1. Second, groups are roughly comparable in terms
of business age, with nil-filers being slightly younger. Third, non-filers are less likely to be
in the trading sector and, perhaps relatedly, less likely to be registered for VAT and e-tax.
More specifically, while about a fifth of active taxpayers are registered for VAT and 7 per
cent overall in the sample, very few (2%) taxpayers in the sample are registered for e-tax.
Fourth, as many as 60 per cent of taxpayers in the sample keep filing in the same way since
registration. While it is positive to see that 76 per cent of active are persistent in their
behaviour, it is also concerning that more than half of non- and nil-filers have been non-
and nil-filing since they entered the tax system. Lastly, categories are not too unevenly
distributed across the four districts.
Randomisation into treatment is performed through a replicable algorithm in Stata and
takes place within each filing category, since the nudges are tailored. The choice of the
treatment arms to assign to filing categories depended on power considerations. While I
was powered enough to capture small effects for non-filers and actives, the smaller size of
the nil-filing group implied that maximum two treatments could be tested on them.45 Non-
filers are allocated to treatments T1 to T5, while nil-filers receive T1 and T3 and active
taxpayers are assigned to T1 and T5 only (see Table 4.2 below). Stratified randomisation
is implemented in order to achieve better balance, increase statistical power and allow
heterogeneity analysis (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). The variables chosen as strata
are those expected to influence the outcome. For nil- and non-filers, strata includes the
district in which the business is located and whether the taxpayer is at his first year since
registration. Size is not used in this case since taxpayers in these categories are never
45Pre-specified power calculations (power = 80% and α = 5%) indicated that a minimum detectable effect
of 5% and 4% for non-filers (reduction in non-filing) and active (increase in tax due) could be found. A
MDE of 20% for nil-filers was implied as well, which is not extremely high but still more difficult to reach
when compared to the other two categories.
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Table 4.1: Experiment Sample - Summary Statistics
Non-filers Nil-filers Active Total

























































































large.46 For PIT, a dummy for whether the individual is a sole trader (see section 4.3)
or not is used as well. For active taxpayers, the strata above are used and an additional
dummy for whether the taxpayer is large is added as well. For the subgroup of active
taxpayers with VAT discrepancy, district, first year and compliance type (active, nil- and
non-filer) are used as strata.47 The final random allocation is produced as shown in Table
4.2.
46Unsurprisingly, large taxpayers only rarely fail to file or file zero, given that this behaviour would almost
automatically trigger an audit from the authority.
47Business size is not included as highly correlated with being active - see previous footnote.
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Table 4.2: Treatment groups
Category T0 Control T1 Deterrence T2 Costs T3 De-reg. T4 Exchange T5 Norms Total
Non-filers 15,266 2,431 2,429 2,424 1,373 1,366 25,289
Nil-fllers 1,182 1,162 1,164 3,508
Active 3,607 3,574 3,578 10,759
VAT disc. 477 472 949
Sample balance on observables As expected, the randomisation is successful in cre-
ating balanced groups. Appendix Section A1 provides a set of tables that compare the
pre-treatment balance of characteristics between the different nudge types, and also shows
p-values from F-test of the joint significance of characteristics in discriminating between
groups. Balance is achieved in statistical terms: of the 145 tests presented in Section A1
in only seven cases the null hypothesis of equality of means is rejected at the 10 per cent
level, well below what is expected from pure chance.
Logistics and timeline The field experiment was organised in close collaboration with
the revenue authority, which provided invaluable support throughout implementation.
Since the nudge represented an official communication from the authority, the content was
ratified by the Legal Office as well.48 Before the experiment started, the author briefed
all tax officials working in the processing of the mail, as well as those involved in the call
centres. The aspect of confidentiality of the research has been stressed so that taxpayers
were not aware that they were part of a study. All taxpayers’ queries have been directed
to the call centre who followed a pre-specified protocol in addressing the calls and clarified
that the letter was to be considered as an important piece of communication from the
authority, even if it did not necessarily translate into an actual audit.49 Also, the taxpayer
TIN was used as a tracking identifier for the corresponding letter. A similar nation-wide
48The trial also obtained ethic clearance from the University of Sussex (ER/FS294/1).
49Anecdotal evidence also shows that some nudged taxpayers tried to reach SRA staff informally, and, in few
cases, approached the Office of the Commissioner General directly. These cases were not the norm and,
despite introducing an element of uncertainty and bias in the identification strategy, can be considered
as negligible.
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tax communication effort has never been carried out in the country before.
Before this experiment, the tax authority did not send standard mail to broad categories
of taxpayers, but rather ad-hoc letters to specific recipients and for specific reasons, such
as informing about taxes due, the outcome of a tax assessment, prepayment of taxes and,
more relevant to this study, to nudge VAT non-filers to submit their returns.50 Appendix
Table A7 reports all the types of notices sent by the authority. Nudging usually takes place
through newspapers and billboards, while most physical letters inform about payments.
The letters have been sent using registered mail, so that the delivery could be tracked
for each taxpayer. Each letter was assigned an identification number that was uniquely
linked to a taxpayer’s TIN. For this reason, it is almost impossible that a letter has been
delivered to a taxpayer in the control group, since control TINs have not been shared with
the post office or linked to any letter. The mailing process in Eswatini consists in the
post office leaving the letter into the recipient’s box, which is located in the nearest post
office. The letter remains in the box for 14 days and is returned to the central post office if
uncollected in that time window. It is the responsibility of the taxpayer to routinely check
their postbox to see if any mail has been delivered.51 The letters, one page long, have been
folded in SRA-labeled envelopes by a dedicated team of SRA staff and interns. A different
colour of the envelope has been chosen so to make the letter more salient to the taxpayer
and differentiate it from SRA standard mail. SRA staff, in collaboration with the national
post office, processed the posting in the field.
In terms of timing of the experiment, the letters have been mailed in autumn 2019,
after the end of tax year (June 2019), so to study changes in reporting behavior, while
not affecting production decisions. The letters were posted in three waves. Given the
staggered filing deadline for income taxpayers (see section 4.3), letters were grouped in
batches and sent 40 days before the recipient’s deadline. That means that for small CIT
payers, whose deadline falls at the end of October, letters were sent by mid-September
(round 1). Likewise, PIT non-VAT registered payers and large CIT/PIT entities received
the nudge by mid-October (round 2) and mid-November (round 3), respectively. The 40-
50However, due to resource constraints not all VAT non-filers are systematically nudged in each period.
51Despite the peculiarity in the mailing delivery process in Eswatini, which entail extra costs in reaching
the nearest post office to collect the letter, the SRA and post office were quite confident that taxpayers,
especially business people, check their mailbox on a regular basis.
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day timeframe has been chosen to reach a balance between the need to make the nudge
punctual and the need to nudge taxpayers before they actually file a return. The closer to
the deadline the recipient receives the letter, the more likely his response will be shaped by
the nudge, while, the further from the deadline, the more likely it is that taxpayers have
not declared yet and can be influenced by the nudge. The tax returns data for the period
2013-2018 shows that while 37 per cent and 25 per cent of CIT and PIT payers file after
the deadline on average every year, an additional 50 per cent and 60 per cent file in the
last 40 days. That translates in about 85 per cent of total taxpayers who have not filed 40
days before deadline, as summarised in Appendix Figure A4.
4.4.3 Identification strategy
Main specification To comply with international research standards, I pre-registered
my trial with the AEA RCT Registry (ID number AEARCTR-0004753). The identification
strategy is quite straightforward as it relies on the fact that the study is a randomised
controlled trial. I regress my compliance outcomes on treatment dummies and taxpayer





βjTreati +XiΓ + εi (4.1)




βjTreati + θiYi0 +XiΓ + εi (4.2)
Where the outcome Y is the ex-post compliance behaviour of taxpayer i, as measured
at three months after the experimental interventions, unless stated otherwise. The variable
Treati indicates which treatment nudge j taxpayer i has been assigned to. Therefore, βj
stands for the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate of impact of nudge j. The set of control
variables Xi includes the strata used in the randomisation (see section 4.4.2) to assure
valid inference (McKenzie, 2012) and additional controls to increase power, such as the
sector of activity and the frequency of filing in the previous five years. The error term
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εi is clusterised at the taxpayer level and robust to heteroskedasticity. When it comes to
active taxpayers, for which non-zero filing behaviour is observed before the experiment, I
also include the baseline outcome variable Yi0 (lagged tax) as a pre-treatment control, in
an ANCOVA estimation which helps reduce the variance of the error term and thus results
in gains in statistical power (McKenzie, 2012).
An additional specification calculates the impact of letters on recipients who actu-
ally collected them. While the main specification above provides ITT estimates, LATE
estimates are derived by using an instrumental variable model where where the actual
collection of the treatment letter is instrumented by the random assignment to it. LATE
refers to the impact on compliers, which would be larger than the ITT estimates, given the
partial letter take-up (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Lastly, in section 4.5.7 I examine the
robustness of my core findings to: (i) clusterising the error terms at the district level, (ii)
using different operationalisation of tax amounts (for actives only), and (iii) allowing for
delays in the timing of the mail delivery.
Outcomes The outcomes of interest differ by taxpayer category. For non-filers, the main
outcomes are the probability to file a tax return and the probability to deregister from the
system. For nil-filers, I consider the probability to switch to non-zero filing as well as the
probability to deregister. Lastly, for active taxpayers and those in the VAT discrepancy
group, I focus on the tax declared. The latter is framed both as the probability to declare
more than previous year, thus to show an increase in reported liability, as well as in the
level of tax declared, adequately transformed in logs and in hyperbolic sines and converted
in US dollars.
Additionally, I consider secondary outcomes as: (i) the probability to file or amend
previous returns, (ii) spillover effects on VAT/PAYE declaration for the subset which is
VAT/PAYE registered (mostly active), (iii) for active only, both turnover and costs de-
clared, as well as the probability to positive filing, given the high instability in filing
patterns (section 4.3) (iv) for non-filers only, the probability to file on time as well as the
probability to register for the e-tax system.
Choice of model The choice of the model depends on the outcome of interest. For
dichotomous outcomes, such as the probability to file a return, I implement a linear prob-
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ability model which provides easier interpretations for the marginal effects than logistic
regression models.52 As discussed in the robustness section, results do not change if I use
a logit model. On the other hand, if the outcome is tax liability, I adopt a tobit model
which best addresses censored distributions, as widely used in the tax literature Alm et al.
(2010); Slemrod and Weber (2012); Alm and McClellan (2012); Mascagni et al. (2018).
Heterogeneity Despite being already quite targeted to each filing category, the nudges
under study can nevertheless show heterogenous effects across subgroups. For this reason,
I perform the analysis of taxpayers’ responses across four sub-groups for which I am suf-
ficiently powered: (i) perpetual taxpayers, (ii) top income decile at the baseline (available
for active taxpayers only – 1,100 of which are in the top decile), (iii) being a new registered
taxpayer (i.e. being in the first year after registration) and (iv) being located in urban
areas.53 Variables (ii) and (iii) are used as strata and are balanced by design. However,
also (i) and (iv) results to be balanced, as shown in Appendix Section A1.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Do non-filers switch to filing their returns?
In this subsection I measure the response of non-filers. As explained in section 4.3, these
taxpayers failed to file a return for tax year 2018, in contrast with what the tax code
prescribes. Figure 4.2 shows the rate of income tax filing and payment over time by
treatment status, for mailing round 1 (SMEs) and 2 (individuals) taxpayers.54 The start
of the experiment and the corresponding deadlines are indicated by vertical lines. While
pre-intervention trends in the treatment and control groups are almost identical for both
groups, a small positive treatment effect on filing and payment start to emerge after the
52While the assumption of homoskedascity does not hold in a LPM, calculating robust standard errors
controls for that (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Moreover, LPM does not restrict predicted values within
the 0-1 interval, but the share of such values is not high, ranging from a minimum of 0% to a maximum
of 5% of the sample.
53For individual taxpayers only, I also look at age and whether the taxpayer is married.
54No data comes from mailing round 3 (large taxpayers) as there are no non-filers due to file in that round.
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official start of the experiment. The rising in filing is not immediate. In some cases,
like with the deterrence nudge in round 1, nudged taxpayers start filing much before the
deadline and continue doing so after it, probably due to the threat of a penalty. A similar
pattern emerges from individuals (round 2) nudged with the compliance costs letter, even if
the jump is much closer to the deadline and supportive of the reminder mechanism explored
in section 4.6. In all other cases, the increase in filing is sizeable but appears much after
the start of the experiment, mostly even after deadline. This could hint to the fact that
significant delays in delivery took place in the field, for which I run a robustness check in
section 4.5.7. In any case, the increase in filing takes a stable trend around the deadline,
about seven weeks after the experiment start date, and remains approximately constant
during the next 15-20 weeks.
Turning to the OLS estimates, Table 4.3 reports the coefficients of impacts of the
treatment letters on the probability to file a return. Standard errors are presented in
parentheses. Column 1 and 2 pool CIT and PIT together, without and with controls,
respectively. T4 and T5 arms, which are tested on PIT only, are dropped from the pooled
sample. Columns 3 and 4 consider CIT payers, while columns 5 and 6 look at PIT ones
considering only treatments T1-T3 which are common to both categories, so to enhance
comparability across the two. Lastly, columns 7 and 8 report all treatments for PIT payers.
Coefficients from regressions with controls are also displayed in Figure 4.3. All coefficients
must be interpreted as incremental changes with respect to the control group. The control
group mean, i.e. the filing average at the endline for not nudged non-filers, is reported at
the bottom. By construction, the filing average of the control group at baseline is 0 per
cent and therefore not reported in the table. As expected, very few (7%) taxpayers who
failed to file in 2018 filed for 2019, thus suggesting again how non-filing can be a well-rooted
behaviour persisting over time.
Results from the table show that all letters increase the probability to file in the pooled
sample (col. 1), and significantly so. When controls are added (col. 2), deterrence increases
filing probability by 2.6 percentage points (p.p.) or a 38 per cent increase over the control
group. The compliance cost nudge as well positively pushes non-filers to submit a return,
even if by a smaller increment (1.3 p.p. or 19%). Interestingly, the deregistration nudge,
who was aimed at increasing the exit from the tax system, has the unintended effect of
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Table 4.3: Non-filers - Impact on Filing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.036∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Compliance costs 0.024∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.007 0.006 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
De-registration 0.024∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.021 0.021 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Fiscal Exchange 0.012 0.013∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Social Norm 0.013∗ 0.014∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.069 0.069 0.095 0.095 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067
R-sq. 0.003 0.016 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.015
F Joint Test 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.027 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.014
Observations 22550 22425 4231 4106 18319 18319 21058 21058
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator vari-
able for having filed an income tax return. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of
corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
pushing non-filers to become visible and still be part of that system. The size of the impact
of the deregistration nudge is similar to that of the compliance costs one. So far, the trial’s
results highlight that both the stick of the threat and the carrot of a more service-oriented
approach improve compliance, even if the former performs twice as better.
Considering columns 4 and 6/8, a number of observations can be made. First, com-
panies seem to be affected by the deterrence letter only, with the softer nudges losing
significance. The impact of T1 is sizeable (col. 4): 3.9 p.p or 41 per cent of the control
group mean. The deterrence nudge significantly improves individuals’ compliance as well,
even if by a smaller increase (1.7 p.p. or 25%).55
55The evidence on PIT payers is linked with the survey data collected in Chapter 3 and it is likely to
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Second, compliance costs seem to matter more for individuals than companies. PIT
payers receiving T2 experience an increase of 1.8 p.p (25%), while companies are not
affected. This could be due to the fact that companies might be more likely to have tax
accountants and therefore lack of tax knowledge is not a relevant constraint for them. This
first evidence links back to the survey data on PIT payers in Chapter 3. From it, it results
that for 89 per cent of surveyed non-filers lack of knowledge is an important obstacle to
filing. The same figure for active payers is 72 per cent. Likewise, tax knowledge as measured
in a tax quiz embedded in the survey results to be strongly significantly correlated with
filing. While CIT payers are not covered, the survey evidence is consistent with the large
impacts of the compliance costs nudge found in this trial.
Third, the deregistration nudge remains significant for companies only, probably due to
the fact that the exit for the system is more costly for them than for individuals. Fourth,
the additional tax morale nudges T4 and T5 both have a weak positive effect on individuals
of about the same size (20%), as reported in column 8. This means that while deterrence
matters, also moral appeals as well as facilitation are effective, in line with the recently
formulated framework of tax compliance presented in Prichard et al. (2019). These three
components under study work in a complementary fashion and none of them back-fires.
A second main outcome of the non-filer trial is the probability to deregister from the
tax system. As explained in section 4.4.2, a specific nudge, T3, teaches how to navigate the
deregistration process. Nudge impacts on this outcome are presented in Appendix Table
A8. Overall, less than 2 per cent of control group deregistered, in line with previous years.
On top of that, the deregistration nudge increases the exit from the system by 0.7 p.p.
(col. 1) or about a 30 per cent increase. However, this estimate turns insignificant when
controls are added (col. 2). Surprisingly enough, the social norm message for PIT payers
increases exits by 0.9 p.p. or more than 50% of the control group mean. Figure 4.3 also
plots impact estimates on deregistration rates. As explained in section 4.3, while lack of
knowledge of the process is addressed with the corresponding nudge, the little impact of it
may be explained either by the over-optimistic belief to still be operative in the future or,
more likely, by the extra monetary and time costs of clearing all past filing and payment
be explained by an increase in the audit probability, rather than improved knowledge of the penalty
structure. The survey data shows that audit likelihood is a key determinant of the decision to file, while
awareness of the size of penalties is not. More on this in section 4.6.1.
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obligations. The fact that the social norm is pushing some individuals to deregister may
hint to the fact that, for a certain group of taxpayers, the descriptive norm of non-filing
is quite high and suggestive of the idea to leave the system. This goes in contrast with
the positive impact of the social norm letter on filing, meaning that for another group of
taxpayers that norm is actually low and they are induced to join the filing majority.
Figure 4.3: Treatment effects - Nonfilers
Given the large magnitude of these estimates, one may wonder to what extent they
reflect real additional tax revenue. To address this question, it is sensible to enquire into
how much tax non-filers are induced to remit when nudged. Appendix Table A9 reports
the impact estimates on the log tax declared. The dependent variable is set to zero for
those taxpayers who do not file at all. While the pooled results show no significant impacts
(col. 1-2), allowing for heterogeneity between corporate and individual taxpayers shows
how companies are remitting less taxes than the control group, and sizeably and signifi-
cantly so when allocated to the compliance costs letter, while individuals react positively.
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Unincorporated taxpayers remit 0.06 more log taxes when taught how to file a return,
an estimate which is significant at the 10 per cent level. This amounts to about 50 per
cent more of what control group individuals remit. In contrast, non-filing companies are
reducing taxes in much the same vein as active companies, as it will be described below.
This negative reaction could be due to either lack of clarity in the nudge, which in turn
irritated recipient taxpayers who respond negatively out of spitefulness, or, less plausibly,
to the fact that control group companies are actually remitting more tax to the authority
out of confusion and hassle costs (Benzarti, 2015). However, it is not clear a priori why I
do not see the same pattern in the control group individuals.
4.5.2 Do nil-filers start to positively file?
When it comes to nil-filers – taxpayers who filed nil returns at baseline – the evidence on the
nudges is inconclusive. Table 4.4 reports the impact of the deterrence and deregistration
nudges on nil-filers’ probability to switch to positive filing. First of all, it can be noticed
that 17 per cent of the control group positively filed in 2019, with individuals being three
times more likely to switch to positive filing than companies. Relatedly, only 56 per cent
(or 1,969) of the nil-filers subsample actually filed a return. The remaining 44 per cent
are included anyway in the model with the dependent variable taking a value of 0. These
two pieces of evidence underline once again the high instability in filing behaviour over
time, which is exacerbated for nil-filers in particular. The fact that a sizeable portion
falls back to non-filing while an additional 17 per cent positively files makes it difficult to
find precisely estimated impact coefficients, both due to a smaller sample size available
(taxpayers actually filing) and a relatively high control group mean.
In terms of impact, the threat letter seems to back-fire, thus producing more nil-filing,
even if the coefficient is not precisely estimated. Third, the deregistration nudge has
a positive impact (in line with the evidence from Mascagni et al. (2020) in Rwanda),
but again not significant. In sum, nil-filing seems to remain a puzzle. As explained in
Santoro and Mdluli (2019) nil-filing is largely explained by a context in which firms are not
operative yet – and the lack of response to threat may indicate that businesses are actually
not operating – and by a sub-optimal equilibrium in which, on one side, the authority
encourages filing (even if reporting zero) in order to avoid stiff penalties for non-filing and,
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on the other side, taxpayers choose to be in a safe position through nil-filing.
Table 4.4: Nil-filers - Impact on Positive Filing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012 0.003 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
De-registration 0.004 0.003 -0.006 -0.005 0.012 0.007
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.168 0.168 0.075 0.075 0.225 0.225
R-sq. 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.017
F Joint Test 0.912 0.958 0.830 0.773 0.856 0.924
Observations 3508 3508 1352 1352 2156 2156
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable for having filed a non-zero income tax return. All
coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and
individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual
income taxpayers.
If anything, a weak impact can be found when considering exits from the system. The
deregistration nudge significantly affects PIT payers only, more than doubling exit rates.
However, this estimate turns insignificant when controls are added. Results are reported
in Appendix Table A10.
4.5.3 Do active taxpayers increase tax liability?
Table 4.5 considers the impact of the deterrence and the fiscal exchange nudge on active
taxpayers’ probability to increase their tax liabilities, conditional on filing.56 These tax-
payers reported a positive taxable income and tax liability at baseline. Overall, 30 per
cent of the control group show an increase in reporting one year later. However, the two
nudges are not impactful in increasing taxes (col. 2). The deterrence nudge is not effective
56A sizeable 20% of active taxpayers failed to file, equally balanced across CIT-PIT categories. This finding
shows once more how the three categories are exchanging taxpayers with each others over time.
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in raising tax declared probably due to the fact that recipients do not consider the threat
as credible. While perceived enforcement may be effective in increasing tax compliance at
the extensive margin (more filing) as shown in Chapter 3, it seems not to be enough to
improve the intensive margin of compliance, i.e. tax declared. As a second possible mech-
anism, additional survey evidence from Chapter 3 also hints to the fact that knowledge of
the penalty structure is not a key driver of filing. This is confirmed by the failure of the
deterrent letter, which aimed at increasing the salience of the penalties, to have an impact.
The reciprocity letter is also ineffective. CIT payers actually decrease their tax declared
once nudged with this letter, while PIT payers are unaffected. This trial then shows how
nudges can backfire, at least for certain categories of taxpayers. The fact that the same
effect does not hold for individuals may suggest that companies are less satisfied with how
tax revenue is used to fund public services, probably because they are more likely to bear the
costs of poor infrastructure and other public services in the country. Consistently, survey
data gathered in Chapter 3 show that active taxpayers have a lower average satisfaction
with six different public services than non-filers. While survey data are available for PIT
payers only, the backfire effect for CIT hints to the fact that dissatisfaction is common to
companies as well. Likely because non-filers are free-riding on tax-funded public services,
they are more satisfied with the their provision. However, the reciprocity nudge generates a
reaction from them (Table 4.3), probably due to a sense of guilt (Andreoni et al., 1998). At
the same time, active filers who have contributed to the public purse may feel dissatisfied
with how taxes are spent and believe that the right thing to do is to retaliate against
the tax collector. In section 4.6, I will try to disentangle the null effects to explore any
underlying mechanisms at play.
Similarly, the subgroup of taxpayers with VAT discrepancies do not react to the deter-
rence nudge, with results reported in Appendix Table A11. The null findings of this trial
may suggest that the discrepancies found in the cross-checking exercise are legitimate or
that the nudged taxpayers do not believe that the authority will credibly enforce the threat
communicated in the letter.
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Table 4.5: Active - Impact on the Probability to Increase Tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.015 0.005 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014)
Fiscal Exchange -0.011 -0.012 -0.056∗∗ -0.055∗∗ 0.006 0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.300 0.300 0.348 0.348 0.280 0.280
R-sq. 0.000 0.014 0.004 0.013 0.000 0.017
F Joint Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 8678 8678 2497 2497 6181 6181
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable for having increased the tax declared compared to the
baseline year. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of
corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for
individual income taxpayers.
4.5.4 Treatment on the treated
In this subsection, I exploit the availability of letter delivery reports to calculate LATE
estimates (see section 4.4.3). While ITTs are more relevant from a policy perspective since
they are informative on the effect size of implementing an intervention that cannot be man-
dated (Bloom, 2008), LATEs are telling of the actual impact of being exposed to the nudge.
As explained in section 4.4.2, delivery reports indicate whether a given letter was returned
uncollected or not, while it is not clear whether this is due to failure to delivery or failure of
collection from the recipient conditional on delivery. Not surprisingly and consistent with
similar studies, letter take-up was far from optimal, 45 per cent. However, quite unexpect-
edly delivery rates widely varied for companies and individuals. Treatment exposure was
almost total for companies, about 93 per cent, and comparable across categories: 93.1 per
cent of non-filing, 94.8 per cent of nil-filing and 93.2 per cent of active companies actually
collected the letter. In contrast, take-up rates for individuals were stunningly low, 21 per
cent: letters were collected by only 12.1 per cent of non-filing, 33.4 per cent of nil-filing
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and 30.1 per cent of active individuals.
One possible explanation for the low take-up from individuals may consist in the fact
that a much larger bulk of letters, about 13,000, was processed for individuals in round
2 (see section 4.4.2). However, nil-filers and actives are equally targeted in round 2 and
they show much higher pick-up rates than non-filers. A more reasonable explanation may
be due to the fact that individual non-filers are a quite peculiar category of taxpayers in
the tax system, quite distinct even from non-filing companies. Contact information for
this group may be incomplete or outdated. Likewise, they may feel distant from or not
interested into what the authority has to communicate to them. Despite the incomplete
implementation of the experiment, delivery rates were not unbalanced across treatment
groups, so they are not inducing any bias in the estimation strategy.57
Table 4.6 below reports the LATE coefficients for non-filers, while Appendix section
A3 displays the results for nil- and positive filers. Unsurprisingly, the already insignificant
impact on nil- and positive filers remain so in Tables A12 and A13, with the exception of
the backfiring effect of positive filers when nudged with the fiscal exchange nudge. The
LATE estimate for T2 does not change much from the ITT one in Table 4.5 due to the
almost complete take-up of companies.
It is worth noticing that LATE estimates for non-filers in Table 4.6 remain highly
significant and larger in magnitude, especially so for individuals, commensurate with the
lower relative probability of treatment. The pooled LATE estimates in col. 2 imply that the
deterrence nudge more than double declaration rates compared to the control group, while
the two service-oriented nudges provoke a 60 per cent increase. LATE impacts for CIT
slightly increase with respect to Table 4.3. In contrast, the estimates for the individual
subgroup, for which exposure to the treatment was particularly low, are about 8 times
larger than the ITT ones and still significant. For example, both the deterrence and the
compliance costs letter increase filing rates by 15-16 percentage points which translate into
three times larger filing rates than the control group. Moral appeals also increase filings
by about 150 per cent.
57Non-filers CIT: T1 92.7%, T2 93.4%, T3 93.3% (p-value 0.807). Non-filers PIT: T1 11%, T2 11.2%, T3
12.1%, T4 12.2% and T5 13.4% (p-value 0.496). Nil-filers CIT: T1 93.3%, T2 96.2% (p-value 0.058).
Nil-filers PIT: T1 34.6%, T2 32.1% (p-value 0.321). Active CIT: T1 92.6%, T2 93.8% (p-value 0.291).
Active PIT: T1 30.1%, T2 30.2% (p-value 0.949).
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Table 4.6: Non-filers - Impact on Filing Probability - LATE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.084∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.146∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Compliance costs 0.056∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.008 0.007 0.162∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
De-registration 0.057∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.022 0.023 0.074 0.076 0.074 0.076
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Fiscal Exchange 0.102∗ 0.105∗
(0.060) (0.060)
Social Norm 0.101∗ 0.105∗
(0.054) (0.054)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.069 0.069 0.095 0.095 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067
R-sq. 0.005 0.017 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.014
F-stat 5333.19 3979.39 4791.95 4607.51 621.37 663.46 386.31 423.43
Observations 22550 22425 4231 4106 18319 18319 21058 21058
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable for having filed an income tax return. All coefficients are LATE estimates where actual exposure to the
treatment is instrumented by the random assignment to it. All refers to the total of corporate and individual tax-
payers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
These results are promising in the sense that they indicate that individual non-filers are
particularly responsive to nudges from the authority.58 If the collection of the letters had
been optimal, the intervention would have induced at least three times higher filing rates
with respect to the status quo. The revenue authority must take this aspect into account
when designing future communication strategies for individual taxpayers. Individual non-
filers are responsive, but need to be reached more effectively.
58LATE estimates for those additional non-filer outcomes whose ITT estimates are discussed in the next
sections are omitted for brevity. The pattern is consistent with what shown in this section, i.e. that
coefficients of impact for individuals are 7-8 times larger when accounting for low take-up.
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4.5.5 Fiscal externalities
While this trial was specifically targeted at influencing filing behaviour with CIT and PIT
in 2019, nudges could also have impacts that spill over other types of taxes or previous
declaration periods. Taxpayers might perceive the nudge as a broader increase in enforce-
ment, and thus comply more with other tax obligations as well. On the other hand, they
might perceive the intervention as pertaining to income tax only, and increase compliance
with the this type of tax only while reducing compliance with other tax to compensate
for the income loss. In considering possible fiscal externalities, I recur to a rich set of
administrative data on (i) filing for other types of taxes, such as VAT and PAYE, as well
as (ii) amendments of previous tax returns.
Results on other types of taxes are not supportive of any spillover effect. If I consider
VAT and the active category, Appendix Table A14 shows that both hard- and soft-toned
messages increase the probability to file and the amount of VAT due, but not significantly
so. This is mostly due to the reduction in power I get when restricting the analysis on
VAT-registered active taxpayers, who are only 15 per cent of the total. For the same
reason, this exercise is not feasible for non- and nil-filers.59 When it comes to PAYE, 27
per cent of active taxpayers are also remitting it. At the same time, no significant spillover
effects are found in this case as well.
Fiscal externalities can also refer to tax returns corresponding to previous years. Given
the data available (see section 4.4.1), I am able to see whether nudged taxpayers amend
previous returns in the period 2013-2018. Interestingly, I see a significant impact for non-
filers. This category, when nudged, is significantly more likely to file for previous years’
returns as well, in addition to the direct effect on 2019 filing (Table 4.3). Table 4.7 below
shows the nudge effects on the probability to file at least one previous returns in the period
2013-2018. The deterrence mailing presents the largest results (1.6 pp), amounting to more
than half of the control group filing probability of 3 per cent (col. 2). Also, the threat
letter seems to work for companies only (col. 4). Likewise, informing about deregistration
options has same positive effects (1.1 pp) on filing rates noticed in Table 4.3, again driven
by companies. Individuals seem more likely to respond to moral appeals (fiscal exchange
and social norms). Notably, the social norm letter doubles the filing rates with respect to
59In the study sample, just 6% and 1% of nil and non-filers are registered for VAT, respectively.
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non-treated individuals and strongly significantly so (col. 6). A similar impact is found
when considering the number of past returns filed after the nudge as outcome, reported in
Appendix Table A15.
The fact that the deregistration message is consistently improving past compliance may
be due to the fact that taxpayers need to clear their tax duties before deregistering from the
authorities. However, this does not seem to be the mechanism in place here. If anything,
taxpayers that eventually deregistered after the trial are less likely to file previous returns
(1.4% vs 3.6% of non deregistered ones) and file on average a smaller number of past returns
(0.2 vs 0.8). It is more plausible that the deregistration nudged acted more as reminder
to file for past years, as it contained the explicit instruction to do so in order to exit the
system (section 4.4.2). The other two taxpayer types do not amend their previous returns
in any meaningful fashion.60
More in general, non-filers seem to be more malleable to the experiment. It can be
the case that, once a non-filer files for the current tax year, her compliance costs for filing
for past years are negligible or, as stated before, that this category increases enforcement
perceptions once nudged, to the point of complying with past filing obligations as well.
4.5.6 Unexpected impact on secondary outcomes
On top of the main outcomes and the fiscal spillovers described above, nudges seem to have
induced an unexpected response in a number of additional, secondary outcomes. First,
non-filers increase registrations to the online e-tax filing system. In principle, I would have
expected an impact from the compliance costs nudge only, since it also included a reference
to the online system. However, as shown in Table A16, T2 is significant without controls
in col. 1 but turns insignificant in col. 2 when controls are added. Other nudges such as
deregistration and fiscal exchange ones are more likely to push non-filers to register. Most
importantly, the threat nudge boosts registration by 1 p.p. over a control mean of 1.4 per
cent, and strongly significantly so (col. 2).
Second, active taxpayers are more likely to positively (non-zero) file once nudged. This
finding is similar to what Mascagni et al. (2017) get when nudging active taxpayers in
60Only 1% and 0.6% of nil and active filers amended previous returns, a very negligible response.
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Table 4.7: Non-filers - Impact on Past Filing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.024∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Compliance costs 0.013∗∗∗ 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
De-registration 0.019∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.021∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Fiscal Exchange 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Social Norm 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.029 0.029 0.054 0.054 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
R-sq. 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.008
F Joint Test 0.000 0.001 0.042 0.038 0.436 0.449 0.000 0.000
Observations 22550 22425 4231 4106 18319 18319 21058 21058
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable for having filed a past (2013-2018) income tax return. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM.
All refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for
individual income taxpayers.
Rwanda, even if stronger in significance. Results are reported in Table A17. Non-zero
filing was not a first order outcome for active taxpayers (sec. 4.4.3) and it is true that 94
per cent of control group positively file. However, both hard and soft toned letters increase
positive filing significantly and much more so for companies, who are also more prone than
individuals to fall into zero filing (Santoro and Mdluli, 2019). It results that while nudges
do not increase tax liabilities, at least they partially prevent active taxpayers from falling
back to zero filing and reporting no tax.
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4.5.7 Robustness checks
My results are robust to a number of checks. First, in order to partially control for spillover
effects that have shown to matter in similar studies (Drago et al., 2015; Carrillo et al., 2017),
I clusterise the error terms at the town level, and allow for error correlation within town.
Cameron and Miller (2015) recommend clustering at the highest subnational level, which
in the case of Eswatini is the district. However, there are only four districts in the country
and the number is too small to have precise estimates. For this reason, I refer to towns,
the second highest administrative area and larger in number than the typical cutoff of 50
clusters (Imbens and Rubin, 2015).61 While this is only an imperfect solution to the bias
that information spillovers can produce in a small country like Eswatini, it is also true that
in the survey evidence from Chapter 3 shows that only 4% of the sample get information on
tax matters from other taxpayers.62 Also for this reason, I do not clusterise the error terms
in my preferred specification discussed in section 4.4.3. To partly confirm that spillovers
are not a main threat to the analysis, the main results discussed in the previous section do
not change when I clusterise the error terms. Appendix Tables A19, A20 and A21 report
the coefficients from the clusterised regressions and compare them with the main ones from
my preferred specification. No significant changes are noticed.
Second, for active taxpayers only, I operationalise the main outcome, i.e. tax liability,
in alternative fashions: (i) amounts in USD, winsorised at the 99th percentile, (ii) the log of
the tax liability with the addition of one unit so to include also cases of zero tax declared,63
and (iii) the inverted hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS).64 Using all these alternative
tax outcomes the sign of the coefficients in Table 4.5 remain the same. However, none of
the estimates is significant, both with more (winsorised amounts) and less (log and IHS)
61Non-filers are spread over 63 towns, nil-filers are located in 54 different towns while active in 57.
62The majority of the sample, 58%, gets information from newspaper and radio. This is reassuring since
the study was not made public. Also, 29% of the sample gets information directly from SRA, which was
prepared to handle taxpayers’ queries according to a common protocol (see section 4.4.2).
63However, by construction, log transformation cannot be performed on negative values of tax declared,
which happens for a sixth of total declarations
64IHS is defined as log(tax + (tax2+1)1/2). Except for very small values of y, the inverse sine is approx-
imately equal to log(2y) or log(2)+log(y), and so it can be interpreted in exactly the same way as a
standard logarithmic dependent variable. It also accounts for negative values of tax.
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skewed distributions. Appendix Table A18 reports the nudge impacts when using the IHS
transformation, while other tables are omitted for brevity.
Third, as a last check, I consider only declarations taking place from four weeks before
the deadline onwards. As explained in section 4.4.2, letters were mailed about six weeks
before deadline. However, there is reason to believe that the experiment has been imple-
mented with delays in the field. This is also shown in the response trend over time in
Figure 4.2. While more detailed delivery reports providing information on the exact date
of delivery are not available yet, the fact that most responses happens quite after the start
of the experiment may hint to the existence of significant delays. By dropping the first
two weeks since the start of the experiment, a period in which it is unsure whether letters
actually reached taxpayer mailboxes, I can be more confident that filing responses are due
to the treatment. Results remain consistent with those from my preferred specification, as
shown in Tables A19, A20 and A21.
As a final consideration, it can be noticed that I have one main outcome for each filing
category, therefore correcting for multiple hypothesis testing may be not necessary. A
second typical correction consists in controlling for the randomisation process, through the
randomisation inference approach. However, in this case the samples are fairly large, with
the smallest group (nil-filers) consisting of 3,500 units, so that the process of randomisation
should not have influenced the estimates I get. On top of that, there are currently no
available programmes able to perform randomisation inference with multiple treatments.
Therefore, I do not implement such check in this paper.
4.6 Further Analysis and Mechanisms
4.6.1 Being contacted by the authority with any type of message
The results presented in section 4.5 are disaggregated by the type of nudge. However, the
mere experience of receiving any communication from the revenue authority can plausibly
influence compliance decisions as well, since taxpayers may perceive themselves to be more
under the agency’s radar. In order to test for this hypothesis (also formulated in section
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4.4.2), I rerun my main specification by pooling all treatment arms together. Results are
consistent with those in section 4.5. Namely, non-filers are mostly affected by receiving
any type of message. As shown in Table 4.8, receiving any nudge increases the likelihood
to file by 1.6 p.p. (col. 2), and more for companies (2.2 p.p.) than individuals (1.4 p.p.).
On average, that implies a 20-24 per cent increase over the control group. Again, nil-filers
(Table A22 Panel A) and active (Table A22 Panel B) taxpayers are unaffected.
Table 4.8: Non-filers - Impact on Filing Probability - Any Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Any Treatment 0.023∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.069 0.069 0.095 0.095 0.067 0.067
R-sq. 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.015
Observations 25289 25164 4231 4106 21058 21058
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is an indicator variable for having filed an income tax return. All coefficients are OLS
estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT
indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
From Table 4.8 it emerges that it may be beneficial for SRA to just communicate with
non-filers in order to improve their filing rates. This is linked to the survey evidence de-
scribed in Chapter 3, which shows that non-filers are often neglected by the tax authority.
PIT non-filers are much less likely than active taxpayers to have had at least one inter-
action with SRA in a whole year, 29 per cent versus 51 per cent. They are also half as
likely to be audited (9% vs 20%) or fined (17% vs 33%). If I interact the experience of an
audit with the perceived audit probability, survey data supports the idea that taxpayers
significantly increase their perception of enforcement when contacted by the authority.65
In turn, the same survey data shows that the perceived audit probability is one of the key
factors correlated with active filing (Chapter 3). More in general, there is wide evidence
on taxpayers having considerable uncertainty over audit probabilities, and almost system-
65The perceived audit likelihood is 74% for audited taxpayers versus 54% of non-audited ones.
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atically overestimating actual audit probabilities (Andreoni et al., 1998). In conclusion,
when contacted by the authority non-filers may update their priors on the risk of audit,
even if the actual audit probability does not change for them, and start complying with
their filing obligations.
4.6.2 Compliance costs and reminder effect
Considering more in depth the most significant results of this paper, the ones on non-filers,
additional evidence on the underlying mechanisms at work can be derived by focusing
on timely declarations. I construct a new outcome variable that takes value one for on-
time declarations and zero otherwise.66 Coefficients of impact on on-time declarations are
displayed in Appendix Table A23. Overall, about 4 per cent of the control group declare
on time. The incremental impact of the nudges differ widely by companies and individuals
and by nudge time. First of all, the compliance costs nudge, which is the only nudge
clearly stating the declaration deadline, is statistically significant only for individuals. This
nudge implies a sizeable 28 per cent increase in on-time filings with respect to the control
group. Secondly, the compliance costs nudge is not affecting companies which are instead
responding to the deterrence nudge with a 62 per cent increment over the control group
mean. Thirdly and unsurprisingly, the moral appeals do not influence on-time filings,
despite impacting the probability to declare (Table 4.3).
This results shed light on how the compliance costs nudge improves compliance. The
reminder explanation seems to be a reasonable candidate for individuals, which are less
likely to benefit from the services of tax accountants than companies. As shown in Chapter
3, knowledge of the deadline is much worse for individual non-filers than active filers.67
Companies, on the other hand, might be well aware of the filing deadline but strongly
respond when the penalty associated with the late filing is made salient. The deterrent
letter may have worked as a reminder as well, given that reference was made to failure to
file by the deadline. However, only companies seem to link the threat of a fine with the
timely filing, while individuals seem to interpret the content differently.
66Taxpayers who did not file yet are considered as late, since they are potential filers.
67Only 16% of non-filing individuals in the survey sample are aware of the fling deadline, compared to 30%
of active filers.
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4.6.3 Do active filers report more deductions to offset tax due?
The immediate answer seems to be yes. Focusing on active taxpayers only, Table A24
reports how log incomes increases for both treatment arms, and significantly so for T1
deterrence. Therefore it seems that deterrence is disclosing more income, which would
otherwise be underreported. This is at odds with previous findings on null (or even nega-
tive) impacts on tax due (Table 4.5). It could well be that active taxpayers are reporting
more income and offsetting this increases with more costs and deductions. Results from
Appendix Table A25 confirm this hypothesis and show that reported log costs increase as
well.68 When it comes to deductions, coefficients are positive as well but not statistically
significant. This finding is in line with similar evidence on negative responses from previ-
ous studies (Ariel, 2012; Carrillo et al., 2017; Slemrod et al., 2017; Mascagni et al., 2017)
and needs further scrutiny. Both researchers and tax administrators could devote more
attention to understanding how tax compliance strategies unfold.
4.6.4 Are active filers targeting previous tax declarations?
As another attempt to understand the reaction of active taxpayers, I focus now on the
decision to target past tax amounts declared. As many as 44% of the experimental group
of active taxpayers filing in 2019 report the exact same amount of tax liability as in 2018.
This share goes above the expected rate of consistency in tax due given the growth of
the Eswatini economy (see section 4.3.1) and is indicative of a strategic behaviour. This
phenomenon is labelled as targeting and suggests a situation in which taxpayers may
lack accurate record-keeping, thus being unable to correctly measure the tax liability and
relying on targeting as a compliance heuristic, or may be strongly affected by cash-flows
considerations, according to which they prefer to remit a predictable amount of taxes each
year.
This phenomenon has been studied in Rwanda by Tourek (2020), which remains the
only quantitative study exploring this behaviour. The evidence from Eswatini confirms the
pattern in Rwanda, where the author finds that in about half of all administrative income
tax filings over a ten-year period (2008-2017) the amount paid by a taxpayer is identical
68Due to limitations in the administrative data, expenses are available for CIT payers only.
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to the amount paid by the same taxpayer the year before (Tourek, 2020).
In order to account for this behaviour, I rerun my main specification for active taxpayers
removing that 44% targeting past liabilities. Results are reported in Table A26 in col. 3-
4 and compared to those from all actives in col. 1-2 (the same reported in Table 4.5).
Surprisingly enough, it can be noticed that, once targeters are removed, the deterrence
nudge shows a significant positive impact of 3.5 p.p., as expected. The impact corresponds
to an increase of about 7% in the probability to remit more taxes over the control group.
The fiscal exchange nudge also produces a positive impact, but insignificant.
In conclusion, the enforcement paradigm seems to be impactful for active taxpayers as
well – as it was with non-filers –, once I take into account the existence of targeters. This
evidence adds a further layer of complexity to the current understanding of tax compliance
in low-income countries. Much more evidence is needed in this direction.
4.6.5 Heterogenous treatment effects
As a final exercise, I rerun the main specification in section 4.4.3 by splitting the sample
according to different dimensions. As described below, overall average effects hide a number
of underlying impact within subgroups. Based on this evidence, tax administrators may
want to tailor nudging by those specific subgroups who are more likely to respond.
Filing history A first important dimension is a taxpayer’s filing history. It can be argued
that the way in which taxpayers have filed in the past is likely to affect present compliance.
For this reason, I split the sample in two subgroups according to whether taxpayers are
persistent in their behaviour, i.e. they have kept filing in the same way in the 6 years
before the experiment (2013-2018) or whether they kept changing their behaviour from
one option to another, such as from positive to nil-filing or from non- to positive filing.
For what concerns non-filers, 54 per cent of which are perpetual (sec. 4.3), Table 4.9
shows how perpetuals are less responsive than non-perpetuals when nudged with deter-
rence, compliance costs, fiscal exchange. Impacts on non-perpetuals are about twice larger
in magnitude, suggesting that they are more malleable or easily intimidated by the tax
authority, probably because they exaggerate audit probabilities. This evidence can be in-
terpreted as suggesting that perpetual non-filers have much more deeply rooted motivations
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for their behaviour which are more difficult to be addressed with a nudge.69 These moti-
vations can include, for example, a Bayesian updating of beliefs about tax debt collection
enforcement. This translates into a perception of non-credibility of the nudging strategy,
given that previous experience with the tax authority presumably convinced perpetuals
that the SRA may not act on its sanction threats. Interestingly, the nudges for which
perpetuals react more are the deregistration and social norms ones. The findings on the
social norm nudge are supported by the survey data in Chapter 3, in which adherence to
a social norm is much more relevant for perpetuals than non-perpetual taxpayers.
At the same time, non-perpetual actives (19% of the total) are much more likely to
react than perpetual ones. Appendix Table A27 Panel A reports that the deterrence
nudge implies a higher probability to increase taxes, which rises by about 25 per cent
the control group mean. Fiscal exchange has positive impact as well, but insignificant.
From this evidence two considerations can be formulated. First, non-persistent active
taxpayers are probably underreporting their taxes and worth to be targeted. Second,
the negative/null results found in Table 4.5 are mostly driven by perpetual actives. This
suggests that persistent active taxpayers are irritated by the nudges probably due to the
fact that they have always reported positive taxes and consider both the deterrent and the
fiscal exchange message as inappropriate. Lastly, nil-filers show no differential responses
across the dimension of filing history, as reported in Appendix Table A27 Panel B.
From this exercise, it can be learnt that filing history matters in explaining nudge
responses. Taxpayers with a more irregular filing history are apparently more likely to be
shaped by communication from the authority, which in turn could exploit this finding by
giving more weight to previous filing behaviour when targeting taxpayers.
New registered taxpayers It is fair to believe that newly registered taxpayers (or
young) can be substantially different than those who have navigated the tax system for a
longer period of time and interacted more with the tax authority. Considering the impact
of nudges across this dimension further confirms that new taxpayers are a particularly
important category to monitor (Mascagni et al., 2019), especially given that the filing
69One motivation could be that the firm is closed, for which deregistering might be the optimal choice.
However, nudging impacts on de-registrations are not different for perpetuals, and results are omitted for
brevity.
263
Table 4.9: Non-filers - Impact on Filing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Perpetual Perpetual Non-perp. Non-perp.
Deterrence 0.036∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Compliance costs 0.024∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.005 0.033∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
De-registration 0.024∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Fiscal Exchange 0.010 0.013∗ -0.001 0.002 0.023∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Social Norm 0.012 0.014∗ 0.017∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.004 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.069 0.069 0.044 0.044 0.098 0.098
R-sq. 0.002 0.016 0.002 0.034 0.002 0.024
Observations 25289 25164 13557 13465 11732 11699
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is
an indicator variable for having filed an income tax return. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a
LPM. All refers to the total of perpetual and non-perpetual taxpayers, Perpetual indicates non-filers
who have been failing to file since registration with the authority, while Non-perp. stands for taxpayers
who have alternated non-filing with other filing behaviour (nil-filing, positive filing).
behaviour in the first year is likely to influence future behaviour (Dunning et al., 2017;
Mascagni et al., 2019).
As reported in Table A28 Panel A, results for non-filers (5% are new) are mostly
driven by old taxpayers, which are strongly affected by treatments T1 to T4. Given the
importance of tax education from similar settings (Chapter 2), the fact that new taxpayers
do not benefit from the compliance costs treatment is concerning. It could well be that
the education nudge was not enough to address the knowledge barriers young taxpayers
may face. Surprisingly, fiscal exchange backfires for young non-filers (-6.4 p.p.). This can
also explain the rather weak effects found for this type of nudge in Table 4.3. Conversely,
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new taxpayers are mostly influenced by the social norm message (11.5 p.p.), which almost
doubles filing rates. Social norms do not work for older taxpayers. Interestingly, the only
significant result in the whole trial on nil-filers comes from new taxpayers (see Appendix
Table A28 Panel B): the deterrence nudge actually backfires with them (-0.09 p.p.) and
significantly so, while is positive but insignificant for older nil-filers, thus summing up to the
insignificant overall impacts (Table 4.4). New active taxpayers do not show any differential
impact with respect to older ones (Table A28 Panel C).
In sum, it is important for the tax authority to carefully choose the correct commu-
nication strategy with newly registered taxpayers. For example, tax knowledge could be
increased for this subcategory by recurring to more intensive intervention than a letter,
such as in-person trainings (Chapter 2). Deterrence is unlikely to be effective and could
even crowd-out any intrinsic willingness to comply. At the same time, more research is
needed in trying to understand why different types of soft-toned behavioural theories, such
as fiscal exchange and social norms, work differently for this category.
Urban and rural taxpayers Another dimension of heterogeneity is taxpayers’ location.
Disentangling the main impacts by an urban/rural indicator, it emerges that, while for nil-
filers and active taxpayers there are no significantly different patterns (Appendix Table
A29), nudges have significantly different impact for non-filers, as reported in Table 4.10
below.
First, deterrence is more impactful in rural (3.2 p.p.) rather than urban (2 p.p.) areas,
even if highly statistically significant in both categories. This may suggest that taxpayers in
remote areas are more likely to see the threat as credible perhaps due to fewer interactions
with the revenue authority. Survey data confirms this hypothesis: urban taxpayers are 43
per cent likely to have any type of interactions with the SRA while rural taxpayers are 35
per cent likely.70 It is also true that revenue authorities channel limited auditing resources
to those areas who are considered to be more profitable, such as urban centres. However,
this study shows how a cheap intervention can easily reach more neglected taxpayers and
still nudge them to comply.
70For example, taxpayers in Hhohho district, the district of the capital Mbabane, are 29 per cent likely to
receive an audit, while taxpayers in more remote districts such as Lubombo and Shiselweni are about 5%
likely only.
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Second, urban taxpayers are more induced to file when receiving the compliance costs
(1.7 vs 0.3 p.p.), deregistration (2 vs 0.2 p.p.) and social norm (2.3 vs 0.1 p.p.) nudges.
Rural taxpayers are totally unaffected by messages other than deterrence. Importantly, the
social norm nudge, that was not strongly significant in the Table 4.3, now turns significant
at 5% level and larger in magnitude for urban taxpayers, inducing a 30 per cent increase
in the filing rate with respect to the control group.
Table 4.10: Non-filers - Impact on Filing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Urban Urban Rural Rural
Deterrence 0.036∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Compliance costs 0.024∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
De-registration 0.024∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.016 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Fiscal Exchange 0.010 0.013∗ 0.014 0.016 0.006 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Social Norm 0.012 0.014∗ 0.019∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.000 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.069 0.069 0.065 0.065 0.075 0.075
R-sq. 0.002 0.016 0.003 0.015 0.003 0.020
Observations 25289 25164 15168 15082 10121 10082
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is an indicator variable for having filed an income tax return. All coefficients are OLS
estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of urban and rural taxpayers, Urban indicates
non-filers located in urban areas, while Rural stands for taxpayers are located in rural areas.
This exercise is informative in the way it suggests that urban and rural taxpayers are
different in the nature of the motivational inducements that are more likely to have an
impact. The fact that rural taxpayers are not influenced by non-deterrent messages is a
finding that could possibly be explored in future research.
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Business size For what concerns active taxpayers, it is possible to divide them by busi-
ness size, proxied by declared income at baseline.71 Taxpayers in the top decile of the
income distribution are categorised as large and compared to taxpayers in the remaining
deciles. These taxpayers are highly relevant in terms of revenue generation. At baseline,
the top income decile remitted a twelve times larger income tax than the remaining nine
deciles, or US$4,367 vs US$361. In other terms, as much as 60% of total income tax at
baseline was raised by the top-income decile. For this reason, it is important to realise that
large taxpayers are reducing their tax due when nudged with any treatment, and signifi-
cantly so when receiving the fiscal exchange one (see Appendix Table A30). The backfiring
effect of the fiscal exchange treatment noticed in Table 4.5 is totally driven by top-income
taxpayers. Small and medium taxpayers either slightly increase reported liabilities (with
the deterrence nudge) or do not respond at all (with the fiscal exchange one).
This result can be interpreted as larger taxpayers being more politically relevant and
therefore being in a better position to reduce tax liability if frustrated by a wrong message.
Large taxpayers enjoy more bargaining power in negotiating with the government (Giertz
and Mortenson, 2014), and are more likely to engage in aggressive tax planning schemes
and recruit the services of financial experts to reduce their tax liability (Tanzi, 2012). Also,
this evidence is in line with the main results in Table 4.5. Companies are more likely to
be large and get irritated by the fiscal exchange nudge if they are not satisfied with the
provision of public services (such as infrastructures) on which their productivity depends
on. Lastly, large taxpayers are usually more targeted by audits and when receiving a non-
deterrent message that appeals to national development they might infer that, as Bardach
(1989) puts it, “the enforcement system cannot cope and must resort to rhetoric instead”.
Individual taxpayers’ demographics As a final exercise, I consider individual (PIT)
taxpayers for whom demographic characteristics are available from administrative data,
such as age and marital status.72 While active taxpayers show very little heterogeneity,
with some only descriptive evidence that nudges to older taxpayers are more likely to
71This exercise is not possible for non and nil-filers, since their baseline income is either missing or zero at
baseline.
72Demographics are not available for CIT payers. Also, non all PIT payers have valid information. Age is
available for 86% of the taxpayer population, while civil status is known for 53% only.
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backfire (Table A31 Panel C),73 and nil-filers do not react differently by age (Table A31
Panel B), more informative trends come up when looking at non-filers (Table A31 Panel A).
With respect to the main results in Table 4.3, older taxpayers present larger effects of the
fiscal exchange letter (2 vs 0.2 p.p. of younger).74 Conversely, the significance of the social
norm nudge is mostly due to younger individuals. There is also an only descriptive evidence
that older taxpayers react more when receiving the compliance costs nudge, probably due
to the larger costs they face ex-ante.75 Being married correlates with age and therefore
the results for married taxpayers resemble those of older ones: married non-filers respond
more to reciprocity appeals and assistance with filing a return, as reported in Appendix
Table A32 Panel A. However, these figures should be considered with more caution given
that marital status is available for 53% of the PIT sample only and cannot be used for the
nil-filer subsample, given its small size to begin with. Results for active taxpayers are not
significantly different across subgroups and reported in Appendix Table A32 Panel B.
4.7 Conclusions and policy recommendations
This paper contributes to the large literature on tax compliance, and specifically to the
burgeoning literature on behavioural responses to tax nudges. Despite the presence of sev-
eral recent studies on tax nudges, the focus has been mostly cast upon developed countries,
while little knowledge has been produced from sub-Saharan Africa. In collaboration with
the Eswatini Revenue Authority, this study implements a nation-wide nudging experiment
by targeting different categories out of the universe of 40,000 corporate and personal income
taxpayers, labelled as non-filers, nil-filers and active taxpayers, and causally estimating the
impact of nudges on a range of compliance outcomes. The content of nudges is built on the
main theoretical formulations on behavioural tax compliance, some of whom are confirmed
73This is consistent with the fact that larger and incorporated taxpayers are likely to backfire, since the
owner of these businesses are likely to be older.
74Older taxpayers are defined as those having an age larger than the median in the population (about 50).
75Survey data in Chapter 3 shows that the average index score for the young group (below 50 years of age)
is of 1.63 out of 5. The corresponding figure for older taxpayers is 1.47, or 10% less. The difference in
the distribution of knowledge is statistically significant at the 5% level.
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in the field. By doing so, this study adds to the limited existing evidence on the drivers
of compliance in SSA, by exploring a country (Eswatini) that has not been studied before.
Furthermore, it is the first study of its type targeting three different filing categories at
the same time, on top of including both companies and individuals (as already done in
Mascagni et al. (2017)). Much of the relevant literature, with few exceptions, has focused
on positive filers only.
The results of the RCT present a nuanced and multi-faceted picture of tax compliance
in Eswatini. While non-filers substantially increase their filing once nudged, submitting
returns for both the current and previous tax years, nil-filers are not responsive – still
remaining a puzzle as discussed in Santoro and Mdluli (2019) – and active taxpayers show
perverse (but fully rational) reactions, mostly driven by top-income entities.
Despite the poor impact at the intensive margin of compliance, the extra revenue
generated by the experiment well compensate for the costs of implementation of about
US$18,000.76 In order to calculate the overall revenue gain associated with the experiment,
I consider the statistically significant ITT results (section 4.5). First, non-filers in the
treatment groups are more likely to file than those in the control group (Table 4.8). About
235 extra non-filers actually filed a return thanks to the experiment. These non-filers
remitted a total of US$109,303. Second, the same non-filers, once nudged, started filing for
previous years as well (Table 4.7). The extra revenue generated by these extra taxpayers
(187 in number) amounts to US$25,505. Lastly, the nudges significantly pushed a small
group of active taxpayers to continue to file positive tax, while they would have remitted
zero tax in the absence of the intervention (Table A17). These 86 extra active taxpayers
declared a total of US$69,269. Therefore, the extra revenue gains causally associated
with the experiment sums up to US$0.2 million, thus making the intervention highly cost-
effective, with an overall cost-benefit ratio of about 1:11.
The aggregate revenue gains are small when compared to similar studies in SSA (Mascagni
et al., 2017). However, these studies focused on active taxpayers only and thus were more
likely to generate larger revenue. The cost-benefit ratio becomes more consistent when
compared to nudge studies targeting non-filers only (Kettle et al., 2016; Brockmeyer et al.,
76Total costs include postage fees, envelopes, printing and additional fees paid to SRA staff for their hours
of work spent on the implementation.
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2019). At the same time, the cost-benefit ratio above is likely to represent a lower bound
of the actual one as it is difficult to quantify the benefits associated with improved compli-
ance at the extensive margin. Beyond immediate revenue considerations, the trial tackled
important detrimental fiscal consequences of non-filing such as horizontal inequality, per-
ceptions of unfairness and production inefficiencies. On top of that, non-filers start to be
visible to the authority and share valuable information with the SRA. All these impacts,
despite being crucial in building a culture of compliance, are almost impossible to quantify.
This study has clear policy implications for the Eswatini Revenue Authority and for
other tax agencies in low- and middle-income countries. First, non-filers represent an
easy target for the authority. By simply contacting them with any type of nudge, the
authority could achieve a 20-24 per cent increase in filing (Table 4.8). This impact could
rise to about 80 per cent if all recipients are actually exposed to the treatment. This
evidence links back to the survey data in Chapter 3 according to which non-filers are less
likely to be reached by the authority. This result gains economic significance given that
non-filers represent the majority of registered taxpayers in Eswatini, as well as in other
SSA countries. In particular, the authority could implement a three-tiered approach in
targeting non-filers, as formulated in the conceptual framework of voluntary compliance in
Prichard et al. (2019) as well as in Alm et al. (2010). In this setting, three complementary
paradigms, i.e. deterrence, taxpayer assistance and moral appeals are equally important
for a tax administration that wishes to encourage voluntary compliance. The parallel
study of Chapter 3 consistently documents that these three strategic pillars are strongly
correlated with the probability of filing in Eswatini. Relatedly, the deterrent pillar of the
framework seems to be more effective in boosting compliance from companies, which seem
to pay more attention to the pecuniary motives, while taxpayer assistance seems a viable
solution to increase compliance of individuals (Table 4.3). The latter strongly increase
the probability to file on-time, on top of the likelihood of lodging a return at all, when
nudged with the compliance costs nudge (Table A23). In this sense, short nudges through
SMSs, automatically sent a little before the deadline, would act as an impactful reminder
for individuals.
Second, alternative approaches should be pursued in increasing tax liabilities for nil-
and active filers. For the former, this study contributes to the almost non-existent evidence
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on how to address nil-filing. The external validity of this trial is reinforced by the results
of a similar RCT from Rwanda (Mascagni et al., 2020), where both the vast majority
of nil-filers continued to do so after being nudged (Table 4.4) and neither deterrence or
deregistration messages produced any impact. The trial on Eswatini nil-filers is ineffective
as well: deterrence significantly backfires for newly registered taxpayers (Table A28) and
that may suggest that other non-conventional messages are more likely to work with this
category. The argument can be made that these taxpayers are actually not operating yet
and legitimately filing nil (Santoro and Mdluli, 2019), but further research is needed to
shed light on this category.
For active taxpayers, this trial shows how difficult it could be to build on non-deterrent
motivations, such as reciprocity (Table 4.5), in a country where satisfaction with public
services is low (Chapter 3). Alternative messages could be based on comparisons to peers,
which proved to play a role in the parallel survey study of Chapter 3. At the same time,
the authority could also explore alternative enforcement channels. While Chapter 3 docu-
mented that standard audit perceptions are linked with the extensive margin of compliance,
i.e. with filing a return, this trial suggests that they are unlikely to be effective at the in-
tensive margin as well, i.e. increasing tax due. If anything, active taxpayers seem both
to update their perceived enforcement likelihood and strengthen their willingness to con-
tribute to national development to the point of being more likely to positively file (avoiding
nil returns, Table A17), but not as much as to increase their tax due. More credible and
salient enforcement messages than the one-page letter of this study could be tested on this
category, in much the same vein as already explored in in Latin America (Pomeranz, 2015;
Bergolo et al., 2019). At the same time, the presence of targeters largely dilutes the impact
of the nudges. As a matter of fact, deterrence is pushing active filers to remit more taxes
once targeters are removed – as expected. It could be derived that the SRA should think
about a strategy to address tax targeting - for example, by just informing these taxpayers
that it is aware and suspicious of their behaviour.
Third, the inherent heterogeneity in this large nationwide experiment should be taken
into account by the SRA when designing its compliance strategy. The authority could
think of more tailored communication strategies building on the results presented in this
paper so to focus on those subgroups that are more likely to respond, without wasting
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(the already limited) resources on those taxpayers whose filing behaviour is more resistant
to change. Immediate recommendations may consist in, for example: (i) implementing
more incisive interventions for both perpetual and newly registered taxpayers, such as
direct contact from the authority for the former and workshops and trainings for the
latter, which also proved to be effective in similar contexts (Chapter 2);77 (ii) exploiting
more standard deterrent messages in rural areas while appealing to moral factors in more
urbanised settings, (iii) targeting top-income taxpayers with more sophisticated deterrent
measures, such as deploying the most qualified auditors, and (iv) acknowledging that,
more in general, companies and individuals are very likely to be driven by different sets
of motivations, values, perceptions – as discussed further in the concluding chapter of this
thesis – and thus implementing different compliance strategies for different taxpayer types.
Lastly, the nudging method could be improved as well and the authority could find
better ways to reach certain filing categories. While letter delivery was successful for com-
panies, it was dismally low for individuals, especially non-filers. Much larger compliance
gains could have been achieved if individual taxpayers were reached adequately. One way
forward could be to update the contact information (especially location and mail box) of
individual taxpayers in the registry. A second option would explore alternative tools such
as emails or SMSs.78 More specifically, emails have the advantage of being cheaper and
more easily to track but also inevitably rely on the quality of taxpayer contact information.
Before implementing this trial I ran a quality check on the taxpayer registry, realising that
email addresses were available in 25 per cent of the cases and poorly representative of the
entire population.79 The authority could devote more effort in cleaning its registry which,
in turn, could serve as a valid basis for reaching individual taxpayers in future nudging ex-
ercises. Future experiments could test alternative methods characterised by higher salience
77Relatedly, the fact that non-perpetual active and non-filers are more responsive may suggest that the
authority could benefit from an automated system tracking filing behaviour and flagging cases in which
a previously active taxpayer stop filing or, conversely, a previous non-filer suddenly starts filing. In the
latter case, as this trial shows, the the tax authority could investigate whether previous returns also
should have been filed.
78In principle, SMSs represent a viable option as well, but they are limited in size and do not allow for
sending more official documentation. However, they could potentially be used to send short deadline
reminders, a mechanism that seems to be at play with non-filers.
79Active, large and urban taxpayers were more likely to have a valid email address.
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of the delivery device and add to the corresponding limited literature (Doerrenberg and
Schmitz, 2015; Ortega and Scartascini, 2016a; Mascagni et al., 2017).
I conclude by highlighting three directions for future research. First, it will be important
to track nudged taxpayers over time and observe their filing behaviour in the following
years, so to gauge whether the gains are long-lived. Tax returns data for future years
will be analysed so to add to the growing evidence on mid-to-long term effects of letter
interventions (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Cronqvist et al., 2018; Brockmeyer et al., 2019).
Second, this study produced both ITT and LATE estimates, with the second being
measurable thanks to the delivery reports shared by the national post office. However,
future data on the actual date of delivery to the recipient’s mailbox will hopefully be
provided by the post office and used to more carefully calculate treatment effects.
As a final point, future research could dig deeper in disentangling different components
at work within a given treatment letter. For example, the deterrence arm could work either
through increases in the salience of the penalty structure or in the perceived probability of
audits (Bergolo et al., 2019). At the same time, the combination of different treatments,
such as those reducing compliance costs and those appealing to national development,
could be more effective in increasing compliance. For reasons of limited sample size, this
study was unable to test additional, more specific or combined, treatments. There is much






Table A1: Balance Table - CIT Non-filers
(1) (2) (3) (4) T-test
Control T1 Deterrence T2 Costs T3 Dereg. P-value









































































F-test of joint significance (p-value) 0.98 0.41 0.99
F-test, number of observations 2120 2121 2120
Notes: The value displayed for t-tests and F-tests are p-values. ***, **, and * - 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
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Table A2: Balance Table - PIT Non-filers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) T-test
Control T1 Deterrence T2 Costs T3 Dereg. T4 FE T5 Norms P-value
Variable N Mean/SE N Mean/SE N Mean/SE N Mean/SE N Mean/SE N Mean/SE (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) (1)-(5) (1)-(6)
































































0.17 0.53 0.82 0.36 0.63












0.48 0.57 0.83 0.98 0.33






































0.47 0.18 0.50 0.97 0.19
F-test of joint significance (p-value) 0.81 0.84 0.99 0.99 0.48
F-test, number of observations 15577 15574 15570 15574 15567
Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are p-values. The value displayed for F-tests are p-values. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent critical level.
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Table A3: Balance Table - CIT Nil-filers
(1) (2) (3) T-test
Control T1 Deterrence T2 Dereg. P-value

























































F-test of joint significance (p-value) 0.99 0.98
F-test, number of observations 901 904
Notes: ***, **, and * - 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
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Table A4: Balance Table - PIT Nilfilers
(1) (2) (3) T-test
Control T1 Deterrence T2 Dereg. P-value
Variable N Mean/SE N Mean/SE N Mean/SE (1)-(2) (1)-(3)































































F-test of joint significance (p-value) 0.82 0.88
F-test, number of observations 1443 1442
Notes: The value displayed for t-tests and F-tests are p-values. ***, **, and * - 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
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Table A5: Balance Table - CIT Active
(1) (2) (3) T-test
Control T1 Deterrence T2 FE P-value
Variable N Mean/SE N Mean/SE N Mean/SE (1)-(2) (1)-(3)






































































F-test of joint significance (p-value) 0.85 0.98
F-test, number of observations 2067 2068
Notes: The value displayed for t-tests and F-tests are p-values. ***, **, and * - 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
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Table A6: Balance Table - PIT Active
(1) (2) (3) T-test
Control T1 Deterrence T2 FE P-value
Variable N Mean/SE N Mean/SE N Mean/SE (1)-(2) (1)-(3)













































































F-test of joint significance (p-value) 0.17 0.58
F-test, number of observations 5114 5117
Notes: The value displayed for t-tests and F-tests are p-values. ***, **, and * - 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
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Table A7: Types of Messages from SRA
Notice Channel Content From Timing
1. Annual notice for




A call to all eligible tax-
payers to submit income
tax returns. The message
is comprehensive and in-





Approx. 5 days, but it varies.
Billboards are placed through-




Radio, TV Topical matters such as





Radio once a week; TV - a cer-
tain number of slots are pur-
chased and presentations are
on an ad hoc basis. Mostly it
depends when the need arises.
3. Notice of assessment Letter Advice taxpayer on
the outcome of the
tax assessed and also
mention the right to
object/dispute
DT Immediately upon closure of
the tax assessment. One NOA
per year for each taxpayer.
4. Debt notice Letter, phone
call, physical
visits
Advice taxpayer on the
taxes due
DT (i) Calls 7 days after deadline
(ii) Letters of demand: 7 and
14 days after (iii) Final de-
mand letter 14 days after






PAYE and VAT returns
DT Every month, after deadline.
Site visit for defaulter more
than 5 to 6 times consecutively.
6. Provisional Tax letter Pre-payment of taxes DT Twice a year.
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A2 Main Results
Table A8: Non-filers - Impact on Deregistration Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Compliance costs 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.005 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
De-registration 0.007∗∗ 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Fiscal Exchange 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Social Norm 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.017 0.017 0.026 0.026 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
R-sq. 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.018 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.005
F Joint Test 0.070 0.354 0.442 0.328 0.534 0.573 0.227 0.258
Observations 22550 22425 4231 4106 18319 18319 21058 21058
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indica-
tor variable for having deregistered from the tax system. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All
refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for
individual income taxpayers.
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Table A9: Non-filers - Impact on Log Tax Declared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.013 0.020 -0.016 -0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
(0.024) (0.025) (0.049) (0.050) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Compliance costs 0.010 0.016 -0.087∗∗ -0.091∗∗ 0.063∗ 0.063∗ 0.063∗ 0.062∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.043) (0.044) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
De-registration 0.022 0.028 -0.000 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.024) (0.025) (0.050) (0.051) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Fiscal Exchange -0.003 -0.001
(0.029) (0.029)
Social Norm -0.012 -0.012
(0.028) (0.028)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.125 0.125 0.158 0.158 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123
R-sq. 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007
Observations 22399 22274 4210 4085 18189 18189 20906 20906
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log(tax+1)
declared. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and individual
taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
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Table A10: Nil-filers - Impact on Deregistration Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
De-registration 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.007∗ 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.018 0.003 0.003
R-sq. 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.020
F Joint Test 0.439 0.439 0.844 0.844 0.231 0.231
Observations 3508 3508 1352 1352 2156 2156
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable is an indicator variable for having deregistered from the tax system. All
coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and
individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual
income taxpayers.
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Table A11: VAT discrepancy - Impact on Higher Tax Declared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Non-Active Non-Active Active Active
Deterrence -0.022 -0.005 -0.146 -0.111 -0.016 0.003
(0.040) (0.041) (0.131) (0.133) (0.041) (0.043)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.381 0.381 0.263 0.263 0.390 0.390
R-sq. 0.001 0.011 0.034 0.117 0.000 0.011
Observations 600 600 36 36 564 564
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is an indicator variable for having increased the income tax remitted. All coefficients are
OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of non-active and active taxpayers, Non-
active indicates non- and nil-filers, while Active stands for positive filing taxpayers.
A3 LATE estimates
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Table A12: Nil-filers - Impact on Active Filing Probability - LATE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence -0.004 -0.003 -0.011 -0.013 0.010 -0.004
(0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.064) (0.065)
De-registration 0.008 0.005 -0.007 -0.005 0.038 0.021
(0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.017) (0.069) (0.068)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.168 0.168 0.075 0.075 0.225 0.225
R-sq. . 0.011 . 0.029 0.002 0.017
F-stat 785.73 1840.09 3917.22 3924.23 181.52 452.76
Observations 3508 3508 1352 1352 2156 2156
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable for having filed a non-zero income tax return. All coef-
ficients are LATE estimates where actual exposure to the treatment is instrumented by
the random assignment to it. All refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpay-
ers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
A4 Additional Results
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Table A13: Active - Impact on the Probability to Increase Tax Declared - LATE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.044) (0.044)
Fiscal Exchange -0.023 -0.023 -0.058∗∗ -0.058∗∗ 0.020 0.020
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.044) (0.043)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.300 0.300 0.348 0.348 0.280 0.280
R-sq. 0.001 0.014 0.003 0.012 . 0.017
F-stat 1435.30 3328.82 6483.64 6473.84 483.18 1167.01
Observations 8678 8678 2497 2497 6181 6181
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable for having increased the tax declared compared to the
baseline year. All coefficients are LATE estimates where actual exposure to the treatment
is instrumented by the random assignment to it. All refers to the total of corporate and in-
dividual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income
taxpayers.
Table A14: Active - Impact on VAT outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Filing Filing IHS VAT IHS VAT
Deterrence 0.023 0.024 0.128 0.120
(0.022) (0.022) (0.502) (0.516)
Fiscal Exchange 0.013 0.017 0.269 0.158
(0.023) (0.022) (0.493) (0.507)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of Y 0.843 0.843 6.745 6.678
R-sq. 0.001 0.034 0.000 0.012
Observations 1578 1578 1302 1192
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
All coefficients are OLS estimates. Filing refers to the probability of
filing a VAT return while PIT stands for the VAT amount remitted.
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Table A15: Non-filers - Impact on Number of Past Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.043∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.036 0.032 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018
(0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Compliance costs 0.021∗ 0.003 0.011 0.009 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.011) (0.011) (0.025) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
De-registration 0.038∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.048∗ 0.050∗ 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Fiscal Exchange 0.024∗ 0.024∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Social Norm 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.065 0.065 0.107 0.107 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062
R-sq. 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004
F Joint Test 0.000 0.105 0.250 0.266 0.637 0.685 0.143 0.157
Observations 22550 22425 4231 4106 18319 18319 21058 21058
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a continuous
variable for the number of past (2013-2018) returns filed. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All
refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for
individual income taxpayers.
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Table A16: Non-filers - Impact on E-tax Registration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.014∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Compliance costs 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
De-registration 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗ -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Fiscal Exchange 0.007∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Social Norm -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.014 0.014 0.038 0.038 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
R-sq. 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004
Observations 22550 22425 4231 4106 18319 18319 21058 21058
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable for having registered for the e-tax system. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to
the total of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual
income taxpayers.
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Table A17: Active - Impact on Positive Filing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.008 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Fiscal Exchange 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.012∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Baseline income 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.943 0.943 0.948 0.948 0.940 0.940
R-sq. 0.001 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.013
Observations 8678 8500 2497 2361 6181 6139
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is an indicator variable for having filed a non-zero income tax return. All coefficients
are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers,
CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
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Table A18: Active - Impact on IHS Tax Amounts Declared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence -0.172 0.046 0.065 0.124 -0.260 0.030
(0.167) (0.135) (0.352) (0.321) (0.187) (0.139)
Fiscal Exchange -0.178 -0.100 -0.266 -0.229 -0.143 -0.062
(0.165) (0.133) (0.346) (0.313) (0.186) (0.138)
Baseline income 0.582∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.024) (0.012)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean Baseline 1.87 1.87 1.88 1.88 1.86 1.86
Control Mean Endline 2.01 2.01 1.51 1.51 2.19 2.19
R-sq. 0.000 0.346 0.000 0.171 0.000 0.458
Observations 8504 8422 2370 2308 6134 6114
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is
the tax amount remitted. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total
of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for indi-
vidual income taxpayers.
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A5 Discussion of results
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Table A19: Non-filers - Impact on Filing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.036∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Cluster Town 0.036∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.017∗ 0.017∗ 0.017∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Drop weeks 5-6 0.032∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Compliance costs 0.024∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.007 0.006 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Cluster Town 0.024∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.007 0.006 0.018∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Drop weeks 5-6 0.022∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.005 0.004 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
De-registration 0.024∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.021 0.021 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Cluster Town 0.024∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Drop weeks 5-6 0.025∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Fiscal Exchange 0.012 0.013∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Cluster Town 0.012 0.013
(0.007) (0.007)
Drop weeks 5-6 0.012∗ 0.012∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Social Norm 0.013∗ 0.014∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Cluster Town 0.013 0.014∗
(0.007) (0.006)
Drop weeks 5-6 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
C. Mean 0.069 0.069 0.095 0.095 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067
C. Mean drop week 5-6 0.054 0.054 0.075 0.075 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
R-sq. 0.003 0.016 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.015
F Joint Test 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.027 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.014
Observations 22550 22425 4231 4106 18319 18319 21058 21058
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for having filed
an income tax return. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT
indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
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Table A20: Nil-filers - Impact on Positive Filing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012 0.003 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
Cluster Town -0.002 -0.001 -0.010 -0.012 0.003 -0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.024) (0.023)
Drop weeks 5-6 0.007 0.005 -0.020 -0.014 0.028 0.022
(0.030) (0.029) (0.035) (0.033) (0.042) (0.042)
De-registration 0.004 0.003 -0.006 -0.005 0.012 0.007
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
Cluster Town 0.004 0.006 -0.006 -0.005 0.012 0.006
(0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.025)
Drop weeks 5-6 0.022 0.017 -0.019 -0.016 0.050 0.043
(0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.042) (0.042)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
C. Mean 0.168 0.168 0.075 0.075 0.225 0.225
C. Mean drop week 5-6 0.298 0.298 0.153 0.153 0.404 0.404
R-sq. 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.017
F Joint Test 0.912 0.958 0.830 0.773 0.856 0.924
Observations 3508 3508 1352 1352 2156 2156
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is an indicator variable for having filed a non-zero income tax return. All coefficients are
OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT
indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
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Table A21: Active - Impact on the Probability to Increase Tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.015 0.005 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014)
Cluster Town 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.015 0.005 0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
Drop weeks 5-6 0.018 0.018 0.023 0.025 0.016 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.027) (0.018) (0.017)
Fiscal Exchange -0.011 -0.012 -0.056∗∗ -0.055∗∗ 0.006 0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014)
Cluster Town -0.011 -0.012 -0.056∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.006 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010)
Drop weeks 5-6 -0.008 -0.009 -0.057∗∗ -0.056∗∗ 0.014 0.013
(0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.017)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
C. Mean 0.300 0.300 0.348 0.348 0.280 0.280
C. Mean drop weeks 5-6 0.323 0.323 0.358 0.358 0.308 0.308
R-sq. 0.000 0.014 0.004 0.013 0.000 0.017
F Joint Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 8678 8678 2497 2497 6181 6181
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an
indicator variable for having increased the tax declared compared to the baseline year. All coeffi-
cients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers,
CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
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Table A22: Nudge Impact by Receiving any T
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Panel A: Nil-filers - Prob. to Positively File
Any nudge 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.008 0.008 0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.168 0.168 0.075 0.075 0.225 0.225
R-sq. 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.017
Observations 3508 3508 1352 1352 2156 2156
Panel B: Actives - Prob. to Increase Tax Liability
Any nudge -0.002 -0.002 -0.020 -0.020 0.006 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.300 0.300 0.348 0.348 0.280 0.280
R-sq. 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.017
Observations 8678 8678 2497 2497 6181 6181
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. In panel
A, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for having filed a non-zero income
tax return. In panel B, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for having
increased the tax declared compared to the baseline year. All coefficients are OLS
estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers,
CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
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Table A23: Non-filers - Impact on On-Time Filing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.013∗∗∗ 0.008 0.026∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Compliance costs 0.013∗∗ 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.012∗ 0.012∗ 0.012∗ 0.012∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
De-registration 0.014∗∗∗ 0.008 0.017∗ 0.017∗ 0.011∗ 0.011∗ 0.011∗ 0.011∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Fiscal Exchange 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
Social Norm 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.043 0.043 0.045 0.045 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
R-sq. 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.009
F Joint Test 0.000 0.147 0.066 0.054 0.121 0.111 0.310 0.288
Observations 22544 22419 4226 4101 18318 18318 21057 21057
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable for having filed an income tax return on time (by the date of the deadline). All coefficients are OLS
estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies
only while PIT stands for individual income taxpayers.
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Table A24: Active - Impact on Log Income Declared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All CIT CIT PIT PIT
Deterrence 0.320∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 0.274 0.356∗ 0.307 0.335∗
(0.161) (0.153) (0.258) (0.199) (0.190) (0.188)
Fiscal Exchange 0.120 0.143 0.262 0.093 0.060 0.090
(0.161) (0.152) (0.259) (0.200) (0.188) (0.187)
Baseline income 0.384∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.024) (0.021)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
C. Mean Baseline 5.59 5.59 12.24 12.24 3.00 3.00
C. Mean Endline 9.46 9.46 11.80 11.80 8.55 8.55
Observations 8591 8571 2410 2390 6181 6181
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is log income declared. All coefficients are OLS estimates. All refers to the total
of corporate and individual taxpayers, CIT indicates companies only while PIT stands for
individual income taxpayers.
Table A25: Active - Impact on Log Expenses and Log Deductions Declared (CIT only)
Expenses Expenses Deductions Deductions
Deterrence 0.148 0.253∗ 0.142 0.261
(0.212) (0.152) (0.284) (0.263)
Fiscal Exchange 0.228 0.149 0.166 0.138
(0.212) (0.151) (0.285) (0.261)
Baseline expenses 1.118∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.022)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Control Mean Baseline 12.85 12.85 3.80 3.80
Control Mean Endline 11.68 11.68 3.69 3.69
Observations 2472 2357 2411 2383
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.Expenses indi-
cate the amount of costs declared, while Expenses stand for the amount of deductions.
All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM.
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Table A26: Active - Impact on the Probability to Increase Tax Declared
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Non-targeters Non-targeters
Deterrence 0.008 0.008 0.034∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
Fiscal Exchange -0.011 -0.012 0.008 0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.300 0.300 0.525 0.525
R-sq. 0.000 0.014 0.001 0.006
Observations 8678 8678 4813 4813
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The de-
pendent variable is an indicator variable for having increased the tax declared
compared to the baseline year. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM.
All refers to the total of targeting and non-targeting taxpayers, Non-targeters
refers to the subsample of actives who are not targeting, after I removed the
44% of the actives who are remitting the same tax amount as at baseline.
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Table A27: Active - Impact on the Probability to Increase Tax Declared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Perpetual Perpetual Non-perp. Non-perp.
Panel A: Actives - Prob. to Increase Tax Liability
Deterrence 0.008 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 0.056∗∗ 0.054∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025)
Fiscal Exchange -0.011 -0.012 -0.019 -0.019 0.025 0.026
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.300 0.300 0.323 0.323 0.194 0.194
R-sq. 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.026
Observations 8678 8678 7063 7063 1615 1615
Panel B: Nil-filers - Prob. to Positively File
Deterrence -0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.015 -0.002 0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.029) (0.029)
De-registration 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.030) (0.030)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean of Y 0.168 0.168 0.097 0.097 0.276 0.276
R-sq. 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.010
Observations 3508 3508 2115 2115 1393 1393
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. In panel A, the dependent
variable is an indicator variable for having increased the tax declared compared to the baseline
year. In panel B, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for having filed a non-zero income
tax return. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of perpetual and
non-perpetual taxpayers, Perpetual indicates taxpayers who have been actively filing (panel A) or
nil-filing (panel B) since registration with the authority, while Non-perp. stands for taxpayers who
have alternatively opted for the 3 filing behaviours.
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Table A28: Nudge Impact by Registration Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All First First 2nd+ 2nd+
Panel A: Non-filers - Prob. to File
Deterrence 0.036∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.029 -0.003 0.037∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.034) (0.035) (0.007) (0.007)
Compliance costs 0.024∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.013 -0.021 0.024∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.032) (0.034) (0.006) (0.007)
De-registration 0.024∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.024 -0.009 0.024∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.033) (0.034) (0.006) (0.007)
Fiscal Exchange 0.010 0.013∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.064∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.032) (0.032) (0.008) (0.008)
Social Norm 0.012 0.014∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.007 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.054) (0.053) (0.007) (0.007)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.069 0.069 0.148 0.148 0.064 0.064
R-sq. 0.002 0.016 0.007 0.020 0.002 0.013
Observations 25289 25164 1494 1493 23795 23671
Panel B: Nil-filers - Prob. to Positively File
Deterrence -0.002 -0.002 -0.090 -0.092∗ 0.006 0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.056) (0.055) (0.016) (0.016)
De-registration 0.004 0.004 -0.029 -0.012 0.008 0.006
(0.016) (0.016) (0.059) (0.059) (0.016) (0.016)
Controls No No No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.168 0.168 0.233 0.233 0.161 0.161
R-sq. 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.056 0.000 0.012
Observations 3508 3508 287 287 3221 3221
Panel C: Actives - Prob. to Increase Tax Liability
Deterrence 0.008 0.008 -0.042 -0.053 0.010 0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.067) (0.067) (0.012) (0.012)
Fiscal Exchange -0.011 -0.012 -0.038 -0.053 -0.010 -0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.064) (0.065) (0.012) (0.012)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.300 0.300 0.324 0.324 0.299 0.299
R-sq. 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.020 0.000 0.014
Observations 8678 8678 291 291 8387 8387
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. In panel A, the dependent vari-
able is an indicator variable for having filed an income tax return. In panel B, the dependent variable
is an indicator variable for having filed a non-zero income tax return. In panel C, the dependent vari-
able is an indicator variable for having increased the tax declared compared to the baseline year. All
coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of young and old taxpayers, First year
indicates taxpayers who filed for the first time in the baseline year 2018, while 2nd Year and more stands
for taxpayers who were at their second year of more when they filed in in the baseline year 2018.
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Table A29: Nudge Impact by Urban/Rural Location
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Urban Urban Rural Rural
Panel A: Nil-filers - Prob. to Positively File
Deterrence -0.002 -0.002 0.009 0.009 -0.022 -0.019
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026)
De-registration 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.004 -0.003 0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027)
Controls No No No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.168 0.168 0.233 0.233 0.161 0.161
R-sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.001 0.009
Observations 3508 3508 2167 2167 1341 1341
Panel B: Actives - Prob. to Increase Tax Liability
Deterrence 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
Fiscal Exchange -0.011 -0.012 -0.002 -0.004 -0.027 -0.023
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.300 0.300 0.318 0.318 0.272 0.272
R-sq. 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.020
Observations 8678 8678 5251 5251 3427 3427
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. In panel A, the
dependent variable is an indicator variable for having filed a non-zero income tax return. In
panel B, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for having increased the tax declared
compared to the baseline year. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to
the total of urban and rural taxpayers, Urban indicates non-filers located in urban areas, while
Rural stands for taxpayers are located in rural areas.
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Table A30: Active - Impact on the Probability to Increase Tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Dec. 1 Dec. 1 Dec. 2-10 Dec. 2-10
Deterrence 0.008 0.008 -0.018 -0.018 0.012 0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.038) (0.038) (0.013) (0.013)
Fiscal Exchange -0.011 -0.012 -0.062∗ -0.070∗ -0.005 -0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.038) (0.038) (0.013) (0.013)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.300 0.300 0.384 0.384 0.289 0.289
R-sq. 0.000 0.014 0.003 0.015 0.000 0.014
Observations 8678 8678 971 971 7707 7707
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable for having increased the tax declared compared to the base-
line year. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of small
and large taxpayers, Dec. 1 indicates taxpayers for the top income decile, while Dec. 2-10
stands taxpayers in all remaining deciles.
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Table A31: Nudge Impact by Age (PIT only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All PIT All PIT Young Young Old Old
Panel A: Non-filers - Prob. to File
Deterrence 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.013 0.013 0.030 0.028
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.022)
Compliance costs 0.018∗ 0.018∗∗ -0.004 -0.003 0.039 0.041
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.018)
De-registration 0.009 0.009 0.001 -0.000 0.014 0.016
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.012)
Fiscal Exchange 0.012 0.013∗ 0.002 0.002 0.020∗ 0.020∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Social Norm 0.013∗ 0.014∗ 0.013∗ 0.013∗ 0.018 0.018
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.069 0.071 0.071
R-sq. 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.017 0.002 0.030
Observations 21058 21058 9909 9909 9362 9362
Panel B: Nil-filers - Prob. to Positively File
Deterrence 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.009 -0.000
(0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033)
De-registration 0.012 0.012 -0.004 -0.008 0.029 0.024
(0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033)
Controls No No No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.225 0.225 0.217 0.217 0.241 0.241
R-sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.035
Observations 2156 2156 1065 1065 1011 1011
Panel C: Actives - Prob. to Increase Tax Liability
Deterrence 0.005 0.006 0.023 0.022 -0.013 -0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Fiscal Exchange 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.280 0.280 0.277 0.277 0.283 0.283
R-sq. 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.013
Observations 6181 6181 3124 3124 3021 3021
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. In panel A, the depen-
dent variable is an indicator variable for having filed an income tax return. In panel B, the de-
pendent variable is an indicator variable for having filed a non-zero income tax return. In panel
C, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for having increased the tax declared compared
to the baseline year. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the total of
young and old taxpayers, Young indicates taxpayers who are younger than the median age in the
sample (50), while 2nd Year and more stands for taxpayers who are older than the median age.
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Table A32: Nudge Impact by Civil Status (PIT only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All PIT All PIT Married Married Non-married Non-married
Panel A: Non-filers - Prob. to File
Deterrence 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.020 0.017 -0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Compliance costs 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗ -0.010 -0.009 0.006 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
De-registration 0.009 0.009 0.022 0.021 0.012 0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Fiscal Exchange 0.012 0.013∗ -0.004 -0.007 0.026∗ 0.026∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Social Norm 0.013∗ 0.014∗ 0.023 0.024 0.018 0.019
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.067 0.067 0.084 0.084 0.058 0.058
R-sq. 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.025 0.001 0.025
Observations 21058 21058 6166 6166 5555 5555
Panel B: Actives - Prob. to Increase Tax Liability
Deterrence 0.005 0.006 -0.029 -0.027 0.012 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.033)
Fiscal Exchange 0.006 0.007 0.027 0.027 -0.045 -0.046
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Mean 0.280 0.280 0.296 0.296 0.279 0.279
R-sq. 0.000 0.017 0.003 0.018 0.003 0.045
Observations 6181 6181 2236 2236 1051 1051
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable for having filed an income tax return. All coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. All refers to the
total of married and non-married taxpayers, Married indicates non-filers who are married, while Non-married
stands for taxpayers who are not married.
A6 Figures
Figure A1: PIT vs CIT shares over GDP
Source: ICTD Government Revenue Dataset.
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Figure A2: Deregistrations from the Tax System
308
Figure A3: Experiment Letter
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The main contribution of this thesis consists in a more concrete understanding of which
factors explain tax compliance and how they could be realistically leveraged by resource-
constrained revenue authorities in sub-Saharan Africa. The quest for more knowledge on
taxpayers’ behaviour and for more successful, evidence-based compliance strategies for the
tax administrators to implement is the common thread linking the three studies presented
in this dissertation.
The first study (Chapter 2) explores the impact of the provision of tax education in
building income tax compliance. The context, Rwanda, is one of a low-income country,
where income tax is a key source of revenue but compliance is far from being optimal.
Especially newly registered taxpayers find it difficult to comply with a presumably obscure
tax law – even in terms of filing a tax return. In collaboration with the Rwanda Revenue
Authority, who implemented the Taxpayer Training Programme countrywide, I produce
causal evidence on the impact of such trainings on attendees’ behaviour. By means of
an encouragement design and the combination of survey and administrative data, I show
that attending the training increases the probability to file a return by 43% over the
control group average. While impacts at the extensive margin are positive, non-significant
results are found in terms of tax remitted. As key mechanisms of the impact on filing,
improvements in tax knowledge and complexity perceptions seem to play a major role.
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Also, an alternative educational initiative, a one-to-one coaching service, produces null
results – mostly due to poor implementation from the authority.
The second study (Chapter 3), run in Eswatini, explores the drivers of the decision to file
an income tax return by surveying one thousand entrepreneurs, evenly split between non-
filers and active filers. Both (neoclassical) pecuniary and (morale-based) non-pecuniary
theoretical formulations are tested. In this chapter too, survey data is matched with
administrative data. Dataset matching also allows for the comparison of survey-based,
self-reported measures of compliance with actual filing behaviour. This study shows that
different sets of factors are at work when taxpayers decide whether to file or not: (i)
the threat of audits, (ii) compliance costs, proxied by perceptions on the ease to file and
tax knowledge, (iii) non-pecuniary factors such as peer pressure and intrinsic motivation.
Also, the role of these factors is strengthened when persistent non-filers and persistent
active filers are compared. This study also shows that self-reported compliance is not
necessarily correlated with factors (i)–(iii) above: when regressing the self-reported measure
of compliance, deterrence is no longer important, while the quality of communication with
the authority, as well as not expecting anything in return (somehow in contrast with the
concept of fiscal reciprocity) are significantly affecting compliance.
Lastly, the third study (Chapter 4), always set in Eswatini, represents a method-
ologically more robust way of understanding taxpayers’ behaviour. With a randomised-
controlled trial, I test different theoretical motivations behind evasion by nudging 20,000
income taxpayers. Three different filing categories are drawn from tax records – non-, nil-
and active filers – and nudged with behaviourally-informed mailings from the tax author-
ity. Results indicate that non-filers are significantly responsive to nudges, irrespective of
whether they stress pecuniary or non-pecuniary motives. Nil and positive filers do not
respond to mailings and, in some cases, as with large active companies, they even reduce
their tax liability. If anything, nudges targeting positive filers are effective in impeding
them to fall into nil-filing. Importantly, lots of variation is observed between firms and
individuals and across additional dimensions such as past filing behaviour, location, size
and age of the business.
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5.2 Research and policy implications
This thesis attempted to contribute to the growing literature on public finance and devel-
opment and tried to do so both theoretically and methodologically.
In terms of the theoretical contributions, this work is one of the first in considering the
multidimensional nature of tax compliance, by considering three filing categories – those of
non-, nil- and active filers. These are agents who only in few instances report positive tax to
the fiscus. In the majority of cases, they either fail to file or, when filing, report zero income
and zero tax due. The phenomenon of non- and nil-filers is widespread in SSA but still
insufficient evidence on them has been produced in the literature, which has historically
focused on positive filers. Second, this thesis explores some factors of the taxpayer evasion
decision problem which are still under-researched. Above all, the role of tax knowledge
seems to be pivotal both for newly registered taxpayers (Chapter 2) and the population
of taxpayers – old and new – as a whole (Chapter 3-4), as well as in encouraging both
self-reported and actual compliance (Chapter 3). Relevantly, results are consistent across
countries. Third and relatedly, additional aspects of the taxpayer’s profile are taken into
account. For example, the role of past filing behaviour, largely neglected in the literature,
is explicitly recognised in Eswatini and has important implications for the Rwandan study
on newly registered taxpayers as well, since the training program’s goal was to build a solid
taxpaying habit from the moment in which a new taxpayer enters the tax system.
For what concerns the methodological contributions, this thesis aimed at proposing a
new solution to the intricate problem of measuring tax compliance. All three studies relied
on the combination of survey and a wealth of detailed administrative data - merged with
unique identifiers - a novel approach rarely found in the literature. Also, this approach shed
some light on the inconsistencies inherently involved with self-reports (Chapter 3), which
often are not consistent with actual records on behaviour. As a second important contri-
bution, this effort aimed at showing a successful way of doing tax research in the South, by
setting up a long-term research collaboration with local partners (tax authorities), based
on mutual learning and the in-depth understanding of the local realities.
Last but not least, this thesis has important policy implications. First, it highlighted
the role of scientific research in terms of designing better tax compliance strategies and
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generated a genuine and enthusiastic interest towards research within the partnering tax
administrations. Most importantly, my work with revenue authorities increased my part-
ners’ awareness of the huge potential that can be untapped by an adequately sophisticated
quantitative analysis of the wealth of tax data routinely produced by their IT systems.
Second, the results of this thesis are able to show that revenue authorities should com-
plement their traditional enforcement strategies, usually based on audits and fines, with a
variety of alternative, non-pecuniary, solutions that seem to be equally effective. Among
these solutions, improving taxpayers’ knowledge through dedicated educational initiatives
seems to be the way forward (Chapter 2, 3, 4). Likewise, modernising the communication
strategies is also recommended, especially so in Eswatini, as it may improve both the in-
trinsic willingness to comply (Chapter 3) as well as compliance at the extensive margin,
pushing non-filers to submit tax returns (Chapter 4).
5.3 Limitations and next steps
Despite consisting of completed projects, this thesis has also prompted many plans for
additional analysis and improvements. This is mostly due to the fact that, due to time and
budget constraints, not everything I dreamed to do actually happened in the field. The
fact that the following limitations exist represents an exciting opportunity for developing
more research work in the future:
• Long-term impacts. It is crucial to understand if an intervention fostering com-
pliance has long-lived effects. Needless to say, it takes time to produce evidence on
this. While I found the time to show only some initial and inconclusive evidence on
mid-term effects of the tax trainings in Rwanda (Chapter 2), it is unknown whether
the tax nudge impacts I found in Eswatini (Chapter 4) will persist over time. For
this reason, I am committed to track the experimental sample in the next tax years
and realise whether a one-time input from the authority is enough to generate sus-
tained effects. The same will be done with the Rwandan sample in Chapter 2. The
long-term research collaboration with the two revenue authorities ensures that the
relevant datasets will be shared in the future.
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• Alternative communication channels. Chapter 4 speaks of the effectiveness of
mailings, while it cannot say much about other delivery methods. Ongoing discus-
sions with the SRA are exploring the possibility of using alternative channels, such
as emails and SMSs, to nudge taxpayers. While emails are available for a restricted,
non-representative subsample of the taxpayer population, phone numbers can be de-
rived from all taxpayers. On the one hand, emails can be used to better target nil-
and active filers (they are more likely to have e-mail addresses) to shed more light
on the null/negative impacts of mailings from Chapter 4. On the other hand, SMSs
could be cheaply implemented when targeting non-filers, who are the vast majority
and seem to respond to any nudge from the authority.
• More on nil-filers. Nil-filers still remain a puzzle in the African tax systems. The
limited evidence on them from few countries - mostly in Rwanda and Eswatini, thanks
to the work I contributed to at the International Centre for Tax and Development
- is inconclusive as well. It may seem that they are just legitimately reporting zero
turnover, mostly because they have not been operating since registration. Hence, nil-
filers are not affected by deterrence and do not need to de-register from the system
(Chapter 4). If this is true, the tax administrations should revise their registration
policies, which are often aggressive and aimed at registering as many new taxpayers
as possible even if they are not generating any income. To understand better what
lies behind this behaviour, I plan to run additional qualitative work on this group,
especially through focus group discussions and open interviews. Extra survey data,
to be compared to what gathered in Chapter 3, will be beneficial as well.
• Explore the linkages between registered non-filers and informals. While
I have been able to discriminate between non-filers and active taxpayers in Chap-
ter 3, the open question remains of whether non-filers are more similar to small,
subsistence-level, informal traders (such as street vendors) than to active agents.
Survey evidence from Chapter 3 seems to confirm this conjecture - non-filers perform
poorly in terms of tax knowledge and awareness, direct involvement in the tax sys-
tem and relationship with the revenue authority. Also, they have more traditional
and rudimentary business practices than active payers. Additional survey data can
be gathered from totally informal traders, not registered with the authority, to see
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how comparable they are with their registered, formal counterparts. Robust evidence
on these linkages could inform the revenue authorities on how they should register
new taxpayers. If including informal-like traders into the system does not bring any
benefit, not only in terms of revenue raised but also in terms of filing habits, the
authority should reconsider its registration strategy. Ideally, this could potentially
lead to the institution of a new, simplified tax regime for all informal taxpayers, with
only a fixed, presumptive tax payment required. Much more work should be carried
on in this direction.
• Better understand the differences in compliance between companies and
individuals. As documented in Chapter 4, companies and sole traders differently
react to behavioural nudges. More specifically, companies are influenced by the en-
forcement approach only, while individual businesses react to both hard- and soft-
toned messages. Furthermore, even within incorporated entities, differential impacts
are found depending on the business’ size - top-income decile companies are showing
perverse responses, reducing tax declared. This indicates that the determinants of
the compliance decision of companies and individuals are partially different. Most tax
morale studies are still focused on individual taxpayers, with findings on tax morale
often extrapolated to businesses as well (Prichard et al., 2019). However, businesses,
which are more likely to be larger and more operative than sole traders, may face the
compliance decision more self-interestedly rather than driven by absolute ethical con-
cerns. Companies are likely to be more focused on factors such as the predictability of
business environment, profit maximisation, government investment and competition.
On top of that, companies consist of groups of individuals, often organised within a
well structured and bureaucratic setting, where the intrinsic motivation to comply
of an individual component may significantly diverge from the company’s values and
behaviours. Chapter 4 only produced some preliminary evidence on this understudied
topic and much more work is needed in order to understand what drives compliance
in different kinds of taxpayers.
I trust that I will devote my future work to these key aspects of the tax compliance
conundrum and ultimately improve my understanding of the complexities, challenges and
potentials of the tax systems in sub-Saharan Africa.
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